tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-70054121000058820532024-03-13T10:33:06.897-07:00BountifulEnergyDebunks the arguments of energy decline theorists, peak oil doomers, and others. Argues that energy is abundant.Tomhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18396160316791132955noreply@blogger.comBlogger33125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7005412100005882053.post-17239275349712352632023-11-14T17:52:00.000-08:002023-11-14T19:37:20.368-08:00Oil Remains Abundant<p>Probably a key point of the energy decline movement has been the idea of “peak oil”. The theory has been that oil and gas would imminently decline, leading to catastrophic consequences for civilization, such as collapse. Although this group has a number of different theories (declining net energy, declining EROI, and so on), the primary and central theory of the group has been peak oil. Indeed the energy decline movement (the subject of this blog) was often referred to as the “peak oilers” by the press back in 2008 when the group had publicity. As a result I will discuss the peak oil theory specifically in this post.</p><p>As always, I think the theories of this group are quite wrong, including the peak oil theory. To be sure, oil will peak and decline someday, but that will be caused by high oil prices and a switch to alternatives. We will never “run out” of oil, and its decline will have only modest and barely-noticed effects on society. There are clear substitutes for all usages of oil, and the economy will transition when the time is right. Peak oil will be caused by not needing it as much anymore, not by depletion.</p><p>Not only do I think the group is wrong about the cause and consequences of peak oil, but I also think the group is wrong in their estimates of how much oil remains and the timing of peak oil. The group has often portrayed peak oil as imminent because of depletion, but that is simply not correct, in my opnion. Even if there is only a very gradual switch to alternatives (EVs), oil supplies are adequate for decades. We do not face any kind of energy shortage during the next 50 years, even if the transition to EVs is very gradual.</p><p>In this post I will develop a very simple mathematical model of oil supplies and depletion. I will show that oil supplies are adequate for the next 50 years or so. I should mention that I have no training whatsoever in petroleum engineering or geology. I’m a math/econ sort of guy. However, I’ve noticed that most members of this group (even the thought leaders) have no training in the field either. So it seems fair (to me) to construct an extremely simple model as an amateur, based on very basic math. I will use only a few key facts and very simple math to develop the outline of a basic model.</p><p><br /></p><h3 style="text-align: left;">The Model</h3><p>The first fact to understand is that oil extraction is a process that currently takes many years and has many stages. First, there are petroleum geologists who scour the earth looking for new oil deposits which haven’t been found yet. After which, there is a planning and engineering effort which can last for many years before any oil comes out of the ground in a particular project. At any time, there is a PIPELINE of oil development projects, at various stages of completion. Old oil wells are continuously depleting and being replaced with newer ones. The oil companies manage of pipeline of projects years in advance so new oil wells will come online as old ones deplete.</p><p>At any time, there is a useful figure called the “reserves to production ratio” (henceforth R/P ratio) whcih measures how much oil we have in reserves compared to present usage. Right now, the R/P ratio is about 55, which means that we would have 55 years of oil remaining even if the pipeline discussed above stopped totally and immediately, and no new discoveries were made. Of course, problems would emerge long before the 55 years were up. At some point before the 55 years that we ran out, drilling of new wells could not keep pace with depletion of old ones, and oil production would plummet, probably near the end of the 55 year period.</p><p>It is important to understand that oil production for the world will not follow a Hubbert curve. Individual oil fields may well follow a Hubbert curve, but the world will not. This is because any decline in global oil production increases prices, which causes more furious drilling or other technologies which drive the production of oil back up. For example, an individual oil field may undergo depletion, but operators can then use technologies such as steam injection (injecting steam into the well) which drives production back up. As a result, any tiny decline in global oil production will cause increased prices and increased production, preventing any further decline. The eventual decline in conventional global oil production would happen drastically, at the end of the oil era, when no amount of furious drilling or steam injection could overcome the rapid depletion. </p><p>We mentioned before, that we would have 55 years of oil remaining if we stopped all discovery right now, and didn’t develop any unconventional oil reserves. Probably, oil production would continue as normal for 35 years or so then would suddenly plumment to zero during the last 20 years. Furious drilling of existing reserves and techniques such as steam injection would initially prevent a decline in production. However, depletion of existing wells would grow worse and worse over time, until any amount of drilling or technology could not arrest the decline, leading to a sudden plummet at the end.</p><p>Thus, at present, we face 35 years or so of steadily increasing prices and then sudden crisis. This assumes all discovery ceases right now and no unconventional oil is ever used.</p><p>Of course, we have more time than that. Discovery and development of unconventional resources are ongoing. It is not possible that discovery would suddenly and totally cease, that we would fail to develop any unconventional oil, and so on. Discoveries and development of unconventional resources have been keeping pace with depletion for years. The R/P ratio has remained basically unchanged at higher than 50 since 2010 (https://www.statista.com/statistics/682098/oil-reserves-to-production-ratio-worldwide/). The R/P ratio is the result of exploration and technological advancement by tens of thousands of people in different areas, many years in advance. It’s a statistical phenomenon which follows a smooth curve. It will start declining some day, but it will follow a smooth curve and will not have any kind of sudden discontinuity. As a result, the 55 year figure is a big underestimate of how much oil could ultimately be extracted.</p><p>Here we can begin sketching out the basic parts of a model. Oil is being extracted and thereby depleted. This reduces the R/P ratio over time. On the other hand, there is a pipeline of upstream projects, new discoveries, and development of unconventional oil reserves, all of which increases the R/P ratio over time. These two factors are in competition with each other. Production decreases the R/P ratio and discovery and unconventional development increase the R/P ratio.</p><p>There is a third factor which needs to be taken into account. At present there is a a transition to electric vehicles underway. At present, 18% of new car sales worldwide are EVs. Electric trucks (the tesla semi and others) are starting to come online also. Any construction of EV factories or deployment of EVs pushes to date of oil depletion back into the future and increases the R/P ratio. It represents oil not burned now. If discoveries kept up the pace they have been doing for the last 13 years, but EVs became more widespread, then discoveries would stay constant but depletion would slow down, leading to an <b>increase</b> in the R/P ratio.</p><p>Thus, we have three factors tugging at the R/P ratio: 1) depletion, 2) discovery and unconventional development, and 3) EV adoption. The question is: which factor is winning? What will happen over the next 50 years?</p><p>Let’s make some pessimistic assumptions and see the results. Let’s assume that EV adoption is very gradual, much slower than it has been in the last few years, and it takes a full 50 years for half of vehicles on the road to become EVs (here the word “vehicle” is an abstraction which includes cars and trucks in proportion to their fuel usage. For example, a class 8 truck might count as 8 “vehicles” because it burns so much more fuel). At the same time, all oil discovery slows down drastically, starting now, and only little unconventional oil could ever be extracted, so the additions to oil reserves decline to 0 over the next 50 years. These are highly pessimistic assumptions. What would be the result?</p><p>The result is that the R/P ratio 50 years from now would be 85, which is much higher than today. We start with 34*55 years of oil, which is 1.87 trillion barrels. However, discoveries and development of unconventional oil declines linearly to zero over 50 years, which implies we gain an additional 0.85 trillion barrels (34*50*.5) during that time, so we have a total of 2.72 trillion barrels to use over the next 50 years. At the same time, EV penetration increases linearly to 50%, gradually, so the total amount of oil burned over the next 50 years is only 75% of what was initially expected (34*.75*50). As a result, we burn 1.275 trillion barrels out of 2.72, so are left with 1.445 trillion at the end. Oil consumption is half at that point (EVs constitute 50% of all vehicles then). The end result is an R/P ratio of 85 (1445/(34*0.5)).</p><p>Thus, using very pessimistic assumptions, the R/P ratio INCREASES over time, and the date of exhaustion gets further away. Of course, the R/P ratio won’t really increase to 85 because oil companies will curtail discoveries and curtail development of unconventional resources. Oil companies keep the R/P ratio at 55 as a kind of inventory management, so they will curtail upstream development if it gets too high. Incidentally, the curtailment of discoveries and upstream production has already happened at oil companies, which implies that the date of exhaustion is getting <b>further away</b>.</p><p>I pointed out earlier than we cannot just keep production constant until we suddenly run out. Near the end of the oil era, oil production would suddenly plummet despite furious drilling. Here I will define an R/P of 15 as an oil crisis where oil is imminently plummeting and we must rush to convert vehicles and car factories to EVs. </p><p>Using any kind of assumptions, it is very difficult to reach an oil crisis (R/P of 15) over the next 50 years.</p><p>Let’s try making drastically pessimistic assumptions. Assume it takes 100 years to reach an EV penetration of 50%. Furthermore, all new oil discoveries and all unconventional development drops linearly to zero over only 40 years (not 50). The result is an R/P ratio of 43.4, fully 50 years from now. Such an R/P ratio is still higher than it was in the 1990s. Even using drastically pessimistic assumptions, oil production is quite adequate 50 years from now, and reserves are quite adequate.</p><p>Of course, this has not taken into account the billions of people in China, India, and southeast Asia who wish to start driving and join the middle class, as well as population growth in the developing world. However, those areas are far more densely populated than the USA (which consumes almost 25% of all oil by itself). People there are much more likely to follow the model of Japan in terms of oil consumption, and even that will take many decades. As a result, global oil production has been growing fairly gradually for decades and is only 33% higher than 30 years ago. This factor is obviously greatly outweighed by EV adoption and would not change the above analysis by much.</p><p><br /></p><h3 style="text-align: left;">Conclusion</h3><p>It does not appear that an oil crisis is imminent. No plausible mathematical analysis yields an imminent oil crisis. At least for the next 50 years, and probably much longer, oil supplies are adequate to meet demand.</p><p>I saw a video from Nate Hagens recently showing an imminent drastic drop-off of oil production in the near future. That video made two mistakes, in my opinion. First, it assumed that we are already halfway through our total oil endowment, which is incorrect. Second, it did not mention or take into account EV adoption which is already underway, is growing exponentially, and which pushes out of the date of depletion into the future. When these two factors are included in a basic mathematical model, we see that there is no imminent oil crisis.</p><p>So far, I’ve offered some scenarios which stretch 50 years into the future. I don’t like to predict further than 50 years into the future, or even that far, because technological developments occur which render such predictions useless. For example, almost nobody foresaw, 8 years ago, that the biggest car company by far would be an EV company, that EV sales would be increasing at a rate of about 20% per year, and so on. There have repeatedly been technological developments which start out quite small, but which totally change the long-term trajectory. Thus any long-term projection I would have made would have been FAR too pessimistic because of technological developments. The peak oil movement in particular has frequently been very wrong even 5 years out. As a result, the 50 year estimates indicated above are almost certainly far too pessimistic because they ignore technological developments which are disruptive and which could change the picture completely (for the better) over the next 50 years. This makes it even less likely that we face any kind of oil crisis.</p><p>Finally, all of this is assuming relatively stable geopolitical conditions. It is always possible there will be a nuclear war because of Ukraine or something similar. I have no way of predicting that, or even calculating its probability. However, we do not face any kind of imminent disruption because of oil depletion, no matter what assumptions are made. Fifty years from now, R/P ratios are likely to be similar to what they are now.</p><p>One final thing. Oil is by far the scarcest substance in the world that we use, relative to demand. Nothing else is so concentrated in a single geographical area, so widespread in its usage, and so difficult to substitute. Yet even oil shortages pose no serious problem for the next 50 years. Shortages of other things (like coal and minerals) are MUCH FURTHER AWAY than shortages of oil. Since we don’t face any crisis of oil, we don’t face any crisis of anything else we dig out of the ground either.</p><div><br /></div>Tomhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18396160316791132955noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7005412100005882053.post-49572705161177925632023-06-06T09:28:00.056-07:002023-07-30T10:57:24.394-07:00There is no energy crisis<p>In this post, I will show that we don't face an imminent energy crisis. The idea of an imminent energy crisis is badly wrong for several different reasons, as I'll show below.</p><p>By "energy crisis" I mean running out of energy or some kind of permanent downslope. I am not referring to global warming here, which is a separate issue.</p><p><br /></p><h4 style="text-align: left;">Coal becomes more abundant over time</h4><p>I pointed out, in an earlier article, that Hubbert curves would never have worked for global oil. This is because the extraction of oil and its growth were curtailed, which renders Hubbert curves invalid from that point on. Hubbert curves require <b>constant drilling effort </b>in order to work. However, the Middle Eastern countries curtailed their oil output, starting in the 1970s, in order to increase prices. From that point forward, Hubbert curves would <b>understate</b> the amount of oil remaining in those countries. Curtailment leads to an imminent peak in <b>extraction, </b>but it pushes the date of exhaustion further into the future. For this reason, Hubbert curves have not worked for Middle Eastern countries.</p><p>The situation with coal is similar, but even more so. Coal production in the USA has been curtailed since 1918. As a result, Hubbert curves will <b>drastically</b> underestimate the amount of coal remaining there. This is probably the reason for the vast discrepancy between the USGS estimates of coal and Hubbert curve estimates of the same resource. Hubbert curves will not work in this case, and the USGS estimate is probably right.</p><p>In addition to that, the USA has started curtailing coal production even more severely, starting in 2008. This is because of renewables, and also because fracking drove down the price of gas, leading to a shift towards gas for electricity generation. This decline in coal production pushes out the curve of remaining coal <b>far</b> into the future. The area under the curve remains the same, but the curve is much flatter and wider.</p><p>Here in the USA, we had more than 270 years of coal remaining, as of 2008, according to the USGS estimates (Hubbert curves will not work in this case and would drastically underestimate the amount). However, the amount of coal produced per year declined by 38% between 2008 and 2016, because of declining demand. Thus, the amount of coal remaining 8 years later, at the new lower rate, was not 270 years, but 424 years. Thus we “gained” an additional 154 years of coal in an 8 year period. The decline in demand flattens the curve of remaining resources and pushes it <b>far</b> out into the future.</p><p>As a result, we started off (in 2008) a long way from an energy crisis, and we are going further away from an energy crisis quickly.</p><p>We began the transition to renewables long before coal reached a geological peak. This totally changes the long-term trajectory of coal extraction. Even a gradual 0.5% linear transition to renewables, begun long in advance, will totally change the long-term trajectory. It's like a ship crossing the Pacific Ocean, which diverts its course by one degree at the beginning of the trip. That small diversion at the beginning results in a massive change in where the ship ends up at the end. Even a 0.5% sustained annual conversion to renewables, begun this early, implies that the energy crisis is getting <b>further away </b>over time, and the date for exhaustion of coal is receding into the future. A 0.5% linear transition to renewables implies that we gain more than 1 year of coal usage for every year that passes (435*0.005-1 = 1.175). Since we are converting the energy system to renewables at a much faster rate than 0.5% per year, we are getting <b>much further away </b>from an energy crisis over time. The possibility of an energy crisis -- always remote -- has now passed, and stands no realistic chance of ever occurring.</p><p>There are also "unconventional" coal resources such as underground seams which could be mined using underground gasification. Even if we did nothing to transition to renewables for centuries, it is entirely possible that those unconventional coal resources would then be extracted, just as horizontal fracking was developed and used when necessary. Thus, the estimate of 435 years, indicated above, could be a massive underestimate even if there were no transition to renewables.</p><p><br /></p><h4 style="text-align: left;">Renewables could replace coal very quickly</h4><p>Not only is coal super-abundant, but we could transition to renewables quickly at any time.</p><p>I pointed out in a subsequent article that renewables have a very short doubling time and can grow exponentially and very quickly. Any country could transition entirely to renewables in less than 40 years, using any plausible estimate of EROI and energy payback time, by diverting only a very small amount of its net energy now. As a result, the United States has <b>vastly</b> more time than required to transition to renewables, and is transitioning much faster than required.</p><p>As I pointed out in a previous article, the United States, and all other industrial countries, are <b>curtailing </b>their growth of energy and growth of renewables. This is done for several reasons. First, demand for energy in first world countries is flat. Second, we don't wish to prematurely retire our old energy generators such as gas-fired turbines, before the loan has been paid off. It would be uneconomic and more expensive. However, if we were willing to pay more money, the transition could happen faster than it is happening.</p><p>As a result, even a massive shortfall in coal resources, compared to USGS estimates, could be compensated by an increased exponential growth of renewables. It would cause an unfortunate financial loss, and higher electricity rates for consumers, but it would imply only a very temporary shortfall of energy. Even a 95% reduction in ultimately recoverable coal reserves would still cause a shortfall of less than a decade, and not a collapse of civilization.</p><p>I must also mention that technology continues advancing. The price of solar panels, for example, has dropped by 90% in just the last 15 years. The remaining coal reserves in the USA (435 years) provide a lot of time for further technological development. It is entirely plausible that electricity from solar panels and batteries will become cheaper over time than <b>thermal</b> energy from coal extracted from the ground. At which point, coal is practically useless anyway. And there are other technological developments which could occur in 435 years. Even fusion could be available before then.</p><p><br /></p><p><b>Conclusions</b></p><p>Thus, the idea of an imminent energy crisis is badly wrong, in my opinion, for multiple, overlapping reasons. First, the amount of coal remaining is gigantic, leaving centuries for a transition. Second, the transition is happening far earlier than required, which pushes the end date of coal far into the future, so we are getting <b>further away </b>from an energy crisis over time. Third, we could transition to renewables at any time far faster than is required. <b>Any one</b> of those three things would imply that there is no imminent energy crisis. The United States in particular has a vast excess of energy options for at least centuries, and probably much longer.</p><p>Oil is a different matter. Oil is much scarcer than coal or gas. It’s possible to argue that we are underinvesting in upstream oil development, which will cause a shortfall in the future, leading to high oil prices. Energy in general, however, remains extremely abundant far into the future, and probably forever, until civilization ends for some other reason.</p><p>Of course, many countries have more limited energy supplies than the USA. However, several other countries have similar excessive energy reserves, such as Australia and Norway. Those countries could <b>sell</b> coal to other countries (such as Japan) as they transition to renewables.</p><p><br /></p>Tomhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18396160316791132955noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7005412100005882053.post-57086347145110616522023-05-27T08:58:00.008-07:002023-06-04T13:51:46.987-07:00A Question of Boundaries<p>One of the recurring questions in EROI analysis is where the boundaries should be drawn. How wide do you make the boundaries when calculating energy inputs? Do you include the roads wihch are needed to transport solar panels, for example? Should you include first world salaries of solar panel installers?</p><p>The new net energy metric I introduced in the prior article, and the ensuing discussion, can inform where the boundaries should be drawn.. When calculating a rate of exponential growth, the boundaries for net energy analysis should include the minimum energy investment to replicate an energy gathering device. Let me provide some examples.</p><p>In our scheme outlined in the prior article, energy investments would not include the entire transportation infrastructure or first world standards of living, which would happen after the exponential growth had already occurred. Energy investments would include, however, the energy investment needed to refine oil, in addition to its extraction, because refined oil products (such as diesel) are required to power the machinery to drill new oil wells.</p><p>As another example, refinery losses for oil production would count as an ongoing investment, because the refining doesn’t all need to occur at once before any oil from a well is produced. In this case, it makes no difference if the energy comes from the oil itself, or from some external source, since the effect is the same mathematically in either case. However, self-consumption of coal for underground coal gasification (for example) should simply be ignored and not countaed as an investment at all, since it never needed to be extracted in the first place, so it has no effect on replication time.</p><p>As another exmaple, the roads needed for installing solar panels would count as an energy investment, but any other transportation infrastructure would count as a return. The rest of the transportation network is not necessary for replication and could come after the exponential growth has occurred.</p><p>In this manner, the disagreements over boundaries could be narrowed considerably.</p><p>Of course, these above remarks hold only when calculating a replication time and its effect on economic growth. Another use of net energy metrics is to calculate CO2 emissions. In which case, the boundaries should be drawn differently. When calculating CO2 emissions, self-consumption of cola for underground coal gasification should be counted. Also, first-world transportation (car transportation, for example) to a solar power site should be counted. It depends upon the use to which the metric is being put.</p><p>Net energy metrics are only useful as part of a broader calculation, and the broader calculation informs where the boundaries should be drawn.</p>Tomhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18396160316791132955noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7005412100005882053.post-2564085196426356412023-05-24T14:05:00.054-07:002023-06-11T12:38:00.652-07:00Net Energy and Economic Growth<p>One of the effects of net energy metrics is their effect on economic growth. A higher EROI or lower payback time would enable faster exponential growth, other things being equal. This is because a shorter energy payback time would allow more generations of exponential growth in a given span of time.</p><p>Any energy gathering device (such as a solar panel or oil well) requires an investment of energy now to obtain more energy later. In turn, the output of that energy gathering device allows us to build more such devices in the future. This re-investment over time, across generations of energy gathering devices, is what allows the growth of energy obtained and is one component of economic growth. Net energy metrics determine how much of our net energy we must sacrifice now to obtain more later, and how fast the subsequent growth can occur.</p><p>In this article I will examine the effect of net energy on economic growth. I will introduce a new net energy metric — energy replication time — which can be used to measure the effect of net energy on economic growth. I will also provide some simple mathematical examples, using the new metric, which show the effects of net energy on economic growth. At the end, I’ll describe some of the implications of this new metric.</p><p><br /></p><h3 style="text-align: left;">A New Net Energy Metric</h3><p>As mentioned before, the amount of net energy we obtain is a function of continued re-investment of energy in the past. This continued re-investment of energy, across generations of energy gathering devices, is part of what constitutes economic growth. In order to calculate the rate of growth, for a given sacrifice of net energy now, we must know the replication time of an energy gathering device. After we have determined the replication time, we can plug that number into standard exponential formulas.</p><p>Here we define a new net energy metric, namely Energy Replication Time, or ERT. An ERT can be defined as the upfront energy investment from net ongoing returns. Thus, ERT can be defined as follows: </p><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="text-align: left;">U<sub>i</sub> / (O<sub>r</sub> - O<sub>i</sub>)</p></blockquote><p>where U<sub>i</sub> is an upfront energy investment, O<sub>r</sub> is ongoing power returns, and O<sub>i</sub> is ongoing power investments. For example, if we had solar panels with a 1 megawatt-year initial investment, and 1.1 megawatts of power returned, and 0.1 megawatts of ongoing investments, then the energy replication time is 1 year. A panel would return enough net energy in one year to build another panel like it.</p><p>It is clear that ongoing investments should simply be subtracted from ongoing returns, as above, when calculating the energy replication time. This is because the ongoing returns are diverted to "pay" the energy investment of a subsequent energy gathering device. For example, assume a hypothetical fusion reactor which fires lasers at deuterium to cause fusion. The lasers require 100MW, and the fusion yields 1,000MW. Of course, you could just run a wire from the output of the reactor back around to the input, thereby powering itself. This leaves 900MW to "pay" the the energy investment of the next reactor. As a result, the denominator is simply the gross ongoing returns minus ongoing investments.</p><p>This new metric (ERT) is slightly different from energy payback time (EPBT). Whereas EPBT considers all energy investment (including disposal) as an upfront investment, our new metric (ERT) considers as an upfront investment only the energy needed to construct a new device and start it operating. As a result, ERT cam be plugged into standard exponential formulas whereas EPBT cannot.</p><p>Thus, we have defined a new net metric here, Energy Replication Time (ERT), which is defined as U<sub>i</sub> / (O<sub>r</sub> - O<sub>i</sub>), where U<sub>i</sub> is an upfront energy investment, O<sub>r</sub> is ongoing power returns, and O<sub>i</sub> is ongoing power investments. This metric can be plugged into standard exponential formulas and will determine the amount of growth which can be obtained given a sacrifice of net energy now.</p><div><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: left;">A Few Simple Demonstrations</h3><p>Using this new metric, we can perform some simple mathematical demonstrations. Assume we have a kind of solar panels with an energy replication time (as defined above) of 1 year. If we diverted all of our energy to building new solar panels, the number of panels would double in one year.</p><p>However, that is not exactly right. That would only be correct if the new solar panels were all stored in a dark warehouse until the end of the year, then all suddenly deployed at once. If the solar panels were deployed instantaneously, then the number of solar panels would increase faster than that. A solar panel which is manufactured at the start of the year and deployed right away would start contributing to making new solar panels immediately. The faster the panels are deployed, the faster the growth. </p><p>The exponential base can be calculated using the following formula:</p><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="text-align: left;">(1+1/n)^n</p></blockquote><p>where n is the replication time divided by the average deployment delay. As a result, if the panels are deployed one month after their manufacture, then the number of panels would increase by a factor of ~2.61 every year (because (1+1/12)^12 = ~2.61). Of course, panels which are deployed instantaneously would increase their number by a factor of <i><b>e</b></i> each replication period.</p><p>For the rest of this article, I will assume that solar panels are deployed instantaneously. This is a theoretical upper bound of the rate of growth for a given replication period.</p><p>Using the formulas outlined above, we can perform some simple calculations of economic growth.</p><p>Suppose we have panels with an energy replication time of one year. We wish to increase the number of panels by a factor of 100. If we devote all the energy returned to building new panels, how long would it take to increase the number of panels by 100x? The answer is ln(100), or 4.6 years.</p><p>Of course, that estimate is theoretically possible, but wildly unrealistic, for several different reasons. No civilization would devote all of its current energy to investment, for example.</p><p>Let’s suppose a civilization diverts 1% of its net energy to building new solar panels continuously, in addition to the energy investment it was already making. In which case, how long would it take to increase the total number of panels by a factor of 100x? The answer is:</p><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="text-align: left;">ln(100 * (100/1) )</p></blockquote><p>… or 9.21 years, with an initial investment of 1%. However, this estimate is still very unrealistic. While theoretically possible, the vast majority of those new panels would be built in the final year. There would be a sudden onrush of panels in the final year until we obtained 100x as many, as per our goal, and then few would be needed for a long time. That would require building many solar panel factories which operated for less than one year then shut down. It would also require retiring all of our coal fired plants (or whatever we were using previously) in a single year, many of them prematurely. It would also probably require diverting much the workforce to installing solar panels for less than a single year, which would be very disruptive.</p><p>Instead, let's try installing new solar panels at a constant higher rate. We'll spread out the new solar panels over a period of 25 years, which is the lifetime of a solar panel, and also of a factory. In which case, the solar panels are phased in gradually.</p><p>In which case, we can divide our growth into two phases. First, we have a period of exponential growth, during which an initial investment is grown to an amount sufficient to manufacture additional panels at a new higher rate. Second, the output from those panels could power the manufacture of additional panels at a new, constant, higher rate.</p><p>Let’s try another simple mathematical example. Assume a hypothetical civilization which obtains 1GW continuously from solar panels now (drawing from batteries at night). We wish to increase our energy obtained by 100x. In which case, we must install solar panels that return 4GW continuously, each year, for 25 years (4*25=100). Furthermore, we are willing to divert only 1% of our net energy now to initiate the growth. <b>How long </b>of a delay is there before the 1% initial investment can be grown exponentially in order to power the solar panel factories continuously and produce new panels at the higher rate for 25 years? The answer is ln(400), or 5.99 years.</p><p>Here we have a more realistic example. We start by building new solar panel factories capable of producing panels that return 4GW continuously per year. We assume that the new factories take 7 years to construct. We then divert 1% of our net energy now to making new panels. During the first phase, the output of all the new panels is continuously re-invested to making more panels, enabling exponential growth. This intermediate phase would last 5.99 years. After which, we can manufacture new panels at a constant higher rate, of 4GW per year, leading to 100x more energy obtained after 25 years. Most of the time, the panels are manufactured and deployed a constant higher rate. </p><p>Thus, if we wish to increase the amount of energy we obtain each year from solar panels by a factor of 100, but do so in a non-disruptive way, it would take a total of 7+5.88+25 years, or 37.88 years. It would take 7 years to build additional solar panel factories (assumed), 5.88 years of exponential growth during which the initial 1% investment is continuously re-invested, then 25 years of manufacturing panels at the higher constant rate. At the end of the 37.88 year period, our hypothetical civilization would obtain 100x as much power continuously as originally, by sacrificing 1% of its energy for 5.88 years. Presumably, we would stagger the building of solar panel factories so they would come online exactly when the panels to power them were installed.</p><p>We could also perform a basic calculation of how long it would take to replace our current energy system. Suppose we discover that we have a total of 21 years remaining of all coal, oil, gas, and uranium. We’re willing to invest only 1% of our current net energy for 5 years or less to building a replacement energy system of solar panels. No solar panels have been deployed so far, and no panel factories exist. Will we be able to replace our current energy system entirely before running out of fuel? The answer is <b>yes</b>, but barely. It would take 33.9 years (7+1.39+25), using the assumptions above (the term of 1.39 is how long exponential growth of 1% must continue to produce 100%/25 each year). However, during the final 25 years, the energy from fossil fuels would decline linearly to zero, so fossil fuel usage would average only half during that period, so only 12.5 years of fossil fuel usage during that period, so 20.89 years total (7+1.39+12.5) of fossil fuels would be required to replace our current energy system.</p><p>It must also be mentioned that the energy investment for disposal has been omitted here. The above calculations would only be correct if we simply abandoned old solar panels and did nothing to dispose of them. This factor is omitted because it considerably complicates the calculations above. However, it is clear that disposal is an extremely minor factor under any regime of exponential growth, because the disposal would happen 25 years after the initiation of growth (assuming solar panels or other energy gathering devices last 25 years).</p><p><br /></p><h3 style="text-align: left;">Conclusions</h3><p>From the above, we can draw a few preliminary conclusions.</p><p>First, the payback time of solar panels is already short enough to enable extremely rapid exponential growth. We could also undergo extremely rapid exponential growth with any other common source of energy, such as coal, gas, oil, uranium, and so on, because they all have payback times shorter than solar PV.</p><p>Second, we are <b>curtailing</b> the exponential growth of energy because of insufficient need. The rest of the economy does not grow anywhere near that fast. We can already grow our energy supply quickly enough for any reasonable anticipated need.</p><p>Third, the important energy replication time is for solar panels in a desert near the equator, such as the Sahara or northwest Australia. This is because the panel factories, and the panels to power them, could be located there. As a result, the exponential growth could occur there (over only a few years) and then the resulting panels could be exported elsewhere. The rapid exponential growth would occur regardless of the net energy performance elsewhere, and the export of panels would happen after the exponential growth had occurred. It is mathematically obvious that it does not matter much what the net energy performance is of the panels located elsewhere, as long as it remains above a very low level (like low single digits). Even an EROI of lower than 3 for those panels would be perfectly tolerable when considering the amount of energy generated and how quickly we could grow our energy supply.</p><p>Fourth, there is no energy crisis. Even if fossil fuels declined to zero over only a few decades, there would still be enough time to replace them with renewables.</p><p>In conclusion. We have introduced a new net energy metric in this article: Energy Replication Time (or ERT). ERT is defined as the upfront investment from net ongoing returns for any energy gathering device (such as solar panels). It was shown that the replication time of solar PV is already short enough to enable rapid exponential growth. As a result, no energy crisis will ever occur. Further improvements in net energy for solar PV (or any other energy source) would have only modest benefits.</p><p><br /></p>Tomhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18396160316791132955noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7005412100005882053.post-42629147620843785302023-04-10T15:52:00.012-07:002023-04-12T14:01:15.656-07:00Oil is easily substituted, and ultimately not important<p>One of the main claims of the energy decline movement is that oil is somehow an irreplaceable source of energy. Oil somehow has remarkable energy density or other properties which render it a special source of energy that cannot be replaced by anything else.</p><p>That point of view is badly wrong, in my opinion. Oil has many easy, obvious substitutes which cost about the same or less. Oil has obvious substitutes for <b>all </b>of its uses. Some of those substitutes would take several decades to implement (we can't all switch to EVs tomorrow, for example). However, all of the substitutes are easy and straightforward for an industrial economy.</p><p>In this article I will outline the substitutes for oil, for all of its uses.</p><p>Right away, I must point out that more than 60% of oil usage is for light-duty vehicles (cars and SUVs) which can be easily replaced by EVs[1]. Another 15% is used for delivery vans and heavier trucks which travel less than 300 miles per day, which can also be easily electrified. Thus, we can simply use battery-electric vehicles for more than 75% of oil usage. Thus, most of the problem has an extremely obvious solution which is already widespread.</p><p>Railroads and long-haul trucking can be electrified using overhead wires. Most of the railroad tracks in the world already have overhead wires. Similar wires could be installed over a few key highways in the United States and elsewhere, thereby placing every populated location within 300 miles of an overhead wire, and therefore within the range of battery-electric heavy trucks such as the Tesla Semi. Railroads and long-haul trucks represent another 10% of oil usage, bringing the total for electrified transport to 85% so far.</p><p>The remaining terrestrial vehicles include buses, ferries, construction equipment, agricultural machinery, and mining equipment. All of those vehicles travel back and forth to the same location throughout the day or operate in a small area continuously throughout the day. As a result, they can all use battery swapping.</p><p>Finally, ships and airplanes can use synthetic methane. Methane is the main component of natural gas. It is easy to make methane using renewable electricity, water, and the Sabatier process. This has already been done on an industrial scale for many decades and was first discovered more than a century ago. It has always been easy to make methane. This one thing by itself is an obvious substitute for all uses of oil. Vehicles like ships, trucks, and so on, can just use a compressed methane tank and their existing internal combustion engines (with slight modifications). Where I grew up, in the SF Bay Area, there have been methane-powered garbage trucks, taxis, and buses for decades.</p><p>There has <b>always been </b>an easy, drop-in substitute (synthetic methane) for all uses of oil. We could have switched to synthetic methane at any point. It was not price-competitive with diesel until recently, but if we were willing to pay today's higher fuel prices then we could have switched to synthetic methane at any time. Thus, the idea that oil is somehow irreplaceable is clearly not correct. The transition to synthetic methane would have been easier than the transition to EVs because existing car designs and production lines could have been used.</p><p>Thus, there are multiple, overlapping substitutes for all uses of oil. Almost all of the substitutes are a similar price or lower than oil is at present.</p><p><br /></p><p>[1] https://www.otherlab.com/blog-posts/us-energy-flow-super-sankey</p><p><br /></p>Tomhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18396160316791132955noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7005412100005882053.post-51715441307987281292021-07-25T12:03:00.002-07:002021-07-26T09:44:56.099-07:00Railroads to the Rescue!<p><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;">One of the main claims of the Energy Decline movement is that trucks will suddenly stop running once diesel becomes scarce. </span><span style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;">There was a book written about this problem, entitled <i>When Trucks Stop Running</i>.</span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Since that time, battery-powered trucks have been introduced by Tesla and other manufacturers and are commercially available now.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;">The problem with battery-powered trucks is that they have a 200 mile range or so. That range is insufficient for long-haul trucking. However, </span><span style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;">that range <b>IS SUFFICIENT</b> if we use inter-modal transportation. I am proposing that we could switch some of the truck traffic to rail as diesel becomes scarcer. Instead of using long-haul trucking, we would use short-haul trucks to deliver the cargo to the nearest railroad, and then use other short-haul trucks to deliver the cargo from the railroad to its destination. In which case, the range of battery-powered trucks is sufficient.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;">Take a look at <a href="https://www.mapsofworld.com/usa/usa-rail-map.html">this map</a> of the railroad network in the United States. You will notice that almost everybody lives within a 200 </span><span style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;">mile radius of a railroad. There are some rural areas in Nevada, Idaho and Wyoming which are not within 200 miles. However, those areas are extremely sparsely populated, consisting of very small towns spread far apart. I would estimate that approximately 99.9% of the population of the continental US lives within 200 miles of a railroad (the proportion is certainly higher in Europe and Asia, which are more densely populated). The one major exception is western Florida, but a railroad could be built there if necessary.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Thus, we could simply switch modes of transportation and use rail more often. A combination of current railroads and 200-mile trucks is sufficient to reach almost everywhere in the country.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Railroads do not require diesel for their propulsion. About 30% of the railroads in the world are powered by overhead electricity lines, and many countries have electrified their entire railroad networks in less than 20 years.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The only reason long-haul trucking is used at all is because it’s often cheaper than using trains part of the way. If you want to use a train part of the way, then you must drive the truck to the nearest railroad, offload its cargo onto a train, offload the cargo from the train and back onto another truck, then drive that truck to its final destination. The added step of loading and offloading takes time and money. Oftentimes, it’s cheaper just to drive a truck the whole way. Furthermore, the route is sometimes more direct by just driving a truck the whole way.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">However, that calculus changes when diesel is more expensive. Suddenly, it becomes cheaper to use rail part of the way despite the additional step of loading and offloading. As a result, long-haul trucking could become much rarer as diesel becomes more expensive.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Of course, there are a few rare circumstances where long-haul trucks would be irreplaceable. Think of those isolated towns in rural Nevada. In those rare cases, we could use biofuels or synthetic fuels for long-haul trucking. I would estimate that less than 0.01% of freight delivery in this country is not amenable, at all, to rail or inter-model transport. Although biofuels couldn't scale up to power everything, they could certainly scale up to power those rare cases.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Finally, I should point out that the industrial revolution and first-world countries were built using railroads, not trucks. Back in 1910, the US had a railroad network about 3x longer than today, and long-haul trucking was non-existent. Anything possible in 1910 is still possible now. Long-haul trucking is not really necessary at all. I once lived in a tiny isolated town of a few hundred people, which still had an old railroad depot (long since abandoned). This is common almost everywhere in rural America.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Thus, the solution to diesel becoming more expensive is to use electrified rail more often.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">All of this assumes that hydrogen fuel-cell trucks are impossible, as was widely assumed in the energy decline movement (<a href="https://energyskeptic.com/2019/hydrogen/">here</a>). However, long-haul fuel-cell trucks were introduced late last year and Hyundai is scaling them up. In which case, long-haul trucking could continue without diesel.</span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></p>Tomhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18396160316791132955noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7005412100005882053.post-18798148292192409312021-07-25T11:02:00.013-07:002021-08-07T10:58:14.064-07:00Response to Pump Up The Storage<p><span style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">In this article I will briefly respond to Dr Murphy’s article entitled <a href="https://dothemath.ucsd.edu/2011/11/pump-up-the-storage/">Pump Up The Storage</a>. In that article, Dr Murphy shows, through straightforward calculations, that pumped hydropower storage is nowhere near sufficient to compensate for the intermittency of renewables. He assumes that renewables need 7 days of backup power to compensate for prolonged overcast wind lulls. He then calculates the amount and size of dams necessary to provide 7 days of storage and finds that it would take triple the annual concrete used in the United States and would be much larger than any construction project completed so far. As a result, Dr Murphy concludes that it would be impossible, or at least very difficult, to use pumped hydro storage to compensate for the intermittency of renewables.</span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">In his article, Dr Murphy provides all kinds of calculations and physics. However, he makes some assumptions too. In this article, I will make different assumptions and see the results.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">First and foremost, I will assume we use a combination of storage mechanisms. I will assume that we use pumped hydropower for the first 12 hours of storage (nighttime) so that solar power is essentially a 24-hour energy source on sunny days. Of course, this would not be enough for long overcast periods. For longer periods of storage, hydrogen would be used. As a result, I will assume 12 hours of pumped hydro storage, not 7 days, which means only 1/14th the amount of storage is required from pumped hydro. I will address the inefficiency of hydrogen later.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">It makes no sense to use a single form of storage for all purposes. Instead, storage would be divided into short-term and long-term solutions. The short-term storage is used every single night, so we would use a more expensive, smaller, and more efficient form of storage for that (like pumped hydro). The long-term storage is used only occasionally but is prolonged, so we would use a less efficient form (like hydrogen) which allows large volumes of storage.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Second, I will assume that the dam size needs only to be 5% of the size which Dr Murphy assumes. In his simple physics model, Dr Murphy proposes constructing a dam right through the <b>middle</b> of the reservoir. This is never done in practice. A simple physics model will not suffice here. We need to dig into the details of dam construction and siting. Dams are not built haphazardly. Instead, a crew of surveyors will spend years finding a naturally-occurring “choke point” or narrow section between mountains or in a valley. For example, the Hoover Dam is not built through the middle of Lake Mead. Instead, it is built in a tiny choke point, so it's much narrower. </span></span><span style="font-family: inherit; font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;">I obtained the figure of 95% narrower by looking on Google Maps, observing the three largest dams in North America (Daniel Johnson, Hoover, and Glen Canyon) and then estimating the width of the dam versus the width of the reservoir using a ruler. Those three dams would be more than sufficient by themselves for 12 hours of storage for the whole country.</span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><br /></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Next, I will assume that electrification reduces total energy demand by approximately 50%. Electric vehicles, heat pumps, and so on, are far more efficient than their fossil fuel counterparts. For example, an electric vehicle travels almost triple the distance per unit of energy as a gasoline-powered car. As a result, I will assume a 50% reduction in energy usage from electrification.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Finally, I will assume that the dams are built in a staggered fashion over 50 years. Dr Murphy calculates that it would take triple the annual concrete production in the United States to build his dams. However, the dams wouldn’t all be constructed in a single 3-year period.</span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">If we use the assumptions above, then the dams would take 0.01% of concrete production continuously (3/50/20/14/2 = 0.01%). This would be sufficient for 12 hours of storage for the whole country, until the sun comes up again.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Incidentally, far more dams have already been constructed than would be needed for this purpose in North America. It would be necessary to increase the maximum <b>power</b> of those dams by adding turbines. However, the size of the dams is already sufficient.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">I should also point out that we could use any combination of short-term storage technologies, including pumped hydro, compressed air, sodium-sulfur batteries, iron-air batteries, flow batteries of various chemistries (vanadium, iron, organic, and others), pumped heat, gravimetric, and others. Storage is only an unsolvable problem if <b>all</b> of the above solutions combined are insufficient. However, it appears that any <b>one</b> of these solutions by itself is sufficient to provide our 12-hour short term storage.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Finally, this scheme relies upon a long-term form of storage also (hydrogen). This kind of storage is necessary to keep the lights on during prolonged wind lulls when it’s also overcast in the desert. Dr Murphy points out in another <a href="https://dothemath.ucsd.edu/2011/09/got-storage-how-hard-can-it-be/">article</a> that hydrogen has large round-trip energy losses, so he subsequently dismisses it. However, those large round-trip losses would be incurred only occasionally. Periods when it’s overcast in the desert, and there’s no wind in Texas, are fairly rare. Whereas nighttime happens every single day (and would use our efficient storage above), overcast wind lulls happen only a few times per year. Let's assume that 10% of total energy comes from hydrogen storage with a 67% round-trip energy loss. In which case, it would be necessary to overbuild our solar and wind farms by 20% (0.9+0.1*3) to generate enough hydrogen the rest of the time to cover those periods. This compares with coal power plants which use steam turbines and lose 60% of their energy as waste heat all the time, so the coal mines had to be overbuilt by almost triple to keep the coal power plants running.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">In conclusion, it appears to be relatively easy to compensate for the intermittency of renewables. The trick is to find an optimal combination of locations and storage technologies. It cannot be done using a simple physics model of a single solution. We must try various things in combination to find something which works. Once this is done, it becomes clear that a renewable future is totally feasible and (in fact) fairly straightforward using currently-available technologies.</span></span></p>Tomhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18396160316791132955noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7005412100005882053.post-26646788781621381032021-07-20T14:07:00.004-07:002023-12-16T22:21:49.484-08:00More on battery-powered tractors<p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">In this article, I intend to continue my prior article and drill down on some of the details regarding battery-powered tractors. I'll fill in some missing details. It will be detailed and boring.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">I had a few additional ideas to refine my last article. These ideas would maximize the number of useful recharge cycles and minimize battery size, keeping battery costs down and earning additional money. Also, there are some ideas to minimize the distance driven by the tractor. And there are some other ideas. If all these things are implemented, I believe this idea could be cheaper than operating tractors on diesel, at current prices.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">In order to keep battery costs down, it is necessary to use the batteries as many cycles as possible before they expire due to calendar life. Batteries expire after a certain time period (like 10 years). </span></span><span style="font-family: inherit; font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;">We must maximize the number of useful cycles during that time period, because the upfront purchase price is a sunk cost and we must get as much usage as we can. This would be done in several ways.</span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">1. The same battery trays could be used for the combine harvester also, and for other agricultural machinery. The same algorithm would be used to power the harvester across the field. Different pieces of agricultural machinery are used at different times (for example, the harvester is used in the Fall). As a result, the same batteries could be swapped between different pieces of equipment, using the same forklift.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">2. The batteries could fast recharge during the day, while the tractor is operating, and thereby be recharged and used twice in one day. This halves the number of batteries we would need.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">3. The area of the field in the diagrams above must be increased by a factor of 21. The tractor will then take 21 days (a typical planting season) to complete the entire field. The tractor would stop at night and the batteries would recharge. The battery swapping idea will still work as long as the tractor returns to the right-hand edge of the field more than once during a single day.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">4. The same batteries could feed electricity back into the grid and be used for peak shaving the rest of the year. The recharging station on the farm would need an inverter to feed power back to the grid. This could cycle the batteries even more and earn the farmer additional money, thereby paying for the batteries.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Electricity peaks are much higher during the hot months of June, July, and August. However, the planting and harvesting seasons are in Spring and Fall. Thus, they do not overlap. This would allow the batteries to be used for planting during April or May, peak shaving in June, July, and August, and harvesting later, for example.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">As a result, each battery would recharge twice per day for 21 days each of planting, fertilizing, and harvesting. I'll assume the batteries are used to shave peaks 40 times during the summer and are discharged almost completely during those 40 times. Thus, each battery would undergo 1,660 recharge cycles over 10 years. If we assume a battery cost of $100/kwh, then the price of batteries per kwh delivered is 6 cents (100/1660). That price is way below the cost of peak generators, and that price plus the price of electricity is<b> </b>below the price of diesel. As a result, this idea is cost effective and would be modestly cheaper than what is done now.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The price of the battery trays would be on the order of $150,000 every 10 years. This compares with a total price for tractor, harvesters, and so on of $600,000 or so, which also last about 10 years (the engines run continuously near the top rated horsepower for 4000 hours). Thus, the batteries would add 25% more cost than just buying a tractor and harvester. However, that additional cost would be offset by the farmer being paid for peak shaving, and also savings on fuel costs.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Overall, this idea could be slightly cheaper than using diesel at current prices.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><h2 style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: small;">A few additional ideas</span></span></h2><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Instead of the forklift going back and forth to the recharge station every swap, the forklift could bring 4 battery trays at once to the general area where 4 swaps would take place. There could be a covered raised shed for swaps so the batteries don't need to be left on the ground. Each shed could have a stack for fresh battery trays and another for depleted. This would minimize forklift driving. For example, there could be 8 sheds along the right side of the field in diagram above, and the forklift removes 4 spent batteries from the shed when necessary, takes them all at once to the recharging station, and then takes 4 fresh batteries from the recharging station to the next shed. The individual swaps then involve only driving to the nearby shed and back. The farmer would drive 4 fresh batteries to a shed, operate the tractor, stop periodically on the right hand side of the diagram, remove the depleted tray, place it in the nearest shed, take a fresh battery from that shed back to the tractor, and so on. When the shed has nothing but depleted batteries, the farmer drives all 4 trays back to the recharging station and drives 4 fresh trays from the recharging station to the NEXT shed.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The electrodes to recharge the battery trays can be way up some round holes in the bottom of the trays. The batteries are recharged using poles which stick up the holes on the bottoms of the trays and have electrodes on the ends. The holes close automatically using spring loaded plastic doors. In that manner, the electrodes are not exposed to rain or debris.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Of course it would be possible to optimize the size of the batteries, the number of battery trays, the number of swaps, the number of sheds, and so on.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Similar battery swapping ideas could be used for mining dump trucks, which also return to the same location over and over again. Similar ideas could also be used for ferries, shuttle buses, and so on.</span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Minor update 2023-01-18: Of course it would be possible to have only two small batteries, and to swap back and forth between them. This might be the most economical thing. If the farmer needs to run an electrical line to his field anyway, it would cost very little extra to run a higher voltage line. This implies that the tractor couldn't recharge overnight.</span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Minor update 2023-12-16: The forklift which delivers the batteries to the tractor could be automated and could be a robot with no human operator. Since the task involves incredibly simple and repettitive movements, it seems like the most obvious thing is for the forklift to be automated and have no human operator.</span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;">I think the optimal solution is to use an automated forklift and only two batteries. When one battery is being used, the other is being recharged. This reduces to the total battery cost. The energy density of the batteries is less important since the batteries are frequently swapped. As a result, it would be possible to use cheaper batteries (such as sodium-ion batteries) with lower energy density.</span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;">I think the optimal solution might be to use only two cheaper sodium-ion batteries with an automated forklift.</span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;">This solution would almost certainly be cheaper than diesel tractors are now, but for one impediment. I don't know how expensive it would be to run an 960v electrical line to a shed at the edge of the field. This would require wooden poles, an aluminum cable, and a transformer for where the cable attaches to the power grid.</span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></p>Tomhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18396160316791132955noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7005412100005882053.post-41165013799382411382021-07-13T13:34:00.008-07:002021-07-28T13:09:05.243-07:00Tractors can easily run on batteries<p><span style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Recently I saw a new book released by the Post Carbon Institute, entitled <a href="https://www.postcarbon.org/publications/the-future-is-rural/">The Future is Rural</a>. In that book, the author claims that everyone must relocate to the countryside because Peak Oil is near, and the tractors will stop running. According to the book, tractors cannot possibly run on anything other than liquid fossil fuels, so they will stop running fairly soon. We need to go back to farming by hand. Here is a quote from the book:</span></span></p><blockquote><p>Farm equipment tends to operate near its horsepower capacity, whereas a car might only work near capacity when accelerating into traffic now and then. Hydrocarbon liquid fuels are the only known substances with enough energy density that can be carried easily onboard a tractor under typical working conditions and enable work to be performed continuously for many hours (pp 12).</p></blockquote><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><br /></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Similar sentiments are echoed repeatedly within the energy decline movement. One of the core beliefs of that movement is that industrial agriculture will soon end, because of peak oil, and we'll need to revert to farming by hand.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">It’s worth pointing out, right away, that tractors could easily run on alternative fuels like methane, ammonia, or hydrogen. One tractor manufacturer (New Holland) has already been preparing for several years to manufacture methane-powered tractors, and is releasing a methane-powered model for regular purchase later <b>this year</b>. Methane can easily be produced using renewable electricity and the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sabatier_reaction">Sabatier process</a>, which has been in widespread use for more than a century. Ammonia and hydrogen are other chemical fuels which can be produced using renewable electricity and can be used to power tractors. A hydrogen-powered tractor is already in use (although it’s a <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-06/16/c_139143895.htm">prototype</a>). The notion that tractors can only run on liquid fossil fuels is therefore clearly wrong.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">However, decline theorists also argue that tractors cannot possibly run on batteries, either. The batteries would weigh too much for the tractor to carry. Tractors run all day continuously, and they run near the top rated horsepower for the entire time. As a result, they have enormous fuel consumption. Batteries do not have sufficient energy density to power tractors. The batteries needed to power a tractor all day (and near the top rated horsepower) would be too large and heavy to fit on the tractor. Most of the energy would be spent carrying the batteries themselves.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">For example, I looked up a typical tractor <a href="https://www.deere.com/sub-saharan/en/tractors/row-crop-tractors/row-crop-7-family/7r-210-tractor/">here</a>, and found it has a fuel tank of 135 gallons. Diesel weighs about 7 pounds per gallon, so the weight of the fuel is 945 pounds. A lithium-ion battery weighs about 100x more than diesel for the same energy (see <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_density">here</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lithium-ion_battery">here</a>), however batteries are about 3x as efficient as small diesel engines, so the battery needed to replace 135 gallons of diesel fuel in that tractor would weigh 31,185 pounds (135*7*100/3). That is more than the weight of the tractor! As a result, tractors cannot run on batteries.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;">However, in this article, I will demonstrate that tractors can easily run on batteries. It can easily be accomplished using battery-swapping.</span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The convenient thing about tractors is they don’t travel in a straight line. Instead, they zig-zag across an agricultural field, like this:</span></span></p>
<pre>--->--->--->--->
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<---<---<---<---
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--->--->--->--->
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<---<---<---<---
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<p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">(Apologies for the ASCII art).</span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">You will notice that the tractor repeatedly returns almost to the same location, over and over again throughout the day. This allows us to use much smaller batteries on the tractor and swap the batteries on occasion. If this were done, then the energy density of batteries is more than sufficient to power a tractor all day.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">I am proposing a new idea of battery swapping for tractors. I suggest that the battery for a tractor be divided into 32 smaller batteries. This is easy to do, because the batteries for EVs consist of many individually-packaged 2860 cells. So the battery for a tractor could be divided in to 32 smaller batteries which are packaged in removable battery trays. Those trays could be swapped using a forklift. The batteries would all recharge overnight. The forklift is also battery-powered. When the battery in the tractor is running fairly low and the tractor approaches the right-hand side of the diagram above, the forklift takes a new battery tray to the tractor and swaps out the old battery tray. The forklift ends up traveling only a fairly short distance throughout the day, because the tractor returns to the right-hand edge of the field repeatedly anyway, and the forklift meets it there.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Here is another ASCII art diagram:</span></span></p>
<pre>--->--->--->--->
| #
<---<---<---<--- |
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--->--->--->---> |
| *
<---<---<---<--- |
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</pre>
<p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The tractor follows the zig-zag pattern on the left, but the forklift only travels up and down the vertical bar on the right. The forklift meets the tractor at the hash marks. The batteries are stored in a small shed at the asterisk, which has a 480 volt recharger.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">During each swap, the forklift will carry the depleted battery from the last swap (which had been left on the ground temporarily) to the recharging station, obtain a new battery, drive back to the tractor, remove the old battery from the tractor and set it on the ground, then install the new battery.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Of course, this does add a small additional energy expenditure. The forklift needs to travel back and forth along the right-hand edge of the diagram above, in order to accomplish the battery swapping.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Let’s calculate how far the forklift needs to travel, and how much energy is consumed by doing so. We’ll assume a hypothetical farm which has a square plot of land. The tractor must zig-zag throughout the entire plot of land during a single day. If it takes more than one day, then the tractor could recharge overnight, so we’ll assume that one day is the maximum energy expenditure between recharging. We’ll assume that the width of the agricultural machinery dragged by the tractor is 1/200th the width of the plot of land (this number is realistic), so the tractor must zig-zag 200 times in a day to cover the entire plot of land. As a result, the maximum distance travelled by a tractor in a single day is 201 times the width of the land (going back and forth 200 times, and also going all the way down the length of the land once). In contrast, the forklift must travel 16 times the width of the land in a day. The forklift travels only along the edge, and only 32 times, because 32 is the number of battery swaps. Furthermore, the average distance travelled by the forklift for each battery swap is only half the width of the land (sometimes, the tractor happens to be right near the middle of the field anyway, near the recharging station, where the fresh batteries already were). As a result, the distance travelled by the forklift is 8% of the distance travelled by the tractor (16/201 = 0.08). It is also worth noting that the forklift could weigh less than 10% of what the tractor weighs. If we assume that energy consumption is proportional to weight, then the forklift will use 0.8% of the total energy that the tractor uses. This is still a massive overestimate, because most of the energy used by the tractor is spent on dragging plows through the Earth, not just carrying the weight of its battery, whereas the forklift needs only to carry the weight of the tractor’s battery. Suffice it to say that the energy consumed by the forklift would be far less than 0.8% of the energy used by the tractor. As a result, the battery-swapping scheme imposes negligible additional energy costs.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Now that we have divided the battery into 32 sub-batteries, we can calculate the weight of those sub-batteries and see how much they would affect the weight of the tractor. Lithium ion batteries weigh about 100x more than diesel for the same amount of energy (as described above). However, I will assume (as a rough estimate) that batteries have 3x the energy efficiency of a small diesel engine (this is realistic; small internal combustion engines waste more than 70% of their energy as waste heat). Furthermore, we have divided the battery into 32 smaller batteries so we can swap them. Conveniently, the weight of each swappable battery works out to be approximately the same as the diesel fuel it replaces (1*100/3/32 = 1). Thus, our battery swapping scheme would not increase the weight of the tractor at all. In fact, it would slightly reduce the weight of the tractor, because the diesel engine and transmission could be removed, and electric motors are lighter.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">As a result, we can easily power tractors with batteries. Energy decline theorists assumed it could never be done, but they wrongly assumed that a single large battery must be used. If we divide the battery, and use battery swapping, then it becomes entirely feasible to use batteries for tractors.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Of course, it’s worth pointing out that small diesel engines in tractors lose more than 70% of their energy as waste heat, whereas batteries and electric motors lose only about 15% as waste heat. Thus, the battery-swapping scheme I described above is actually far more energy-efficient than the diesel tractors we use now. Although battery swapping imposes a 0.8% energy loss due to forklift usage, diesel engines impose a 70% energy loss.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><h2 style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px; text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Postscript</span></h2><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Originally, I intended to write this post only as a hypothetical example. I wanted to show that there are many alternatives to diesel for tractors, and even batteries would work. I certainly don't expect that this will be used in practice. I admit to knowing very little about farming.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">However, after considering the idea further, I think it’s actually plausible and could be used in practice. In fact, this idea might be preferable to alternative fuels. Alternative fuels (such as hydrogen, ammonia, and synthetic methane) would impose large efficiency losses and are much more expensive than diesel fuel. Battery swapping, however, could be slightly cheaper than diesel fuel, even including the cost of replacing worn-out batteries after 12 years.</span></span></p><p class="p2" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 13px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"></span><br /></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The big drawback of this idea is that it requires additional labor. The person who operates the tractor would need to stop every 5 or so passes across his field, get out, walk to where the forklift was last parked (the last battery swap, which would be about 50 feet away), pick up the last depleted battery from the ground, drive the forklift to the recharging station at the center of the right edge of the field, drop off the last depleted battery tray, fetch a new battery tray, drive back to the tractor, remove the recently depleted battery tray from the tractor and leave it on the ground, install the fresh battery, get back in the tractor, and keep driving. Since he would have to do this 32 times per day, I would guess it would add at least two hours of labor. He would end up driving a forklift for 6 miles if we assume a plot of land that’s 2000 feet on a side, so just driving the forklift that distance in a day would take more than half an hour. However, it would save at least $350 each day for an additional two hours of labor, compared to using synthetic fuels (I assume synthetic fuels would cost $6/gallon which is $2 more than diesel, and a typical tractor uses 175 gallons in a day). My labor is worth less than $350 for two hours. Of course, the farmer would have to buy a small forklift too, which looks like it would cost about $4,000. However, that cost would be recovered in less than 12 days of usage (4000/350 = ~12). As a result, this looks like it could actually be the best alternative to diesel fuel for tractors.</span></span></p><p class="p1" style="font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s1" style="font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span></p>Tomhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18396160316791132955noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7005412100005882053.post-14832226880497886332018-10-21T00:48:00.003-07:002018-10-22T20:06:47.783-07:00Prieto's and Hall's Estimate of Solar EROI Is Very OutdatedPedro Prieto and Charles Hall published a book a few years back entitled <i>Spain's Photovoltaic Revolution</i>. In that book they claim that solar PV has a drastically low EROI of less than 3. The reason for that low EROI is because Prieto and Hall calculate EROI differently from how it has generally been done. Prieto and Hall include things like labor expenses and first world salaries as energy investments (money is converted to energy by means of a formula). Those things are generally not included as energy investments for any sources of energy, but Hall and Prieto decided to include them for solar PV, drastically reducing its EROI all the way down to below 3.<br />
<br />
However, that analysis is years old. Things change quickly in the field of solar PV. We must ask if that figure has improved. It is possible that the extended EROI of solar PV (including first world salaries) has improved considerably, not just because the EROI of the panels themselves has improved, but also because of improvements in foundations, frames, panel washing machines, and so on.<br />
<br />
In this article, Prieto's and Hall's analysis will be repeated with more updated figures. This will be accomplished using monetary data taken from Lazard.<br />
<br />
Prieto and Hall accomplished their task by adding up all the monetary expenses incurred by a solar PV plant, and then multiplying the resulting price by the energy intensity of the economy as a whole. This is what Prieto and Hall did for their PV plant in Spain and for the Spanish economy more generally. Their figures are summarized in a <a href="http://energyskeptic.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Pedro-Prieto_ISBPE_2017-Spains-solar-revolution-revisited.pdf">PDF presentation</a> which Prieto gave recently (page 62).<br />
<br />
I stress again that it's <b>not necessary</b> to track down and add up all these individual monetary expenses for a solar PV plant. That information is <b>already available</b> as the final levelized price of electricity for solar PV. Accountants have <b>already added up</b> all the monetary expenses for solar PV, along the entire supply chain, and have included all those expenses in the final levelized price. As a result, there is no purpose in duplicating the accountants' work and adding up prices for things like panel washing, security services, and so on.<br />
<br />
Instead, we can easily re-calculate the extended energy investments for solar PV by just using the unsubsidized non-interest portion of the levelized price, then multiplying that price by the general energy intensity of the U.S. economy per dollar, similar to what Prieto and Hall did for Spain.<br />
<br />
Let's do that procedure now. The levelized price of electricity for solar PV is $0.05/kwh (as per <a href="https://www.lazard.com/media/450337/lazard-levelized-cost-of-energy-version-110.pdf">Lazard</a>). If we assume half of that money is devoted to interest payments and energy investments already counted, that leaves $0.025/kwh for everything else. We can obtain an "energy intensity" for the entire U.S. economy by dividing the GDP by all energy usage, similar to what Hall and Prieto did for Spain. The US has a GDP of $19.39 trillion, and uses 97.7 Quads, which is 1.477 kwh/$1 (I just googled for those figures). Multiplying this by $0.025/kwh (from above) yields an uncounted energy investment of 0.037 kwh/kwh. If we assume an EROI of 14 for solar PV in a sunny region like Spain or the American Southwest, then the already-counted energy investment is 0.0714 (or 1/14), and the extended energy investment is 0.037 (above). Adding the two together yields a total extended energy investment of 0.108. Inverting this figure yields an extended EROI of 9.26 for solar PV in a sunny region.<br />
<br />
That figure of 9.26 for an extended EROI is more than 3 times higher than the figure offered by Prieto and Hall, which was 3.0. At this point, we must ask why this newer estimate is so much higher.<br />
<br />
Right away, it is clear that Prieto's solar plant is spending approximately 6x more money on these "extended" miscellaneous energy expenses than a more recent solar plant. Prieto uses a figure of 0.22 kwh/kwh for "extended" energy investments, which is 6x higher than the 0.037 figure we calculated above. In other words, the "miscellaneous" energy costs at Prieto's solar plant are vastly higher than at more recent solar plants.<br />
<br />
The reason is fairly clear. Prieto's solar plant is a 1 megawatt solar plant, whereas newer plants are often 200 megawatts or larger. There is a large economy of scale when it comes to miscellaneous energy investments. Some of the energy investments which Prieto lists in his spreadsheet are <b>fixed</b> costs which would be reduced by a factor of 200 (per unit of energy delivered) for a larger plant. For example, a power plant which is 200x larger does not require 200 separate access roads leading to the plant, and so on.<br />
<br />
Furthermore, the costs listed in Prieto's spreadsheet are also subject to improvement and "learning by doing" over time, even without any economy of scale. For example, washing solar PV panels could be done by a machine, rather than by hand, which could greatly reduce the monetary cost. Newer PV plants usually do not have fences or canals surrounding the plant. Fairs, exhibitions, promotions, and so on (which are significant energy investments in Prieto's spreadhsheet) could just be cancelled, since the novelty of a PV plant has worn off, and we don't need an opening exhibition for every new solar plant. The "premature phase out of manufacturing equipment", which Prieto counts as a massive energy investment, will presumably be done less frequently as the technology matures. And so on.<br />
<br />
In conclusion. Prieto's and Hall's estimate of the extended EROI of solar PV is obsolete and outdated. It uses data from an old, very small solar PV plant. Newer plants are much larger and correspondingly benefit from an economy of scale. As a result, newer plants have much lower extended energy investments. An updated analysis yields an extended EROI of 9.26 for solar PV, not 3.0.<br />
<br />
<b>Afterword</b><br />
<br />
One more thing. Prieto and Hall decided to <b>include</b> first world salaries, labor costs, and related discretionary energy expenditures as "energy investments", as mentioned above. Presumably, the same could be done for all other sources of energy. For example, if a Russian engineer at an oil company takes his whole family to the Bahamas, on a private jet rented with his salary, then that would count as an energy investment to obtain oil. In my opinion, those expenditures of energy should not be counted as energy investments.<br />
<br />
However, those energy investments <b>have</b> been counted in this analysis. We have used to same method that Hall and Prieto used to estimate energy intensity, and have included labor, just as they did. The levelized cost of electricity from solar PV includes <b>all</b> labor costs along the entire supply chain, including first-world salaries for engineers, so it is included in the analysis above.<br />
<br />
Still, such a broad definition of EROI made little difference. It reduced the EROI for solar PV from 14 to 9.26. In other words, the "extended" costs of solar PV have declined to such a degree that including them now makes only a modest difference.<br />
<br />
<i>Correction: The original version of this article contained an arithmetic mistake which I found several days after first posting it. The initial version of this post claimed an "uncounted" investment of 0.017 kwh/kwh, whereas the correct value is 0.037. This implies an extended EROI of 9.26 for the newer solar plant, not 11.32 as originally claimed.</i><br />
<br />Tomhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18396160316791132955noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7005412100005882053.post-87766939520470101582018-10-19T00:29:00.001-07:002018-10-23T13:58:49.389-07:00Reports of Low EROI for Solar Power Are OutdatedA common claim within the energy decline movement is that renewables have much lower EROI than fossil fuels. For example, it is often claimed that coal has an EROI of 80 and oil has an EROI higher than 15, whereas solar PV has an EROI of only 10. Thus, solar PV is no match for fossil energy and cannot provide the same amount of net energy.<br />
<br />
Such claims have been made repeatedly within the energy decline movement for more than 15 years now, and they rely upon data which is considerably older than that. Presumably, the EROI of fossil fuels has deteriorated at least somewhat, and the EROI of solar PV has improved at least somewhat, since those claims were first made. As a result, it's worth re-examining the issue and seeing what the respective EROI ratios of those sources of energy are now.<br />
<br />
Gagnon et al (2009) published an analysis of EROI trends over time for both oil and gas combined. EROI for oil and gas had declined from approximately 30 in the early 1990s to approximately 17 in the mid-2000s. Gagnon et al also included a best-fit linear trend line of that data. Simply extrapolating from that linear trend line (visually using a ruler) yields an EROI for global oil and gas of approximately 13 now.<br />
<br />
The EROI of solar PV, on the other hand, has been improving fairly rapidly. Leuwen et al (2016) examined the trend lines for energy payback studies of solar PV and found a consistent decrease in energy payback time over decades. The most recent studies (in 2014) indicate an energy payback time of approximately 1 year in areas of moderate insolation. This figure implies an EROI of approximately 25 for solar PV, assuming a 25+ year lifespan. The oft-quoted EROI of 10 for solar PV is two decades old and is seriously out of date.<br />
<br />
In which case, the EROI of solar PV is already nearly twice as high as the EROI for gas and oil worldwide. As a result, the notion that fossil fuels have much higher EROI ratios than solar PV is badly outdated and is exactly the opposite of the true situation; in fact, solar PV has an EROI ratio which is considerably higher than oil and gas worldwide.<br />
<br />
Granted, the EROI for coal in the United States (80) is still much higher than the EROI for solar PV. However, the United States is an <b>outlier</b> insofar as its coal deposits are larger and more easily accessed than anywhere else in the world. As a result, the United States is not a good comparison for solar PV in areas of <b>average</b> insolation. Instead, we should compare the EROI of average solar to the EROI of average coal for the world.<br />
<br />
In which case, the EROI of solar PV is higher than the EROI for coal worldwide. In my opinion, China is a good comparsion for coal, because China mines and uses more coal than the rest of the world combined. Hu et al (2103) published a historical trend line for the EROI of Chinese coal and found steady declines over decades. The trend line indicated an EROI of 27 for Chinese coal in 2010. A simple visual extrapolation (again using a ruler) indicates an EROI of approximately 22 now. As a result, the EROI of Chinese coal is already lower than the EROI of solar PV in areas of moderate insolation, and the gap is presumably widening over time.<br />
<br />
Extending the boundaries of EROI analysis will simply reduce the EROI of fossil fuels by <b>more</b> than for renewables. Coal fired electricity in particular has <b>far more</b> "uncounted" energy investments, which are reflected in its much higher price (as shown <a href="http://bountifulenergy.blogspot.com/2018/09/extended-eroi.html">here</a>). Any conversion of money into energy, as was done by Prieto and Hall (2013), will reduce the EROI of fossil fuel electricity by more. This implies that extending boudaries will <b>increase</b> the EROI advantage which solar power already enjoys.<br />
<br />
This analysis makes no attempt to compensate for energy quality. Even if we count the waste heat losses from cooling towers at coal power plants as "energy returns", which artificially inflates the EROI of coal-fired electricity, the EROI of global coal is <b>still</b> worse than the EROI of solar PV in areas of average insolation.<br />
<br />
It should also be mentioned that the EROI of solar PV continues to improve and this trend shows no sign of stopping. New kinds of solar panels are being introduced, such as perovskite and organic solar cells. Those panels have an estimated energy payback time of a few months or less. If the lifetime of those panels can be improved to 20 years, it implies an EROI of 60 or higher for areas of average insolation.<br />
<br />
It is possible that the EROI from 4th-generation, thin film solar cells deployed in desert regions near the equator will exceed the EROI from any fossil fuels anywhere, ever. If EROI were actually an important metric (which it is not), then global civilization could simply relocate its most energy-intensive manufacturing (such as aluminum smelting, or solar panel manufacturing) to desert regions near the equator, which could afford them higher EROI than any fossil fuels have ever provided.<br />
<br />
In conclusion. The idea that solar PV has very low EROI, is simply outdated and is based upon obsolete data. The EROI of solar PV has been improving ever since that claim was first popularized around 2005. By now, the EROI of solar PV matches or exceeds the EROI of all fossil fuels, except coal in a few ideal locations. The EROI advantage which solar PV enjoys is likely to increase in the future because the EROI of solar PV continues to improve and shows no sign of stopping, whereas the EROI of fossil fuels continues to decline.<br />
<br />
<br />
References<br />
<br />
Gagnon, N., Hall, C., Brinker, L. 2009. A preliminary investigation of the energy return on energy investment for global oil and gas production. Energies 2 490-503.<br />
<br />
Louwen A., van Sark W.G.J.H.M., Faaij A.P.C., Schropp R.E.I. 2016. Re-assessment of net energy production and greenhouse gas emissions avoidance after 40 years of photovoltaics development. Nature Communications 7<br />
<br />
Hu, Y., Hall, C., Wang, J., Feng, L., Poisson, A. 2013. Energy Return on Investment (EROI) of china's conventional fossil fuels: Historical and future trends. Energy 1-13.<br />
<br />
Prieto, P., Hall, C. 2013. Spain's Photovoltaic Revolution. Springer.<br />
<br />Tomhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18396160316791132955noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7005412100005882053.post-14616947885829428532018-10-17T12:07:00.002-07:002018-10-18T14:21:56.128-07:00Hubbert Curves Would Never Have WorkedEveryone who followed the peak oil story is familiar with Hubbert curves. A Hubbert curve is a bell-shaped curve which is claimed to represent oil extraction for a region over time. It is claimed that all oil extracting regions will follow such a curve or approximate it.<br />
<br />
Since all oil producing regions supposedly follow a Hubbert curve, such curves could be used to <b>predict</b> oil extraction for any region. We can just look at the production profile from a region, and see how far along its bell curve it happens to be. For example, we can draw a bell curve through the past production profile of some region, then extend the bell curve out into the future. In so doing, we would predict the future oil extraction from that region over time. We could also predict the total future <b>amount</b> of oil extracted by adding up the area under the curve we had extended. These procedures are done mathematically, not visually, but Hubbert's very earliest paper relied upon a simple visual extrapolation.<br />
<br />
Presumably, Hubbert curves are based upon a statistical phenomenon. With a consistent amount of effort devoted to discovery and extraction, production will follow a fairly consistent pattern. The largest oil deposits are discovered first and are depleted as quickly as possible. New oil wells are drilled at a certain rate. At first, new wells more than compensate for depletion of old ones. Eventually, there are more and more "old" oil wells, and the newer ones get smaller and smaller, until depletion of old wells overcomes extraction from new ones, leading to a peak and then decline. The end result is a bell-shaped curve for the region as a whole.<br />
<br />
However, that behavior is a statistical phenomenon which relies upon certain conditions being met. In particular, it requires a constant amount of effort devoted to discovery and extraction. If the resources devoted to discovery and extraction increased exponentially over time for a region, for example, then we would expect the resulting curve to be negatively skewed, with the peak further to the right. More oil would be extracted toward the <b>end</b> of the production profile, and the drop-off would be fairly rapid. On the other hand, if discovery and extraction were exponentially decaying, then we would expect a rapid ramp-up and a gradual decline. In both cases, the curve would not be symmetric at all, and Hubbert curves would no longer work.<br />
<br />
In my opinion, Hubbert curves would only work in regions where there is a consistent amount of effort devoted to extraction. In other words, there must be a consistent amount of money and resources devoted to discovery, drilling, and so on. Only then would Hubbert curves work at all. Otherwise, Hubbert curves would not work at all, because the underlying forces which cause the statistical trend would no longer be operating.<br />
<br />
This explains why Hubbert curves failed for Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Emirates, Iran, Iraq, and Russia. All of those countries were presumed to be entering terminal decline in the 2005-2010 period, but none of them actually did. The reason is because the effort devoted to extraction has changed drastically over time in those countries, which would render Hubbert curves completely useless. For example, Iraq was subject to sanctions for decades. Russia underwent a collapse. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Emirates, and Iran voluntarily curtailed their oil production as part of a cartel strategy, in order to control prices. Once those events have occured, Hubbert curves will be useless at that point, and cannot be used to predict oil production going forward.<br />
<br />
Curtailment is a phenomenon which requires special consideration. The Middle Eastern countries with large oil deposits all curtailed their production as part of a cartel strategy, starting in the early 1970s. Doing so will push the date of geological peak way out into the future, but will make the peak of a Hubbert curve appear much <b>closer</b>. Curtailment would cause an inflection point on the production graph, which Hubbert curves would misinterpret as a sign of imminent geological scarcity. In fact, curtailment pushes geological scarcity further away. In this case, a Hubbert curve would indicate the <b>opposite </b>of what is really happening. Thus, Hubbert curves will not work at all for a region which was greatly curtailed its oil production.<br />
<br />
This implies that Hubbert curves would not have worked for the world as a whole, either. The Middle Eastern countries (for which Hubbert curves are not applicable) represent approximately 70% of the conventional oil deposits on Earth. As a result, any Hubbert curve for the entire world would include the 70% of deposits for which Hubbert curves are not applicable.<br />
<br />
There is also good reason to believe that Hubbert curves would stop working when the price of oil has considerably increased. Any large increase in the price of oil would lead to an increase in drilling effort, which would invalidate Hubbert curves from that point forward. For this reason, the peak of conventional oil, excluding the Middle East and Russia, has not followed a Hubbert curve either. A Hubbert curve actually did predict the peak of oil outside the Middle East and Russia, but the peak for such a large region will <b>increase prices</b>, and thereby cause increased discovery and extraction, which will invalidate the Hubbert curve from that point forward. For that reason, Hubbert curves did predict the peak for oil outside the Middle East and Russia, but the decline was offset by increased drilling and discovery caused by increased prices.<br />
<br />
This is another reason why Hubbert curves would never have worked for the world as a whole. Hubbert curves have worked fairly well for individual regions, but a peak for the world will <b>change prices</b>, which would cause Hubbert curves to stop working.<br />
<br />
As a result, we can conclude that Hubbert curves would never have worked for the Middle East or for Russia, which collectively have more than 70% of worldwide conventional oil deposits. Nor would Hubbert curves have worked for the world as a whole. Nor would Hubbert curves have worked for the regions <b>except</b> the Middle East and Russia, once the peak has been passed.<br />
<br />
Interestingly, Hubbert curves did appear to work fairly well when the condition of constant effort was actually met. The peak of conventional oil, outside the Middle East and Russia, for a given price, did actually occur in 2005. That is exactly what Hubbert curves had predicted, and I don't think it was a coincidence. Hubbert <b>was</b> actually on to something here.<br />
<br />
However, Hubbert curves need to be applied far more judiciously and sparingly than they have been in the past. When we see an inflection point on a curve, we must ask <b>why</b> the inflection point occurred. Is drilling being curtailed in that region for political reasons? Has the price of oil changed greatly? Has a cartel formed? Is there some kind of political disruption or turmoil that would interrupt drilling or curtail output? If so, Hubbert curves will no longer apply.<br />
<br />
These considerations imply that Hubbert curves will not work for predicting future coal production for the United States or for the world. The United States has faced inadequate <b>demand</b> for coal, going back to the 1970s. All industrialized countries have stopped growing their per-capita energy production because of inadequate <b>demand</b>. Growth was purposefully curtailed. In the case of the United States, this happened long before the geological peak of coal. As a result, Hubbert curves will greatly <b>underestimate</b> the amount of coal which could be extracted there, because they will misinterpret that inflection point as an indicator of approaching geological scarcity, when it actually indicates that scarcity is being pushed further into the future. In my opinion, this is the reason for the drastic discrepancy between USGS estimates for coal in the United States and Hubbert curves applied to the same region. Hubbert curves are inapplicable there, and would drastically underestimate the amount of coal that could be extracted. Since the United States coal deposits are such a large fraction of global coal deposits, Hubbert curves won't work for global coal production either.<br />
<br />
In summary. Hubbert curves are based upon a statistical regularity. As such, they'll only work when certain conditions are met. They work when there is a constant amount of effort devoted to discovery, drilling, and extraction. In all other circumstances, they fail badly.<br />
<br />
As a result, Hubbert curves cannot be used to predict oil production for the Middle East or Russia, nor can they be used to predict oil production for the world as a whole. Furthermore, Hubbert curves cannot be used to predict coal production for the United States or the world. In all those cases, Hubbert curves will greatly underestimate the amount of oil or coal that could be produced.<br />
<br />Tomhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18396160316791132955noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7005412100005882053.post-26245133120854645202018-09-21T20:35:00.000-07:002018-09-28T10:21:11.291-07:00Extended EROI<h3>
Introduction</h3>
Some EROI authors have suggested that renewable sources of energy have much lower EROI ratios than generally believed. The reason is that published EROI figures do not include <b>all</b> of the energy investments which were incurred. There are many small energy investments which are difficult to count, for example, the energy investments for smelting aluminum used to build metal fences around a power plant. Those tiny energy investments are omitted from EROI analysis. As a result, the EROI ratio is overstated for renewable sources of energy.<br />
<br />
There are many small energy investments for any source of electricity, which are too numerous and too minor to count. For example, the EROI of solar power (commonly quoted as 10) does not include the energy investments to replace truck tires which wear out during the delivery of solar panels to solar farms. Nor does it include the energy investment of the steel-making equipment used to manufacture the steel for parts for that truck. And there are thousands of other little uncounted energy investments, such as energy investments for fences around the power plant, roads to the plant, security cameras, replacement of transportation equipment, electricity used in the plant office, and so on. Any one of those energy investments might be quite small, but taken together, they can add up to a lot, because there are so many of them. When those little energy investments are added up, the EROI of renewable electricity will be reduced considerably.<br />
<br />
Of course, the same holds true for all sources of energy. The EROI of coal-fired electricity, for example, does not include the energy investments of building roads to the coal power plant, building a railway to the coal power plant, replacing locomotives which have worn out delivering coal to the power plant, and so on. Those energy investments could be considerable and could greatly reduce the EROI of coal-fired electricity.<br />
<br />
As a result, EROI is overstated for all sources of electricity. The only way to get an accurate EROI value is to include all the small uncounted energy investments, or at least try to estimate them.<br />
<br />
Dr Charles Hall has referred to this as "extending the boundaries" of EROI analysis. Prior EROI analyses have not included indirect energy investments such as degradation of transportation equipment. It was considered outside the scope of the EROI analysis. As we extend the boundaries of EROI analysis, we include more and more energy investments that occurred further up the supply chain.<br />
<br />
The purpose of this article is to extend the EROI boundaries all the way, and to include <b>all</b> energy investments for each source of energy, no matter how minor or indirect. This will be done for coal fired electricity, nuclear power, solar PV, and wind power. The result is a convergence of EROI values for different sources of electricity, as will be shown.<br />
<br />
<br />
<h3>
Method of estimating extended EROI</h3>
The great difficulty with extending EROI boundaries is that it becomes more and more difficult to gather the information needed, the further you extend the boundaries. The uncounted energy investments become more numerous and smaller. As an example, a coal-fired power plant requires a railroad connection. That railroad connection requires railroad ties, which are made out of wood, which were taken from a tree, which was chopped down using a chainsaw, which has a plastic gasoline tank, and the plastic was made out of oil, which was extracted by an oil well, and the oil well was made out of steel, taken from a blast furnace. How do we account for the energy investment for the degradation of the blast furnace, which is fully seven degrees removed from the top of the supply chain?<br />
<br />
At some point, the energy investments are so far removed, and there are so many of them, and they are so little, that it becomes difficult to add them all up. It would be nearly impossible to track down all this information.<br />
<br />
Hall and Prieto attempted to extend the EROI boundaries for a solar PV plant[1]. They accomplished this by adding up all the monetary costs for things like roads to the power plant, security cameras, fences, and so on. Prieto was a manager at a solar power plant, so he had access to the relevant accounting information and added up the prices for everything. Hall and Prieto then converted those prices to energy by means of a formula (6 megajoules per dollar, if I recall).<br />
<br />
It was a good idea to estimate uncounted energy investments by looking at prices. That was a significant contribution of Hall's and Prieto's book.<br />
<br />
However, it is not necessary to add up the prices of all these little things like roads to the plant, security cameras, and so on. All of those things are <b>already included</b> in the final levelized price of wholesale solar electricity. For that matter, all monetary expenditures, along the entire supply chain, no matter how minor or indirect, are already included in the final levelized price of solar electricity.<br />
<br />
The price of something includes all the monetary costs, along the entire supply chain, to obtain that thing. Each supplier in the supply chain keeps track of all its monetary costs, and passes along all those expenses to the supplier above it in the chain. All companies keep careful track of money and pass along all of their expenses. There is an army of accountants, spread throughout the economy, who do this. They pass along <b>all</b> monetary costs, no matter how indirect. As a result, the final price of a thing, is a kind of summary of all prices paid to obtain it, throughout the entire supply chain.<br />
<br />
Because of this, we can estimate the uncounted energy investments for a source of energy by just looking at the price of it. The price of electricity from solar PV, for example, includes the price of <b>everything</b> needed to obtain it.<br />
<br />
Thus, we can estimate the extended EROI of a source of electricity using the following algorithm:<br />
<br />
<ol>
<li>Obtain the levelized cost of electricity for a source (from Lazard[2], for example).</li>
<li>Subtract the top-level interest expense, which is not an energy investment.</li>
<li>Also subtract the money which was spent on obtaining energy for the counted energy investments. This can be done using published EROI figures. Those energy investments have already been counted, and we don't want to double-count them.</li>
<li>What is left is the amount of money spent on everything else. We'll call this "miscellaneous expenses". It includes things like profits, salaries, taxes, interest paid on transportation equipment like trucks, and everything else, for every contractor and sub-contractor and supplier, up the entire supply chain. It also includes all money spent on obtaining energy, throughout the entire supply chain.</li>
<li>We must estimate how much of this "miscellaneous" money was spent on energy, and how much was spent on everything else, using a factor. We'll refer to that factor as the "uncounted energy investment factor".</li>
<li>We must multiply the uncounted energy investment factor by the amount of money spent on miscellaneous expenses.</li>
<li>We then add that "uncounted" energy investment to the energy investment from published EROI figures. After which, we can calculate an "extended EROI" by just performing the division again using the energy investment with extended boundaries.</li>
</ol>
<br />
<br />
Let's try extending the boundaries for a typical solar PV plant. We'll assume that the levelized cost of wholesale electricity for solar PV is $0.05/kwh (as per Lazard), that 50% of that money is spent on interest (which is common for projects which involve almost the entire cost upfront and which last decades), and that the EROI of solar PV is 10. In which case, the amount of money for miscellaneous expenses for solar PV is $0.02/kwh (interest was $0.025, and counted energy investments were $0.05, and subtracting both of those leaves $0.02 remaining for miscellaneous expenses). Let's assume, as an initial estimate, that 10% of the miscellaneous expenses are payments for energy. We'll also assume that the price of the energy for investment is $0.01/megajoule. With a conversion factor of 0.10, $0.002 of the wholesale price was spent on uncounted energy investments. At $0.01/megajoule, that translates into 0.2 megajoules, or 0.0556 kilowatt hours. Thus, the counted energy investments for solar PV were 0.1 kwh<sub>invest</sub>/kwh<sub>delivered</sub> (or 1/eroi), and the uncounted were 0.0556 kwh<sub>invest</sub>/kwh<sub>delivered</sub>, leading to a total extended energy investment of 0.1556 kwh<sub>invest</sub>/kwh<sub>delivered</sub>, or an extended EROI of 6.43 for solar PV.<br />
<br />
If we perform the same procedure for various sources of energy, we obtain the following extended EROI ratios:<br />
<br />
<table border="1">
<tbody>
<tr><td><b>Source</b></td><td><b>Extended EROI</b></td><td><b>Notes</b></td></tr>
<tr><td>Solar</td><td>6.43</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>Coal</td><td>5.29</td><td><span style="font-size: x-small;">(assumes EROI of 20 after waste heat loss, $0.10/kwh, 40% interest)</span></td></tr>
<tr><td>Nuclear</td><td>6.22</td><td><span style="font-size: x-small;">(assumes EROI of 30, $0.10/kwh, and 50% interest)</span></td></tr>
<tr><td>Wind</td><td>9.00</td><td><span style="font-size: x-small;">(assumes EROI of 20, $0.04/kwh, and 40% interest)</span></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
Of course, the above figures are dependent upon an uncounted investment factor of 0.10. In other words, we assumed that 10% of miscellaneous expenses are devoted to buying energy products. However, the choice of 0.10 was little more than a guesstimate.<br />
<br />
At this point, we could estimate an accurate uncounted factor by looking at the economy as a whole. We could examine a first-world economy which gets most of its electricity from coal-fired plants and try to estimate how much of its energy expenditure is devoted to the energy industry itself, then subtract the the energy investments which had already been counted.<br />
<br />
I suspect that the factor of 0.10 was too high. If coal-fired plants, for example, consume 18.9% of the energy they produce, then this would have been obvious in Sankey diagrams of the US economy back in the 1970s and 1980s. As a result, let's use a different factor of 5%. In which case, the extended EROI ratios for different sources of electricity are:<br />
<br />
<table border="1">
<tbody>
<tr><td><b>Source</b></td><td><b>Extended EROI</b></td></tr>
<tr><td>Solar</td><td>7.82</td></tr>
<tr><td>Coal</td><td>8.37</td></tr>
<tr><td>Nuclear</td><td>10.43</td></tr>
<tr><td>Wind</td><td>12.34</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
We can use different estimates for the uncounted energy investment factor. With smaller factors, the EROI ratios of all sources of energy increase, and the ratios for coal and nuclear power increase by more.<br />
<br />
<br />
<h3>
Interpretation of Results</h3>
Right away, it is obvious that the extended EROI ratios for different sources of electricity are fairly close together. This is totally unsurprising. The <b>monetary prices</b> of those sources of electricity are also somewhat close together. Any conversion of money into energy would cause the EROI ratios for different sources of energy, of the same price, to converge.<br />
<br />
Furthermore, the high-EROI sources of electricity (such as coal-fired electricity and nuclear power) are also moderately more expensive. This implies that the "uncounted" energy investments are <b>higher</b> for those sources of electricity than for renewables, using any consistent conversion of money into energy. As a result, extending EROI boundaries will reduce the EROI ratios for high-EROI sources of energy (such as coal and nuclear) the most. In turn, that will cause the EROI ratios of different sources of energy to converge <b>even more strongly</b>.<br />
<br />
The result is <b>no large difference</b> between the extended EROI ratios of different sources of electricity.<br />
<br />
Of course, we may have chosen an uncounted factor which was <b>still</b> far too high, even after revising it downwards. In which case, extending EROI boundaries would make little difference for solar PV, and published figures are already fairly accurate. Using very small factors will result in less than a 10% adjustment of published figures for solar PV.<br />
<br />
It is just not possible that solar PV has a drastically low extended EROI ratio while other sources of electricity have much higher extended EROI ratios. Solar PV is <b>much cheaper</b> than alternatives, so any attempt to extend boundaries will cause a strong convergence of EROI values. This implies one of two things. If extending boundaries makes little difference, then the EROI of solar PV was fairly accurate beforehand and is above 9. If extending boundaries makes a large difference, then the EROI ratios of other sources of electricity will be reduced by more, and all sources of electricity will have similarly low extended EROI ratios. There is <b>no possible</b> factor for uncounted energy investment which would yield a very low extended EROI for solar power and very high extended EROI ratios for other sources of electricity. The higher the factor, the more the extended EROI is reduced for coal and nuclear power compared to solar PV. Making assumptions of extremely high uncounted energy investments will result in <b>lower</b> extended EROI ratios for coal and nuclear power than for solar PV.<br />
<br />
One other conclusion from the above figures is that coal-fired electricity has much higher "uncounted" energy investments than other sources of electricity. This is also totally unsurprising. It has frequently been pointed out that solar PV plants require fences and security cameras, which incur energy investments that had not been counted. That much is clearly true. However, coal-fired plants require a railroad connection with a mile-long train full of coal arriving every few days, for the entire lifetime of the plant. That imposes massive "uncounted" energy investments, including fuel usage by locomotives, degradation and replacement of locomotives and rail cars, wear on the national rail network, and so on. Those energy investments are massive and <b>ongoing</b>, and would obviously outweigh the trivial energy investments of installing cameras or fences once. Those much higher "uncounted" energy investments for coal-fired electricity are reflected in its higher price.<br />
<br />
One final point bears mentioning. The extended EROI ratio of solar PV (indicated above) is considerably higher than that estimated by Hall and Prieto. Their analysis was useful, but it's years old. The field of solar PV moves quickly. Hall's and Prieto's estimate has fallen out of date.<br />
<br />
Hall and Prieto estimated the extended EROI of a 1-megawatt solar plant. However, newer solar plants are much larger, frequently larger than 100 megawatts. There is an economy of scale when it comes to uncounted energy costs. Solar plants which are 100x larger do not require 100x as long of a road leading to the plant, or 100x as many employees, or 100x as long of a fence surrounding the plant, and so on (in fact, a solar plant which is 100x larger would require only 10x as long of a fence surrounding the plant, if we assume that all solar plants are laid out in a square shape, which implies a 90% reduction in energy investment for fences, per kilowatt-hour). As a result, Hall's and Prieto's analysis is out of date, and the actual extended EROI of solar PV would be significantly higher now, as indicated in the table above.<br />
<br />
<h3>
Summary and Conclusion</h3>
Extending EROI boundaries as far as possible, while also assuming high uncounted energy investments, causes the EROI values for different sources of electricity to converge strongly. The result is no large difference between EROI values for different sources of electricity. If we assume that uncounted energy investments are extremely low, then published figures for the EROI of solar PV are already fairly accurate.<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<b><span style="font-size: x-small;">References</span></b><br />
<br />
[1] <i>Spain's Photovoltaic Revolution</i>, Charles Hall and Pedro Prieto, Springer, 2013<br />
<br />
[2] Lazard Levelized Cost of Energy, version 11.0. https://www.lazard.com/media/450337/lazard-levelized-cost-of-energy-version-110.pdf<br />
<br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><b>Errata</b></span><br />
This article was originally published with a minor arithmetic error which was corrected several hours after the initial publication.<br />
<br />
<br />Tomhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18396160316791132955noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7005412100005882053.post-26701722010308911732018-09-05T13:00:00.000-07:002018-09-07T00:24:15.373-07:00The Effect of Declining EROI on Industralized CountriesIn the previous article, it was shown that any country can increase its energy supply exponentially with any EROI higher than 1. For example, with an EROI of 10, any investment of energy more than 1/10th of energy supply (or 1/eroi) will lead to exponential growth of energy obtained over time.<br />
<br />
It was also shown in the previous article that a low EROI imposes a <b>delay</b> for civilization when accelerating exponential growth of energy obtained. For example, it was shown (using a simulation) that a low EROI of 10 imposed a delay of 6 years before a hypothetical civilization could accelerate growth from 0%/year to 4%/year.<br />
<br />
However, some modern industrialized countries do not accelerate growth at all. In fact, they do not even grow their energy supply. Those countries are already fully industrialized. Once a country reaches a first-world standard of living, it voluntarily stops growing its energy supply. Citizens decide to spend any increase in their income on things like elaborate medical care, and not on setting their thermostats higher every year. This situation has already been reached in Japan and many places in Europe. It would have been reached in the USA, except the USA still has significant immigration.<br />
<br />
What would happen to such a static country (in terms of energy supply) if it underwent a decline in EROI? Presumably, such a country wouldn't care about how fast it could grow its energy supply. It would care only about keeping the amount of net energy constant.<br />
<br />
In such a country, any decline in EROI could be handled by initiating growth again, at a rate which is sufficient to compensate for the decline in EROI. Doing so would keep net energy constant.<br />
<br />
As a result, we must ask how much net energy must be sacrificed by an industrialized country in the short term, in order to initiate growth and offset declines in EROI. Any acceleration of exponential growth requires a temporary sacrifice of net energy, in order to initiate the growth. How much net energy must an industralized country sacrifice to initiate growth again, sufficient to compensate for a decline in EROI?<br />
<br />
This phenomenon can be modelled using a simple python computer program--even simpler than the last one, because this program has only 24 lines of code, excluding comments. (This phenomenon cannot be modelled using a simple mathematical formula, because generations of solar panels overlap, which resists a simple mathematical description).<br />
<br />
In this paper, a simple python program will be proposed which simulates energy re-investment for an industrialized country over time. The program will execute in a single loop and will simulate energy re-investment, over and over again, each year. As before, we will assume a country which obtains all its energy from solar panels.<br />
<br />
The program will simulate a decline in EROI. We can assume that the decline in EROI is caused by mineral exhaustion over time. The country used to build fancy Gallium-Arsenide solar cells with 40% efficiency and very high EROI, but the Gallium is running out. As a result, the civilization must start building silicon solar cells instead, which use far more abundant materials but have much lower EROI. Furthermore, the country has already filled its only tiny desert region with solar cells, and must now use worse locations, implying lower EROI for solar cells. As a result, the country undergoes a constant decline in EROI over years. This decline in EROI will be modelled in our program by increasing the energy investment required by some constant factor each year.<br />
<br />
At the same time, the program will model the modest exponential growth which must be re-started in order to compensate for the decline. These two factors will operate simultaneously. Declining EROI will decrease net energy obtained, but exponential growth will increase it.<br />
<br />
As pointed out in the previous article, any acceleration of exponential growth requires a temporary sacrifice of net energy for other purposes. How much of its net energy must an industrailzed country sacrifice, and for how long, in order to initiate exponential growth and compensate for declines in EROI?<br />
<br />
When I implemented and ran the program, I obtained the following results. I tinkered with the input parameters, and I found that growing the total amount of energy obtained by 0.7%/year for a country is sufficient to compensate for a decline in EROI from 50 down to 6, over 37 years. In turn, the country had to sacrifice a small fraction of 1% of its net energy for 2 years in order to initiate that growth. The output of the program was as follows:<br />
<br />
<pre>Original net: 0.98</pre>
<table border="2">
<tbody>
<tr><td>year</td><td>total</td><td>retired</td><td>epbt</td><td>net</td><td>FracOriginalNet</td><td>eroi</td></tr>
<tr><td>0</td><td>1.000000</td><td>0.040000</td><td>0.500000</td><td>0.976500</td><td>0.996429</td><td>50.000000</td></tr>
<tr><td>1</td><td>1.007000</td><td>0.040000</td><td>0.600000</td><td>0.978771</td><td>0.998746</td><td>41.666667</td></tr>
<tr><td>2</td><td>1.014049</td><td>0.040000</td><td>0.700000</td><td>0.981080</td><td>1.001102</td><td>35.714286</td></tr>
<tr><td>3</td><td>1.021147</td><td>0.040000</td><td>0.800000</td><td>0.983429</td><td>1.003499</td><td>31.250000</td></tr>
<tr><td>4</td><td>1.028295</td><td>0.040000</td><td>0.900000</td><td>0.985817</td><td>1.005936</td><td>27.777778</td></tr>
<tr><td>6</td><td>1.042742</td><td>0.040000</td><td>1.100000</td><td>0.990713</td><td>1.010931</td><td>22.727273</td></tr>
<tr><td>8</td><td>1.057391</td><td>0.040000</td><td>1.300000</td><td>0.995769</td><td>1.016091</td><td>19.230769</td></tr>
<tr><td>10</td><td>1.072247</td><td>0.040000</td><td>1.500000</td><td>1.000988</td><td>1.021416</td><td>16.666667</td></tr>
<tr><td>12</td><td>1.087311</td><td>0.040000</td><td>1.700000</td><td>1.006372</td><td>1.026910</td><td>14.705882</td></tr>
<tr><td>14</td><td>1.102586</td><td>0.040000</td><td>1.900000</td><td>1.011922</td><td>1.032573</td><td>13.157895</td></tr>
<tr><td>16</td><td>1.118077</td><td>0.040000</td><td>2.100000</td><td>1.017641</td><td>1.038409</td><td>11.904762</td></tr>
<tr><td>18</td><td>1.133784</td><td>0.040000</td><td>2.300000</td><td>1.023530</td><td>1.044419</td><td>10.869565</td></tr>
<tr><td>20</td><td>1.149713</td><td>0.040000</td><td>2.500000</td><td>1.029593</td><td>1.050605</td><td>10.000000</td></tr>
<tr><td>22</td><td>1.165865</td><td>0.040000</td><td>2.700000</td><td>1.035830</td><td>1.056970</td><td>9.259259</td></tr>
<tr><td>24</td><td>1.182244</td><td>0.040000</td><td>2.900000</td><td>1.042245</td><td>1.063515</td><td>8.620690</td></tr>
<tr><td>26</td><td>1.198854</td><td>0.047049</td><td>3.100000</td><td>1.026987</td><td>1.047946</td><td>8.064516</td></tr>
<tr><td>28</td><td>1.215697</td><td>0.047148</td><td>3.300000</td><td>1.032025</td><td>1.053087</td><td>7.575758</td></tr>
<tr><td>30</td><td>1.232776</td><td>0.047248</td><td>3.500000</td><td>1.037203</td><td>1.058371</td><td>7.142857</td></tr>
<tr><td>32</td><td>1.250095</td><td>0.047350</td><td>3.700000</td><td>1.042522</td><td>1.063798</td><td>6.756757</td></tr>
<tr><td>34</td><td>1.267658</td><td>0.047454</td><td>3.900000</td><td>1.047982</td><td>1.069369</td><td>6.410256</td></tr>
<tr><td>36</td><td>1.285467</td><td>0.047558</td><td>4.100000</td><td>1.053585</td><td>1.075087</td><td>6.097561</td></tr>
<tr><td>38</td><td>1.303527</td><td>0.047664</td><td>4.300000</td><td>1.059333</td><td>1.080952</td><td>5.813953</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
<br />
As is shown above, the country needed to sacrifice a small fraction of 1% of its net energy for two years in order to initiate the growth necessary to outrun declines in EROI. After which, a decline in EROI from 50 down to 6, over 37 years, imposed no decline in net energy for our modelled industralized country.<br />
<br />
(After the 5th year in the table above, I decided to print only every other year, in order to keep the table smaller. Not much changes from one year to the next at that point.)<br />
<br />
(The label "epbt" refers to Energy Payback Time; net refers to net energy obtained; and"FracOrigNet" refers to the amount of net energy obtained relative to the original, for example, 1.0 implies no loss or gain of net energy compared to originally).<br />
<br />
Of course, you can tinker with the input parameters and reduce the final EROI to below 6, or decrease the number of years the simulation runs, or increase the growth rate (and also the temporary sacrifice). I picked these particular parameters because they were the most pessimistic parameters I could imagine which were not just ludicrous. It is extremely unlikely that EROI will decline from 50 to 6 over 36 years. The EROI of 6 is far lower than almost any published EROI figures of any common sources of generating electricity. Furthermore, actual declines in EROI for our global industrial civilization have been FAR more gradual than simulated here. As a result, the parameters I picked were a kind of "drastic worst-case scenario" and should be interpreted as such.<br />
<br />
Still, such a rapid decline in EROI imposed only negligible consequences for an industrialized country. The effect upon net energy obtained was to reduce it by a small fraction of 1% for two years.<br />
<br />
Of course, this does not mean that consumers must actually reduce their energy consumption by a fraction of 1% for those two years. All industrialized countries in the world already have <b>overbuilt</b> their electricity grids. Industrialized countries have enough electricity generation to provide for the highest anticipated electricity demand in an entire year. Most of the time, they have <b>excess</b> generation capacity which is shut down or curtailed. As a result, the sub-1% sacrifice would only be imposed during the few hours per year when demand is highest and the electricity grid is fully committed. The actual sacrifice would probably mean shutting down some aluminum smelter plants for a few additional hours per year, for two years, and running a few gas turbines for longer the rest of the time for those two years.<br />
<br />
From the above, we can conclude that it's <b>easily within</b> the capability of any industrialized country to compensate for any plausible decline in EROI, with no significant loss of net energy.<br />
<br />
The source code for the python program is as follows:<br />
<br />
<pre># This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
#
# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
# EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
# MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.
# IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR
# OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE,
# ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR
# OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
lifetime = 25
total = 1.0
initialEpbt = 0.5
epbtIncreaseFactor = 0.20
growthFactor = 0.007
yearsRun = 40
panelsYearly = []
initialNet = 1.0 - (initialEpbt / lifetime)
# Populate pre-existing panels
for year in range( 0, lifetime ):
panelsYearly.append( total/lifetime )
# Run simulation
print ("Original net:", initialNet)
for year in range(0, yearsRun):
epbt = initialEpbt * (1 + year * epbtIncreaseFactor)
sumPanels = sum(panelsYearly)
retiredYearly = panelsYearly.pop(0)
yearlyToBeAdded = (sumPanels * growthFactor + retiredYearly)
investment = (retiredYearly * epbt) + (sumPanels * growthFactor * epbt)
net = sumPanels - investment
panelsYearly.append(yearlyToBeAdded)
print ("year:%i total:%f retired:%f epbt:%f net:%f frac_orig_net:%f eroi:%f"
% (year, sumPanels, retiredYearly, epbt, net, net/initialNet, lifetime/epbt)
)
</pre>
Tomhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18396160316791132955noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7005412100005882053.post-25688773991222394412018-09-03T17:33:00.000-07:002018-09-06T14:08:59.206-07:00EROI and economic growth<h3>
Introduction</h3>
<div>
<div>
<br />
A great deal of literature has been devoted to calculating the EROI of various energy sources. However, little explanation has been offered for why we should care, or what effect a lower EROI would have on civilization. Why even bother tracking EROI?</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
Some authors have speculated that declining EROI would imply less net energy for other purposes in the economy. For example, a decline in EROI from 100 down to 10 might imply a 90% loss of net energy for civilization. However, that conclusion was incorrect. EROI does not determine the amount of net energy obtained by civilization as a whole. This is because our global industrial civilization has been increasing the amount of energy (and therefore the amount of energy for investment) exponentially over time, and this effect has greatly outpaced any decline in EROI. For example, increasing the amount of energy (and energy investment) by a factor of 1.33 would compensate for a decline in EROI from 1 billion down to 4, with no loss of net energy. (An increase in the amount of total energy by 1.33x would allow 1/4th (or 0.33 / 1.33) of total energy to be devoted to obtaining the energy, yielding a net energy factor of 1.0 (or 1.33-0.33), or no change). Since the amount of energy for investment can increase exponentially, increasing it by a factor of 1.33 is obviously within the capability of industrial civilization, thereby more than compensating for any plausible decline in EROI. As an example, it has been pointed out repeatedly that the EROI of oil has declined from 100 in 1930 to less than 10 now, but there hasn’t been a decline in vehicle traffic by 90% worldwide since 1930. Quite the opposite, vehicle travel has increased tremendously since that time, because the amount of oil has increased by a such a large factor that net energy from oil increased, despite massive declines in EROI.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
Other possible effects of lower EROI would include greater land usage for solar farms, or higher costs of energy. However, those effects would be minor, as a matter of arithmetic, as long as EROI remains above some very low threshold. For example, a low EROI of 10 would imply that a solar farm would need to have ~11% greater land area, compared to a solar farm with an EROI of 1000, in order to obtain the same amount of net energy ( (1-1/1000) / (1-1/10) ~= 1.11) . Prices for solar panels would also be higher by a similar amount (11%), all other things being equal. However, the price of solar panels has dropped rapidly in recent years and is far below the price of electricity from coal-fired plants. The lower EROI of solar panels would have little effect on price compared to recent declines in price for other reasons.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
One effect of lower EROI, which has not been investigated, is the effect on growth. A lower EROI implies a larger upfront investment of energy. A larger upfront investment of energy requires a greater sacrifice of net energy now in order to obtain a desired level of exponential growth. It will take time before exponential growth compensates for the original sacrifice of net energy to initiate that growth. As a result, a lower EROI implies a temporary sacrifice when initiating or accelerating growth.<br />
<br /></div>
<div>
A simple mathematical example may demonstrate this point. Assume a civilization which gets all its energy from solar panels with an EROI of 10 and a lifetime of 10 years. Also assume that generations of solar panels do not overlap; new panels are kept in a dark warehouse until old ones expire, at which point, all the old panels are replaced at once with new ones. In which case, our hypothetical civilization must invest 10% of its gross energy (or 1/eroi) on building new panels just to replace those that expire, leaving 90% of all gross energy for all other purposes. If that civilization decided to embark upon exponential growth, and double the amount of energy it obtains in each generation of solar panels, then it must double the investment energy from 10% to 20%, leading to a reduction of energy for all other purposes from 90% to 80%. This reduction would persist for one generation of panels (10 years) until exponential growth overcame it. Thus, our hypothetical civilization must undergo a temporary reduction of net energy by ~10% for 10 years, in order to accelerate exponential growth from 0%/year to ~7%/year. This reduction by 10% of net energy is determined by EROI. If the civilization had solar panels with an EROI of 100, then only a 1% reduction in net energy would be required to accelerate growth by the same amount.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
Of course, reality is more complicated, for several reasons. First, generations of solar panels do actually overlap -- new panels are installed before all the old ones have expired. As a result, we cannot represent the compound growth with a simple exponential formula. Second, any real civilization obviously would not accelerate its growth from 0%/year to 7%/year overnight, because the sudden loss of net energy would be disruptive. Instead, any actual civilization would obviously ramp up growth more slowly, over a period of a few years, at least.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
In this paper, a simple computer model is used to calculate the effect of EROI on growth of energy obtained. A simple python program is presented which repeatedly calculates re-investment of energy over time, and which ramps up growth slowly enough that net energy never falls below some threshold level.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
The result is that even low EROI values (such as the EROI of 10 for solar panels) have only a modest effect on growth, as will be shown below.</div>
</div>
<div>
<br />
<br /></div>
<h3>
The Model</h3>
<div>
<div>
<br />
The model is implemented as a simple python program which calculates energy re-investment over time. It executes in a single loop which calculates energy obtained and energy re-investment, over and over again, for each year. It takes input parameters such as EROI, target growth rate, and a minimum threshold for net energy. The minimum threshold parameter determines how low net energy can go (relative to the original value) before growth must be curtailed, in order to ramp up growth more slowly. When growth is curtailed (during the ramp-up period), all excess energy beyond the minimum threshold is re-invested for exponential growth.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
When this program is run with an EROI of 10.0, a target growth rate of 4%/year, and a minimum threshold of 97%, we obtain the following results. The civilization requires six years of ramping up growth in order to reach the desired growth rate of 4%/year. During the ramp-up period, 3% of net energy is sacrificed in order to accelerate growth. During the ramp up period, all exponential growth is re-invested, according to the assumptions above. The output of the program is as follows:</div>
<div>
<br />
<br /></div>
<pre>Initial net:0.900000 minimumNetAmount:0.873000</pre>
<table border="2">
<tbody>
<tr><td>year</td><td>total</td><td>retired</td><td>toBeAdded</td><td>net</td></tr>
<tr><td>0</td><td>1.000</td><td>0.040</td><td>0.0508</td><td>0.873</td></tr>
<tr><td>1</td><td>1.011</td><td>0.040</td><td>0.0551</td><td>0.873</td></tr>
<tr><td>2</td><td>1.026</td><td>0.040</td><td>0.0612</td><td>0.873</td></tr>
<tr><td>3</td><td>1.047</td><td>0.040</td><td>0.0696</td><td>0.873</td></tr>
<tr><td>4</td><td>1.077</td><td>0.040</td><td>0.0815</td><td>0.873</td></tr>
<tr><td>5</td><td>1.118</td><td>0.040</td><td>0.0981</td><td>0.873</td></tr>
<tr><td>STOP RAMPING UP</td></tr>
<tr><td>6</td><td>1.176</td><td>0.040</td><td>0.0871</td><td>0.959</td></tr>
<tr><td>7</td><td>1.223</td><td>0.040</td><td>0.0889</td><td>1.000</td></tr>
<tr><td>8</td><td>1.272</td><td>0.040</td><td>0.0909</td><td>1.045</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
</div>
<br />
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
As we can see, net energy must decline from 0.9 to 0.873, for six years, in order to initiate growth. After which, the civilization has enough surplus gross energy to grow at 4%/year with no further sacrifice.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
The source code for the model is as follows:<br />
<br /></div>
<pre># This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
#
# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
# EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
# MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.
# IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR
# OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE,
# ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR
# OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
eroi = 10.0
lifetime = 25
targetGrowth = 1.04
minimumNetFactor = 0.97
total = 1.0
yearsRun = 30
#panelsYearly keeps track of the panels installed each year; one element
# per year. Each element refers to the amount of energy those panels
# will return EACH YEAR.
panelsYearly = []
oldSumPanels = 0.0
rampUpPeriod = True
# Populate pre-existing panels
for year in range(0,lifetime):
panelsYearly.append(total/lifetime)
# Run simulation
originalNet = total - total/eroi
minimumNetAmount = sum(panelsYearly) * minimumNetFactor * originalNet
print("Initial net:%f minimumNetAmount:%f" % (originalNet, minimumNetAmount))
for year in range(0, yearsRun):
sumPanels = sum(panelsYearly)
retiredYearly = panelsYearly.pop(0)
if (rampUpPeriod == True and oldSumPanels > 0
and sumPanels > oldSumPanels * targetGrowth):
rampUpPeriod = False
print("Stop ramping up")
if (rampUpPeriod):
investment = sumPanels - minimumNetAmount
yearlyToBeAdded = (investment * eroi) / lifetime
else:
yearlyToBeAdded = sumPanels * targetGrowth - sumPanels + retiredYearly
investment = (yearlyToBeAdded * lifetime) / eroi
panelsYearly.append(yearlyToBeAdded)
print ("year:%i total:%f retired:%f toBeAdded:%f net:%f" %
(year, sumPanels, retiredYearly, yearlyToBeAdded, sumPanels-investment
))
oldSumPanels = sumPanels
</pre>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<h3>
Conclusion</h3>
<div>
<div>
<br />
A decline in EROI worldwide down to 10 would impose a delay of 6 years when accelerating growth from 0% to 4% for the world economy as a whole.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
Of course, the model above is simplified in some ways. The algorithm used to determine how to ramp up growth would almost certainly be more sophisticated in reality. In which case, the above model is <b>sub-optimal</b>. Results in reality would be slightly better.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
Repeatedly throughout this paper, an EROI of 10 was assumed because that is the EROI of crystalline silicon photovoltaics, which has the lowest EROI of any common source of generating electricity. Still, such a low EROI imposed only a modest delay when accelerating growth. As a result, any plausible decline in EROI in the future would have only modest effects on growth.</div>
</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
<br /></div>
Tomhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18396160316791132955noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7005412100005882053.post-69264076758528127332017-10-19T14:17:00.000-07:002017-10-24T13:02:40.051-07:00Bardi's Universal Mining Machine<h3>
Introduction</h3>
<div>
<div>
<br />
A number of years ago, Dr Ugo Bardi published a very thought-provoking <a href="http://europe.theoildrum.com/node/3451">essay </a>about the possibility of a <b>universal mining machine</b> (which I’ll refer to as “Bardi’s machine” from now on). Such a machine can take common dirt, melt it down, atomize it, and separate it into its elements, each in its own little pile. This would allow us to extract valuable elements from common dirt. It would also prevent us from ever running out any any elements, as I'll explain below.<br />
<br />
Common dirt contains small amounts of all naturally occurring elements. You could dig up a cubic meter of dirt from behind your house, and it would contain trace amounts of every element which occurs naturally. If we atomized common dirt, using Bardi's machine, we would obtain <b>all </b>elements from any piece of earth fed into it. As a result, we would never absolutely "run out" of any element until we had exhausted all dirt on this planet.<br />
<br />
Furthermore, the amount of rare elements available to us would be massive and practically inexhaustible. More than 99.9% of the rare elements (such as copper) exist as very low concentration deposits. The overwhelming majority of rare elements are found as an atom here, an atom there, spread out thinly throughout the earth's crust. If we could mine the low-concentration deposits, then we would increase the total supply of rare elements by more than a factor of 1,000x.<br />
<br />
What's more, we would no longer be "running out" of rare elements at any rate. Once we began mining common dirt, the amount of all elements available to us would be constant, and would not diminish over any time period. When we throw away old smart phones, or we build structures that rust away, they would just return to being common dirt (eventually) and could easily be re-mined. As a result, the amount of materials available to us would not diminish over time.<br />
<br />
Presumably, we will eventually be forced to use Bardi's machine at some point. If we continue mining and dispersing the concentrated deposits of rare elements, as we are doing, we will eventually exhaust all of them. At some point, far in the distant future, we will have exhausted all concentrated copper deposits, all the concentrated rare earth deposits, and so on. At that point, only common dirt will remain. If we wish to continue mining the rare elements at that point, we'd need to use something like Bardi's machine.<br />
<br /></div>
<div>
The problem with mining common dirt is that it takes so much energy to do so. Lower concentrations of elements require higher amounts of energy to mine them. The lower the concentration, the higher the energy requirement. For example, it takes 10 times as much energy to mine an ore which is only 1/10th the concentration. The problem is, the concentration of rare elements is <b>extremely low </b>within common dirt. As a result, it would be energetically extremely expensive to obtain any particular rare element from common dirt. From Bardi’s article:</div>
</div>
<div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<br />
"Consider copper, again, as an example. Copper is present at concentrations of about 25 ppm in the upper crust (Wikipedia 2007). To extract copper from the undifferentiated crust, we would need to break down rock at the atomic level providing an amount of energy comparable to the energy of formation of the rock. On the average, we can take it as something of the order of 10 MJ/kg. From these data, we can estimate about 400 GJ/kg for the energy of extraction. Now, if we wanted to keep producing 15 million tons of copper per year, as we do nowadays, by extracting it from common rock, this calculation says that we would have to spend 20 times the current worldwide production of primary energy."</blockquote>
</div>
<div>
<div>
That is a valid point. It seems to rule out the possibility of mining undifferentiated crust.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
However, one of the commenters for that article pointed out that mining undifferentiated crust would allow us to obtain all the elements at once, not just copper, for the same expenditure of energy. In other words, that expenditure of 400 GJ would yield not just 1 kg of copper, but many kilograms of many other elements also.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
Bardi wisely made a concession to that point. In his subsequent book, he calculates the energy expenditure of mining undifferentiated crust while obtaining many uncommon elements thereby.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
However, I wish to continue with the commenter’s line of thinking. I wish to explore the possibility of mining undifferentiated crust (dirt) and using <b>all </b>the elements obtained thereby, including the common elements such as iron, aluminum, silicon, oxygen, and so on. That is the purpose of this article: to explore the energetic effects of mining undifferentiated crust and using <b>all </b>the material obtained thereby, or at least using as much of that material as possible.</div>
</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<h3>
Can we mine undifferentiated crust?</h3>
<div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
If we started mining undifferentiated crust, using Bardi’s machine, then the elements emitted from it would not correspond to our needs for them. For example, almost 80% of the material emissions from Bardi’s machine would consist of silicon, oxygen, sodium, potassium, and magnesium, which only could be used for making glass, at least in those quantities. Another 18% or so of the material emissions would be common metals such as aluminum, iron (for steel), titanium, and so on. Less than 1% would be the “uncommon elements” such as copper, nickel, rare earths, and so on. We must use the elements in precisely those proportions if we wish to avoid throwing away any elements emitted from Bardi’s machine.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
It’s necessary to avoid throwing away materials, because that’s what would determine how much energy would be required for Bardi’s machine, per kilogram of materials mined. If we used everything emitted from Bardi’s machine, in the proportions in which they were emitted, then the amount of energy used for mining undifferentiated crust would be 10 MJ/kg, as per Bardi’s quotation above, which is a modest amount of energy and is similar to what we use for mining today. If, on the other hand, we mine only copper from undifferentiated crust, and throw everything else away, then the energy expenditure is 400 GJ/kg, which is 40,000 times higher.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
Since we wish to avoid throwing away material, we must align our mining of undifferentiated crust with our usage of materials. Presumably, only a fraction of all mining could be done using Bardi’s machines. Some of the common elements (like aluminum and iron) would still be mined using traditional methods, so only a fraction of our mining would use Bardi’s machines. That fraction must be low enough that no materials are emitted from Bardi’s machine in greater quantities than are used by that civilization. In that manner, Bardi’s machines would <b>displace </b>the energy which otherwise would have been used to obtain materials for glass, steel, and so on, using traditional mining methods. We would get the common elements “for free” from Bardi’s machines, as a side effect of trying to obtain the rare ones, which would reduce the energy expenditure for mining elsewhere in the economy. As a result, the net effect of using Bardi’s machines would not increase the energy requirements for mining as a whole, at least not by very much. The advantage of using Bardi’s machine is that it would also emit small quantities of all the uncommon elements, so we would never run out of them over any time scale.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
Let’s suppose that civilization has exhausted all ores and all concentrated deposits, of all rare elements, everywhere. All that remains is undifferentiated crust for uncommon elements. Also assume that civilization wishes to use Bardi’s machines as much as possible to obtain uncommon elements from that point forward. We’ll assume the civilization uses the same proportions of common elements (such as silicon, iron, and so on) as we use today.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
In which case, Bardi’s machines could be used to mine all the materials for all <b>glass </b>produced by that civilization. Glass would be the material which was relatively most over-supplied from Bardi’s machines (almost 80% of the material emitted could only be used for making glass). As a result, if there was enough demand for all that glass from Bardi’s machines, then there would also be enough demand for all the iron, aluminum, calcium (for cement), and so on. Little material would be thrown away. All other glassmaking operations in civilization could cease, thereby saving the energy that had been expended on it. Also, some of the mining for bauxite, iron, and so on, would also be displaced by Bardi’s machines. The amount of energy used by Bardi’s machines would be on the order of 10 MJ/kg, which is not higher than civilization was already expending upon glass, aluminum, and so on.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
It would be possible to make glass directly from the output of Bardi’s machines, by mixing together the necessary elements while they were still molten, and cooling the result quickly enough that glass is formed. This would displace the amount of energy used for glassmaking elsewhere in the economy, which is on the order of 15 MJ/kg of glass. Of course, we would also make some steel and some aluminum from the output of Bardi’s machines.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
This strategy would reduce the amount of energy required for mining undifferentiated crust. The amount of energy for mining <b>altogether </b>would not be much higher than today. Furthermore, we would get all of the elements which occur in the Earth’s crust, as long as mining continued.</div>
</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<h3>
Elemental Scarcity</h3>
<div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
As a result, we could use Bardi’s machines to a limited degree, and could obtain all elements indefinitely, without ever increasing the energy we use for mining. We would just have to limit the use of Bardi's machines so that they don't produce much more of any elements than were otherwise mined.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
The problem is, the amounts of uncommon elements would be emitted in fairly limited quantities. We’d never run out of uncommon elements, but the amounts produced per year of copper, nickel, and so on, would be fairly limited, assuming we don’t wish to “throw away” anything, and thereby increase the amount of energy devoted to mining intolerably.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
At present, global civilization produces about 70 million tonnes of glass per year. If all that glass were produced from materials from Bardi’s machines, then the following amounts of rare elements would also be obtained:</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
Copper (70 megatonnes * 70ppm) = 4,900 tonnes/year</div>
<div>
Nickel (70 megatonnes * 90ppm) = 6,300 tonnes/year</div>
<div>
Lithium = ~1,800 tonnes/year</div>
<div>
"Rare Earth" elements = ~20,000 tonnes/year</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
As a result, we would mine 0.7 grams of copper per person per year, and also 0.9 grams of nickel, worldwide, and similar or smaller amounts of all the other uncommon elements per person each year. Doing so would never require more energy than is expended on mining now. We could mine those rare elements, in those amounts, from undifferentiated crust until the sun explodes. We would never run out of them, and would never expend any more energy on mining than we do now.</div>
</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<h3>
Conclusion</h3>
<div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
As a result, our civilization could always have enough of the uncommon elements for things like smart phones, flat screen televisions, computer chips, and so on. Many of those devices use less than one gram of uncommon elements, per device. We could always mine enough materials for those purposes, even after billions of years.</div>
<div>
<br />
We would also have enough uncommon elements for "massive" uses of them, such as electric cars, as long as we enforce high rates of recycling. For example, we would have enough lithium for electric cars indefinitely, provided that the batteries are sealed from the environment and the recycling rate is 99% or higher. If we assume that an electric vehicle has 30 kg of lithium in its batteries, the batteries are sealed from the environment, the car lasts 20 years, and 99.9% of the lithium in electric cars is recycled, then an average electric vehicle would require a net of 1.5 grams of lithium per year to be mined. That amount is on the order of what would be emitted from Bardi's machines, with no additional expenditure of energy. As a result, we would have enough lithium (and other uncommon elements) for "bulk" uses, indefinitely, as long as we enforce high rates of recycling.<br />
<br /></div>
<div>
We would not, however, have enough rare elements for “bulk” usages that are just thrown away. Some day, we will not have enough uncommon elements to allow people to throw away larger than single-digit gram quantities of rare elements per year. At some point, careful recycling will be required for devices (such as electric cars) which use large quantities of uncommon elements.<br />
<br />
A few caveats are necessary here. It's possible that we won't have enough lithium in the future to build additional new electric vehicles. We would have enough lithium to sustain the peak number of electric cars indefinitely, but not enough to build additional new electric cars. Also, it is quite possible that we will simply substitute other elements when rare ones become scarcer, in which case, we would not pursue the diffuse deposits for those elements.<br />
<br />
However, we will never "run out" of any element over any time period. The conclusion is that we <b>can </b>mine undifferentiated crust, in limited amounts. It is energetically feasible to do so. As a result, we will never run out of any element over any time period. We may have much lower extraction of some elements, far in the future, but extraction will never be zero for any important element. All uncommon elements will always be available, at tolerable energy expense.<br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><i>NOTE: I made two changes to this article the day after it was published, as explained in the comments below. I also added the "caveats" paragraph shortly after this article was first published.</i></span><br />
<br /></div>
</div>
Tomhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18396160316791132955noreply@blogger.com13tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7005412100005882053.post-88709349210565846842016-07-17T19:57:00.002-07:002016-07-23T15:21:48.094-07:00The Energy TrapIn this post I will address the issue called the "Energy Trap", which was explained well by Tom Murphy on his excellent <a href="http://physics.ucsd.edu/do-the-math/2011/10/the-energy-trap/">blog post</a> and re-iterated by oatleg in the comments to my prior post. Basically, the "energy trap" is a scenario where fossil fuels peak and start to decline, and we must start investing energy in building renewables in order to replace fossil fuels. But there is a problem, as follows: renewables require a large up-front investment of energy, but pay back that energy only gradually over many years. As a result, when fossil fuels start to decline, we must make large up-front investments in renewable power precisely when energy for investment is in short supply, leading to a temporary "energy deficit". For a fuller description of this phenomenon, I highly recommend reading Tom Murphy's blog post entitled <a href="http://physics.ucsd.edu/do-the-math/2011/10/the-energy-trap/">The Energy Trap</a>.<br />
<br />
I decided to model this phenomenon of the "energy trap" by using a small computer program, which I wrote in python. Any reader can download the python interpreter for free and run the simulation on his computer (the source code is posted in the comments below).<br />
<br />
For the simulation, I made the following assumptions:<br />
<ol>
<li>Civilization gets all of its energy as electricity, generated from burning fossil fuels</li>
<li>All fossil fuels peak on the same day and decline immediately according to the right-hand side of a Gaussian curve</li>
<li>Fossil fuels start declining immediately without warning, and without any kind of production plateau</li>
<li>The Gaussian decline curve has a standard deviation of 30 years which is a very rapid decline. As a result, there is a 50% decline in all fossil fuel production in only 34 years.</li>
<li>There are no "unconventional" fossil fuels which will allow us to delay the decline or extend the decline curve</li>
<li>No preparation has been made. The investment in renewables beforehand was zero.</li>
<li>Investors and decision-makers do not begin investing in renewables until 7 years after the declines in fossil fuel production have begun, because it takes time to realize what is happening and ramp up PV production.</li>
<li>Investors use a very naive formula for determining how much PV to build. Once they realize what is happening, they start investing about 5% of electricity production per year to building renewables, later increasing the investment to 1/ERoEI.</li>
</ol>
<div>
Please note that these assumptions are all incredibly pessimistic. These were by far the most pessimistic assumptions which I could imagine but which were still at least somewhat plausible.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
If I run my simulation with those parameters, what results do I get? Here are the results in tabular format:</div>
<div>
<table border="2">
<tbody>
<tr><td>year</td><td>gross_ff</td><td>gross_pv</td><td>gross_total</td><td>net_total</td><td>invest_pv</td><td>invest_ff</td><td>fraction_original_net</td></tr>
<tr><td>0</td><td>1.0000</td><td>0.0000</td><td>1.0000</td><td>0.9000</td><td>0.0000</td><td>0.1000</td><td>1.0000</td></tr>
<tr><td>2</td><td>0.9978</td><td>0.0000</td><td>0.9978</td><td>0.8978</td><td>0.0000</td><td>0.1000</td><td>0.9975</td></tr>
<tr><td>4</td><td>0.9912</td><td>0.0000</td><td>0.9912</td><td>0.8912</td><td>0.0000</td><td>0.1000</td><td>0.9902</td></tr>
<tr><td>6</td><td>0.9802</td><td>0.0000</td><td>0.9802</td><td>0.8802</td><td>0.0000</td><td>0.1000</td><td>0.9780</td></tr>
<tr><td>8</td><td>0.9651</td><td>0.0167</td><td>0.9817</td><td>0.8449</td><td>0.0500</td><td>0.0869</td><td>0.9388</td></tr>
<tr><td>10</td><td>0.9460</td><td>0.0500</td><td>0.9960</td><td>0.8608</td><td>0.0500</td><td>0.0851</td><td>0.9565</td></tr>
<tr><td>12</td><td>0.9231</td><td>0.0833</td><td>1.0064</td><td>0.8734</td><td>0.0500</td><td>0.0831</td><td>0.9704</td></tr>
<tr><td>14</td><td>0.8968</td><td>0.1167</td><td>1.0135</td><td>0.8828</td><td>0.0500</td><td>0.0807</td><td>0.9809</td></tr>
<tr><td>16</td><td>0.8674</td><td>0.1500</td><td>1.0174</td><td>0.8894</td><td>0.0500</td><td>0.0781</td><td>0.9882</td></tr>
<tr><td>18</td><td>0.8353</td><td>0.1833</td><td>1.0186</td><td>0.8934</td><td>0.0500</td><td>0.0752</td><td>0.9927</td></tr>
<tr><td>20</td><td>0.8007</td><td>0.2167</td><td>1.0174</td><td>0.8953</td><td>0.0500</td><td>0.0721</td><td>0.9948</td></tr>
<tr><td>22</td><td>0.7642</td><td>0.2500</td><td>1.0142</td><td>0.8954</td><td>0.0500</td><td>0.0688</td><td>0.9949</td></tr>
<tr><td>24</td><td>0.7261</td><td>0.2833</td><td>1.0095</td><td>0.8941</td><td>0.0500</td><td>0.0654</td><td>0.9935</td></tr>
<tr><td>26</td><td>0.6869</td><td>0.3167</td><td>1.0036</td><td>0.8918</td><td>0.0500</td><td>0.0618</td><td>0.9908</td></tr>
<tr><td>28</td><td>0.6469</td><td>0.3500</td><td>0.9969</td><td>0.8887</td><td>0.0500</td><td>0.0582</td><td>0.9874</td></tr>
<tr><td>30</td><td>0.6065</td><td>0.4000</td><td>1.0065</td><td>0.8519</td><td>0.1000</td><td>0.0546</td><td>0.9466</td></tr>
<tr><td>32</td><td>0.5662</td><td>0.4667</td><td>1.0328</td><td>0.8819</td><td>0.1000</td><td>0.0510</td><td>0.9799</td></tr>
<tr><td>34</td><td>0.5261</td><td>0.5333</td><td>1.0595</td><td>0.9121</td><td>0.1000</td><td>0.0474</td><td>1.0134</td></tr>
<tr><td>36</td><td>0.4868</td><td>0.6000</td><td>1.0868</td><td>0.9429</td><td>0.1000</td><td>0.0438</td><td>1.0477</td></tr>
<tr><td>38</td><td>0.4483</td><td>0.6500</td><td>1.0983</td><td>0.9580</td><td>0.1000</td><td>0.0403</td><td>1.0644</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">(Note: All values are fractions of the original gross amount of energy from fossil fuels; so an invest_pv column of 0.05 means that 5% of the original gross amount of energy is invested in PV panels)</span></div>
<div>
<br /></div>
As we can see, there is an "energy deficit" starting on year 8, because of the energy trap. At that point, civilization is only consuming 93.88% as much electricity as it used to. The reason is because year 8 is when investors have realized that fossil fuels are on a permanent decline, and start "investing" only 5% of yearly electricity in building solar panels. However, the 5% investment is all up front, with little payout this year, leading to an energy deficit of 5% this year plus a few more percent for the amount that fossil fuels had declined thus far. The energy deficit is <i>brief, </i>and civilization is back up to 97% consumption in 4 years.<br />
<br />
Which raises the question: what will we actually do? Will we decide to forgo 5% of our electricity consumption now, as I assume above, in order to avert the gradual collapse of civilization over the next few decades? Or will we take the short-term view, and decide to "eat our seed corn" (so to speak) and cannibalize our energy infrastructure, leading to a small increase in our energy consumption now but the destruction of our civilization later?<br />
<br />
Tom Murphy has this to say about it:<br />
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
"<span style="background-color: white; color: #373737; font-family: "helvetica neue" , "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 24.375px;">Politically, the Energy Trap is a killer. In my lifetime, I have not witnessed in our political system the adult behavior that would be needed to buckle down for a long-term goal involving short-term sacrifice."</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #373737; font-family: "helvetica neue" , "helvetica" , "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 24.375px;"><br /></span></blockquote>
<br />
I disagree with that remark. These decisions are not made by our political system, but by <b>investors </b>in energy markets. Those investors <b>routinely </b>make short term sacrifices for larger payouts later. That is what investment means. For example, investors routinely carry out long-term planning and buy capital equipment (such as power plants) which will pay out over 30 years, but which require an up-front investment now. That is why we have power plants. Investors could <b>always </b>eat their seed corn and spend the money now rather than investing in the future. In general, they don't do that.<br />
<br />
When fossil fuels start declining, the price of energy will skyrocket. Even a modest decline of a few percent of energy, could lead to a tripling of prices or more. At that point, the financial return of investing in renewables would be <b>enormous </b>and nearly certain. Any investment in renewables would promise vast payouts down the line, far higher than are obtained by any other investments. As a result, investors will <b>transfer money </b>from other investments in to this one. Investors are capable of outbidding consumers for that 5% of yearly electricity which is necessary to invest for the transition.<br />
<br />
The energy trap is actually a fairly mild problem. Even using the incredibly pessimistic assumptions I outlined above, we will never face more than a 6.12% deficit of energy. The deficit starts decreasing right away and almost vanishes within 9 years after it begun. The energy trap is easy to overcome, with only modest and temporary sacrifices.<br />
<br />
Furthermore, the deficit of 6.12% is almost certainly higher than what we will face in reality. We have begun transitioning to renewables decades before fossil fuels have begun declining. Furthermore, we get a large fraction of our energy now from sources other than fossil fuels (like nuclear and hydro-electric). What's more, the decline in fossil fuel production will be far more gradual than I modeled above. Also, there will be a production plateau lasting decades before fossil fuels start declining. Furthermore, investors will use a more sophisticated algorithm when determining how much PV to build, rather than just suddenly increasing PV investment from 0% to 5% (as I modeled above) which briefly worsens the energy deficit. When I run my model with more realistic assumptions that aren't so incredibly pessimistic, I find an energy deficit of less than 0.4% at its worst point.<br />
<br />
In conclusion, the energy trap is easy to overcome with only modest adjustments. It requires modest planning--the kind which investment markets routinely carry out. As a result, the energy trap will be a minor problem which will impose only temporary and insignificant reductions in energy, in my opinion. It is also possible that civilization will transition to renewables before we reach peak fossil fuels, in which case the energy deficit will be zero.<br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">(NOTE: The python source code is posted in the comments below)</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">(NOTE: I made minor changes to the wording of this article two days after initial publication. The values from the table have not changed.)</span><br />
<br />Tomhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18396160316791132955noreply@blogger.com8tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7005412100005882053.post-83547165019714249592016-06-19T00:25:00.002-07:002016-08-23T14:42:39.794-07:00ERoEI is unimportant and is being used incorrectly<div class="p1">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">In this article I will show that ERoEI is unimportant by itself. It usually does not matter if ERoEI is increasing or decreasing. ERoEI provides no guidance about which sources of energy we should pursue, nor does it offer any guidance about how much net energy will be available to us in the future. By itself, ERoEI is a useless figure, unless it is lower than 1, which it almost never is. Although different sources of energy (such as coal or solar PV) have different ERoEI ratios, this means nothing important.</span></div>
<div class="p1">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="p1">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">What is important to civilization (and to us) is the <b>amount </b>of <b>net</b> energy obtained from a source of energy. It is an <b>amount </b>of <b>net energy </b>(not a high ERoEI) which allows us to drive cars, fly airplanes, and so on. If we obtain 1 GWh of NET energy, then it does not matter if it came from a high-ERoEI source, or from a low one. What matters is the <b>amount</b> of net energy.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">In turn, the amount of net energy depends upon two things: ERoEI <b>AND </b>the amount of <b>gross </b>energy. <b>BOTH</b> of those figures are required to determine the amount of net energy obtained. ERoEI by itself tells us almost nothing.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Let me provide an example, to demonstrate this point. </span>Suppose you have a solar PV panel with an ERoEI of 3, which returns 1KW on average continuously for 30 years. In that case, the net energy provided by that solar panel is 175.2 MWh ((1*24*365*30)*(1-1/3)) over its lifetime. If, however you have ten such solar panels, then the net energy returned is ten times higher (1752 MWh), despite no change in ERoEI.<br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">For the most part, the amount of NET energy we can obtain is determined by the amount of GROSS energy we can obtain, not by ERoEI. Usually, ERoEI is only a minor factor. This is because the difference in the amount of gross energy between sources of energy is so large that it completely overshadows any minor influence that ERoEI would have.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">For example, suppose we had single 1KW solar panel, and the panel had a very low ERoEI of 4 (which is certainly an underestimate [1]). Even if you increased the ERoEI from the very low value of 4, all the way up to to infinity, so that no energy was required to replace that solar panel, it would make little difference--it would increase the amount of NET energy obtained by only 25%. On the other hand, if you could build 3 such solar panels, instead of 1, then you would triple the net energy obtained. In this case, building two more solar panels had 12x greater effect than increasing the ERoEI to infinity.</span><br />
<br />
<div style="margin: 0px;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">For the most part, the net energy obtained from solar power would be determined by the <b style="font-weight: normal;">number</b> of solar panels built, not by their ERoEI. In turn, the <b style="font-weight: normal;">number </b>of solar panels which can be built, is determined by <b style="font-weight: normal;">non-energy </b>factors like capital and labor, because those are the <b style="font-weight: normal;">scarce</b><b style="font-weight: normal;"> </b>factors which prevent the construction of more solar panels. Energy for investment is <b>not </b>scarce, because this planet is bombarded with 23,000 terawatt-years/year of solar radiation, which is vastly more than we will ever use. It is the <b>scarce </b>factors which determine how many solar panels we can build, and therefore, for the most part, how much net energy we will obtain. </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">This point is complicated and requires further elaboration, so I will discuss it in a subsequent article. Suffice it to say, that the net energy of solar power is determined by non-energy factors such as capital and labor, and has almost no relation to ERoEI, because capital and labor (not energy) are the </span><b style="font-family: inherit;">scarce </b><span style="font-family: inherit;">factors which prevent the construction of more solar panels.</span></div>
<br />
<div class="p1" style="color: black; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px;">
<div style="margin: 0px;">
</div>
</div>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Generally speaking, the amount of net energy goes up as ERoEI <b>declines</b>, although it’s a weak correlation. This is because the amount of gross energy is vastly higher at lower ERoEI ratios, and the greater amount of gross energy more than compensates for any decline in ERoEI.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">For example, solar PV could provide far more net energy than coal, regardless of its lower ERoEI. This is because solar radiation is so much more abundant that its lower ERoEI would be completely overshadowed by its greater amount. As a demonstration, suppose we could convert only 1% of solar radiation striking this planet into electricity using solar panels. In that case, we would obtain 40,000 <b>times</b> more electricity from solar power than we currently obtain from burning coal [2]. That figure does not take into account ERoEI, but it would make little difference. Even if solar PV had an extremely low ERoEI of 4 (certainly an underestimate), and coal had an ERoEI of infinity, it still would only reduce the maximum net energy of solar power by 25% relative to coal [3]. Since solar power is 40,000 times more abundant than coal, an ERoEI adjustment of 25% is not important. It would mean only that we could obtain 30,000 times more energy from solar power than from coal, rather than 40,000 times more [4].</span><br />
<br /></div>
<div class="p1">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Of course, if the ERoEI of some energy source were </span><b style="font-family: inherit;">extremely </b><span style="font-family: inherit;">low (like less than 2), then ERoEI would become an important factor. In that case, ERoEI would actually make a substantial difference, because it would cause a 50% or greater net energy loss. However, </span><b style="font-family: inherit;">all </b><span style="font-family: inherit;">common sources of generating electricity have ERoEI ratios far higher than that. With an ERoEI higher than 8 (which all sources of generating electricity have), the amount of energy spent obtaining more energy is only 12.5%, which is completely overshadowed by differences in gross amount between energy sources.</span></div>
<div class="p2">
<br /></div>
<div class="p1">
<div class="p1">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Again: net energy available is a function of BOTH EROEI AND AMOUNT. Either one of them by itself cannot be used to calculate net energy. If we wish to use a “rule of thumb”, then we should assume that MORE net energy is available at lower ERoEI ratios, but the correlation is so weak that it can’t be relied upon. In any case, ERoEI is not generally an important factor.</span></div>
<div class="p2">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Unfortunately, ERoEI theorists do not realize any of this. Over and over again, they wrongly assume that ERoEI is somehow proportional to net energy. They assume that a higher ERoEI somehow implies more net energy obtained. This is a severe mathematical error, but it’s repeated endlessly throughout the ERoEI literature, across decades.</span></div>
<div class="p2">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="p1">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Let me provide some examples which I read just a few days ago:</span></div>
<div class="p2">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1">“Look [at a] Cheetah… That beautiful and ultra efficient machine, needs an EROI of about 3:1... That’s a metabolic minimum EROI for mammals.</span><span class="s1">Being the minimum EROI for any live being (mammals in particular) 2-3:1 in average, to be kept alive as species and for the couple to successfully breed their offspring (minimum of 2-3 per couple), probably Charles Hall is very right to state that a minimum EROI of 5:1 is required to have a minimum (very primitive and elemental) of civilization, beyond us living as naked apes.”</span></span></blockquote>
<div class="p5">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">No, because that wrongly assumes that greater <b>amounts </b>of net energy are obtained at higher ERoEI. That is a basic mathematical error. Frequently, using a <b>lower</b> ERoEI source of energy will obtain more net energy than a higher ERoEI one.</span></div>
<div class="p5">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="p5">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The Cheetah example is also mistaken in other ways. The Cheetah doesn’t just have a low ERoEI; it also has TOO FEW prey which it can catch. If the Cheetah could eat prey every 5 minutes, then it would have a vast excess of energy even at an ERoEI of 1.5. The problem is that many animals eat only once per day and some animals (such as crocodiles) eat only once per week or so. The problem is <b>amount, </b>not ERoEI. If they eat only 10,000 kilocalories per week, then increasing the ERoEI wouldn’t matter much (even increasing ERoEI to infinity in this case would only gain the animal another 3,300 kilocalories). What would help is to catch MORE prey.</span></div>
<div class="p5">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Here is another example of the same mistake:</span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s2">“</span><span class="s1">We can take our ERoEI 20 FF and invest them in ERoEI 50 sources and make a huge energy profit. Or we can invest them in <5 and make a loss. Our policy makers have lost their heads electing to promote loss making activities.”</span></span></blockquote>
<div class="p7">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="p8">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">No, because that is confusing ERoEI with an AMOUNT of net energy. If an ERoEI were an amount, then spending fossil fuels with ERoEI 20 on solar panels with ERoEI 5, would imply a loss of 15. However, you cannot subtract the ERoEIs of different sources of energy, because they are not AMOUNTS which can subtracted. The correct mathematical operation is to <b>multiply </b>those two numbers, not subtract them.</span></div>
<div class="p7">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="p8">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">If you take ERoEI 20 fossil fuels, and invest them in ERoEI 5 solar PV, then the <b>aggregate</b> ERoEI is 100 (invest 1 unit of fossil fuels initially, obtain 20 units of fossil fuels with ERoEI of 20 thereby, invest each of those 20 units in solar panels with ERoEI 5, then obtain 100 units at the end of it for an initial investment of 1).</span></div>
<div class="p7">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="p7">
Here is another example:</div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s3">“</span><span class="s1">IMO, the only thing that could delay the bad impacts of declining high ERoEI FF is to introduce to the global energy mix an energy source that has higher ERoEI than the fuels they have to replace. </span><span class="s1">Introducing low ERoEI energy sources simply makes things worse.”</span></span></blockquote>
<div class="p10">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span class="s1"></span><br /></span></div>
<div class="p11">
<span class="s1" style="font-family: inherit;">No, because (again) that is confusing ERoEI with an AMOUNT of net energy. The “bad impacts” are caused by TOO LITTLE net energy, not a low ERoEI. Adding <b>any </b>source of energy with an ERoEI higher than 1 increases the total amount of net energy available. Only an ERoEI lower than 1 would make things worse. If the source of energy is <b>cheaper </b>per unit of net energy (as solar power actually is) then it is <b>easier </b>to obtain more net energy that way, regardless of its ERoEI.</span></div>
<div class="p11">
<span class="s1" style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="p11">
<span class="s1" style="font-family: inherit;">…All three of the above quotations are taken from leading figures in the ERoEI literature, all published within the last few weeks. Granted, the ERoEI movement is a tiny fringe movement, but these people are among the leading figures of it. Over and over again, they wrongly assume that ERoEI and net energy are somehow proportional, and that higher ERoEI implies more net energy. That is a basic mathematical error. Frequently, the opposite is the case.</span></div>
<span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif;"><span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif;"><br /></span>
</span><br />
<span class="s1" style="font-family: inherit;">What matters is the AMOUNT of NET energy available to civilization, and that amount is far higher for renewables than for any other source, regardless of ERoEI.</span>
<br />
<div class="p11">
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">* NOTE: In this article, I am using the term "ERoEI" to by synonymous with "EROI" and other spellings. I am referring to the amount of energy obtained for an investment of energy. If ERoEI for some energy source were extremely low (like lower than 3) then ERoEI would start to become more important, since we'd need to build significantly more power plants to generate the same net energy. Since all common sources of generating electricity have an ERoEI much higher than that, ERoEI is not important in any real-world scenario.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;">I revised this article on August 18, two months after its initial publication, to improve the flow of the text.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></div>
Tomhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18396160316791132955noreply@blogger.com54tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7005412100005882053.post-40421645953256277092015-05-21T15:02:00.000-07:002015-05-26T08:47:24.529-07:00Energy decline theory is pseudoscience<div style="font-family: verdana, 'trebuchet ms', sans-serif; font-size: 12px; margin-bottom: 10px; margin-top: 10px;">
Here is a response I wrote on a forum:</div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="font-family: verdana, 'trebuchet ms', sans-serif; font-size: 12px; margin-bottom: 10px; margin-top: 10px;">
I'm sorry, but there's just no science happening here. It's not sufficient to say the word "science" and to use scientific-sounding terms like "biophysical". Those kinds of things are also common within pseudoscience.</blockquote>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="font-family: verdana, 'trebuchet ms', sans-serif; font-size: 12px; margin-bottom: 10px; margin-top: 10px;">
What is required are specific, falsifiable, risky predictions of things which weren't happening anyway. Then those predictions must be confirmed by subsequent evidence. That is the first step toward actual science, and it has never happened and is not happening within this group.</blockquote>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="font-family: verdana, 'trebuchet ms', sans-serif; font-size: 12px; margin-bottom: 10px; margin-top: 10px;">
This group has all the hallmarks of pseudoscience. It has never produced any risky, falsifiable predictions which were confirmed by subsequent evidence, not even once. There have been massive failures of prediction, over and over again, but the theories remain totally unchanged, and the failures of prediction are not even addressed. Failures of prediction are handled by making the theory less and less falsifiable ("there is now a long descent which is difficult to see", see John Greer). Members do not respond to criticism, and leave errors uncorrected when they are pointed out. Notably, this group is ignored by legitimate researchers. There is almost no interconnection between this group and actual legitimate fields of study, and this material is rarely cited outside this group. Notably, it appears that this group settles its conclusions in advance ("civilization is about to collapse"), then generates theory after theory which all lead to that conclusion, but then the predictions all fail.</blockquote>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq" style="font-family: verdana, 'trebuchet ms', sans-serif; font-size: 12px; margin-bottom: 10px; margin-top: 10px;">
If you guys want to start doing science, then you need to respond to criticism without badly misreading it, modify your theories in light of failed predictions, and make falsifiable, risky predictions which are confirmed by subsequent evidence. Those things would be the first steps toward actual science, but those things are just not happening here.</blockquote>
<div style="font-family: verdana, 'trebuchet ms', sans-serif; font-size: 12px; margin-bottom: 10px; margin-top: 10px;">
----<br />
<br />
Here is another post from the same thread:<br />
<div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq"; margin-bottom: 10px; margin-top: 10px;">
George, you said:<br /><i>"I'm talking about <b>net free energy per capita</b>, not raw energy produced... The numbers you quote do not take into account the amount of that energy it took to obtain that amount...So with slowing net energy increase and increasing total population the amount of usable energy for the economy per individual is in decline."</i></blockquote>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq"; margin-bottom: 10px; margin-top: 10px;">
<i></i>No, that's clearly wrong. Let's do the math. According to the EIA's numbers, world energy consumption has increased from 480x10^15 to 524x10^15 btu, between 2009 and 2013 (inclusive). At the same time, world population increased from 6.83x10^9 to 7.08x10^9 people (<a href="http://www.geohive.com/earth/his_history3.aspx)." rel="nofollow" style="color: #765301;">http://www.geohive.com/earth/his_history3.aspx).</a> That means that per-capita energy consumption has increased from 70.27x10^6 btu/capita to 74.01x10^6 btu/capita in that time. In other words, per capita energy consumption increased by 5.3% in 4 years, which is a compound growth rate of ~1.3% per year.</blockquote>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq"; margin-bottom: 10px; margin-top: 10px;">
Now let's look at the prior 29 year period, from 1980-2009 (inclusive), using the same sources of data. Per capita energy consumption increased from 63.63x10^6 btu/capita to 70.27x10^6 btu/capita over 29 years, which is an increase of 10.4% over 29 years or only ~0.35% per year.</blockquote>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq"; margin-bottom: 10px; margin-top: 10px;">
In other words, per capita energy consumption is not only increasing, but the rate of increase accelerated. The growth in per capita energy consumption was much faster during the period of 2009-2013 than during the prior 29 years.</blockquote>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq"; margin-bottom: 10px; margin-top: 10px;">
Those figures are not EROI adjusted. It's impossible to find reliable statistics on worldwide average EROI.</blockquote>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq"; margin-bottom: 10px; margin-top: 10px;">
However, it's totally implausible that average EROI worldwide has dropped by an amount sufficient to erase that acceleration in energy consumption. Even if EROI had been stable and had not declined at all over 29 years, and then suddenly dropped from 30 to 15 (a decline by half, which is totally implausible) in only the 4 year subsequent period, the EROI-adjusted per capita energy consumption still increased faster (0.5% vs 0.35%) during the period from 2009-2013 than during the prior 29 years.</blockquote>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq"; margin-bottom: 10px; margin-top: 10px;">
The straightforward conclusion from this, is that per capita energy consumption is increasing, and the rate of increase has sped up, no matter what you think happened to EROI (within reason).</blockquote>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq"; margin-bottom: 10px; margin-top: 10px;">
I don't know how you arrived at the conclusion that "usable energy ... per individual is in decline". Your statement is not compatible with the data which hitssquad just presented.</blockquote>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq"; margin-bottom: 10px; margin-top: 10px;">
This is exactly the opposite of what energy doomers had predicted. They had confidently predicted a sudden collapse of civilization in the late late 2000s and rapid declines in energy consumption. What happened was the opposite of what they had predicted, yet again.<br />The consistent and severe failure of prediction from these theories implies that there is something seriously wrong with them. It's <b>long overdue</b> to start asking what is wrong.</blockquote>
<div style="margin-bottom: 10px; margin-top: 10px;">
<br /></div>
</div>
---<br />
<br />
Here is another post from the same thread:<br />
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Hi Harry,</blockquote>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
I just read through the comments again, and came across yours. You said:</blockquote>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
"Could you be very kind and point me to some of those suggestions? I am about to radically decouple!"</blockquote>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Harry, are you going to radically decouple because you expect civilization to collapse soon? If so, you're about to throw your life away. Civilization is not collapsing for these reasons. The most recent collapse predictions from this group are no more scientific, and no better founded, than any of their other collapse predictions over the prior decades.</blockquote>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
This material is just totally wrong. It's littered with severe errors that invalidate its conclusions, it's ignored by almost all relevant experts, it does not meet the minimal criteria of a valid scientific theory, and it's characterized by massive, repeated failures of prediction without any corresponding correction of the underlying theories.</blockquote>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
There have already been many people who moved out into the wilderness circa 2005 in expectation of a drastic collapse of civilization, for these reasons. They wasted ten years of their lives on a fringe doomsday theory. Do you really want to join them? Of course, you can do whatever you want, but you should clearly envision what you will feel like when five or more years have passed and civilization hasn't collapsed and not that much has happened other than you living in the middle of nowhere.</blockquote>
<br />
<br /></div>
<div style="font-family: verdana, 'trebuchet ms', sans-serif; font-size: 12px; margin-bottom: 10px; margin-top: 10px;">
The original conversation is <a href="http://questioneverything.typepad.com/question_everything/2015/05/civilization-collapse-30/comments/page/2/#comments">here</a>.</div>
Tomhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18396160316791132955noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7005412100005882053.post-64047659008776754472015-05-11T18:59:00.003-07:002017-01-05T18:03:52.344-08:00Six Errors in ERoEI calculationsThe <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_returned_on_energy_invested">ERoEI</a> ratio refers to the amount of energy which we must expend in order to obtain more energy. For example, if we must use one barrel of oil in order to drill for another three barrels of oil, then the ERoEI ratio of the oil we obtained thereby is 3:1, or just 3. As another example, it may take one bushel of coal worth of energy in order to mine 10 more bushels of coal, in which case the ERoEI of the coal we obtained is 10:1, or just 10.<br />
<br />
Different sources of energy have different ERoEI ratios. Some sources of energy (such as coal) have high ERoEI ratios, typically more than 20:1, which indicates that coal requires very little energy expenditure to obtain it. Other sources of energy, such as oil, have much lower ERoEI ratios. Some sources of energy, such as corn ethanol, take as much energy to obtain as they will yield. They provide no leftover energy to society, and have an ERoEI of 1.<br />
<br />
The ERoEI of various energy sources has been calculated throughout various papers on that topic. There are at least 30 papers calculating the ERoEI ratio for various sources of energy such as nuclear, coal, solar PV, and others.<br />
<br />
Unfortunately, the reported ERoEI ratios for any given energy source are often widely divergent from one paper to the next. For example, Weissbach et al<sup><span style="font-size: xx-small;">[1]</span></sup> report an ERoEI of 75 for nuclear power, whereas another study<sup><span style="font-size: xx-small;">[2]</span></sup> reports an ERoEI of less than 1 for the same energy source. As another example, the ERoEI of solar PV is reported as 2.3 in Weissbach et al's paper<sup><span style="font-size: xx-small;">[1]</span></sup>, and the high 30s in another paper<sup><span style="font-size: xx-small;">[3]</span></sup>. Those kinds of discrepancies are common throughout the ERoEI literature.<br />
<br />
Much of those discrepancies are caused by errors in the calculation of ERoEI which I will detail here. Once these errors are corrected in the offending papers, the resultant ERoEI ratios for different sources of energy become much closer together.<br />
<br />
The errors are as follows:<br />
<br />
<h3>
<b>Error #1: Energy returns are repeatedly treated as energy investment</b></h3>
It's crucial not to count energy returns as energy investment, because they are different things. It would be incorrect to include energy returns as energy investment. It would yield the wrong result. However, this mistake is made repeatedly in the papers of Charles Hall and others.<br />
<br />
As an example, the paper<sup><span style="font-size: xx-small;">[4]</span></sup> from C Hall (<i>What is the Minimum EROI that a Sustainable Society Must Have?) </i>calculates the EROI of oil. However, it includes the energy cost of freeways, automobiles, and so on. <b>That is a mistake, because those things are energy returns, not energy investments to obtain energy. </b>If I drive my car down the freeway, and I'm not doing so out of necessity for gathering coal, then it was because of <b>energy returns.</b><br />
<b><br /></b>If you include <b>all</b> energy returns as energy investment, then the EROI of every energy source is 1. This is an application of the first law of thermodynamics. It would be highly surprising if we got more energy out of an energy source than was present within it. As a result, it is not surprising that the EROI of any energy source will converge to 1, as returns are included in the denominator. However, that does not yield any useful information, because it does not tell us how much energy is left over after obtaining the energy to provide for consumption. That is just a roundabout way of testing the first law of thermodynamics--something which has already has been tested and which could be tested far more directly. If we wish to find how much energy is left over as a return, then we must <b>exclude </b>returns from the denominator.<br />
<br />
Many of the conversions of money to energy, which are found throughout the EROI literature, are implicitly committing this mistake. For example, in Hall's papers such as <i>Spain's Photovoltaic Revolution</i><sup><span style="font-size: xx-small;">[5]</span></sup><i> </i>and the accompanying presentation<sup><span style="font-size: xx-small;">[6]</span></sup>. On pp 12 of that presentation, there is a conversion of money into energy units, in order to find the energy cost of things like accountants employed by solar companies, etc. The formula presented is "At 1 Toe = 42 GJ, this represents 5.12MJ/Euro" which is derived from dividing the GDP with all energy usage in the entire country (Spain). <b>That is a mistake, </b>because most energy usage in the country is <b>energy returns, </b>not energy investment. To correct this mistake, Hall et al should take the total energy return for the country as a whole and divide it by the ERoEI which prevails for the country as a whole.<br />
<br />
Performing this correction (assuming an average EROI of 10 for the country), by will increase the reported ERoEI of solar PV for that paper from 2.79, to <b>5.22</b>. The figure of 5.22 is much closer to other reported ERoEI calculations for solar PV. This correction was performed by dividing all values by 10 which were the result of a money conversion as found in the chart on pp 12 in the above presentation<sup><span style="font-size: xx-small;">[6]</span></sup>.<br />
<br />
<h3>
Error #2: Lifetime estimates are incorrect</h3>
Many papers wrongly assume that the lifetime of an energy source is <b>identical to its warranty period. </b>For example, Hall et al's book<sup><span style="font-size: xx-small;">[5]</span></sup> indicated above, and Weissbach et al's paper<sup><span style="font-size: xx-small;">[1]</span></sup>, both assume that the lifespan of a solar PV module is 25 years because that is the warranty period.<br />
<br />
It would be highly surprising if solar PV cells failed on exactly the day their warranty expired. For example, I bought a car with a 50,000 mile warranty, but it didn't cease working at 50,000 miles.<br />
<br />
The reason manufacturers are offering a 25 year warranty on solar cells is because they expect the vast majority of cells to last longer than that.<br />
<br />
This error has a large effect on calculated EROI. In Weissbach et al's paper<sup><span style="font-size: xx-small;">[1]</span></sup>, the EROI of nuclear is calculated as 75 but the EROI of solar PV is calculated as 3.8, partly because nuclear plants are assumed to last twice as long as their original rated lifespan based upon observations, but solar cells are assumed to fail the exact day their warranty expires.<br />
<br />
Even worse, many EROI papers contain incorrect aggregations of lifespan estimates. For example, C Hall's book<sup><span style="font-size: xx-small;">[5]</span></sup> includes energy costs for things such as access roads to the solar plant, metal fence posts around the solar plant, concrete in the foundation, steel frames for the solar cells, etc. These things are <b>grouped together </b>with the solar cells themselves and are therefore wrongly assumed to have the same lifespan as the cells themselves. Even if the solar cells spontaneously stop working the very day their warranty expires, the rest of the plant (access roads, fences, steel frames, canals, and so on), will certainly last much longer, and would be re-used.<br />
<br />
<h3>
Error #3: Not counting embedded energy which is recovered</h3>
Papers about EROI frequently include the "embedded energy" cost of components for an energy source. For example, calculations of the EROI for solar PV often include the "embedded energy" in the aluminum frames which support the solar panels in the field.<br />
<br />
If embedded energy is counted on the way in, then it must also be counted on the way <b>out. </b>These papers uniformly fail to account for the energy which is recovered when the aluminum is recycled when the frames are dismantled. The recovered energy should be counted because the aluminum <b>will </b>be recycled. Almost all major corporations recycle structural materials such as aluminum because they <b>save money </b>by doing so.<br />
<br />
This factor alone has a <b>large effect </b>on the reported EROI of solar PV. Much of the energy for solar PV is actually devoted to the aluminum frames which support the panels. About 75% of the energy for manufacturing those panels would be <b>recovered </b>when the panels are decommissioned.<br />
<br />
In J Lundin's paper<sup><span style="font-size: xx-small;">[7]</span></sup>, there was some confusion expressed over how much recycled material should be assumed within incoming aluminum used to build solar frames. In my opinion, the incoming aluminum should be counted as <b>100% virgin, </b>and the outgoing aluminum <b>must also be counted, </b>and should be counted as <b>100% recycled </b>minus the energy costs of recycling. This is the only correct way. If recycled aluminum is used when a power plant is constructed, then the recycled portion is displacing the usage of that recycled aluminum elsewhere, which would require precisely that amount of aluminum to be made from raw materials for something else. Thus, 100% of the aluminum used for construction of the plant should be counted as virgin. However, 100% of the aluminum which is recovered should be subtracted from energy investments (not including the energy used to recycle the aluminum) because <b>that</b> is displacing aluminum which would have been made from virgin material elsewhere.<br />
<br />
<br />
<h3>
Error #4: Waste heat losses are counted as energy returns</h3>
This is a recurring problem throughout the ERoEI literature. Waste heat should not be counted as energy returns because it is not usable as energy to society. The only exception is when the waste heat is actually used for something (such as combined heat and power plants), but this is rare.<br />
<br />
This factor is parcticularly important when computing the ERoEI of oil. Oil is refined and then used as transportation fuel within vehicles. Those vehicles have engines which convert the chemical energy in fuel to kinetic energy (movement). However, the engines lose about 70% of the energy in the fuel during the conversion. <b>This must be counted as an energy loss. </b>As a result, the EROI of oil is overstated almost everywhere by at least a factor of 3.<br />
<br />
In fact, it might be useful to abandon the ratio "EROI" in these cases, and adopt the ratio "thermodynamic work over energy investment" or TWoEI. It is <b>work </b>which we want in the economy, not waste heat.<br />
<br />
This factor is especially important when considering the oft-repeated figure that "oil had an EROI of 100 back in 1930". This comment is frequently repeated by the doomsday prepper sect. In fact, that EROI of oil back in 1930, does not include refinery losses, nor does it count losses in internal combustion engines which were even less efficient back then. If I perform a back-of-the-envelope calculation which takes into account those two factors (100*0.7*0.15), I obtain a corrected EROI of <b>10.5</b> for oil in 1930, not 100.<br />
<br />
<h3>
Error #5: Outdated figures are used</h3>
Frequently there are large discrepancies in the EROI calculations because different technologies are assumed when calculating energy inputs. For example, there are large discrepancies of the reported EROI of nuclear power. That is partly because some papers<sup><span style="font-size: xx-small;">[1]</span></sup> calculate the EROI using gas diffusion enrichment of uranium, while other papers calculate the EROI using centrifruge enrichment<sup><span style="font-size: xx-small;">[8]</span></sup>. Those different assumptions will yield very different EROIs for nuclear power, because centrifuge enrichment is so much more efficient. This factor is a large part of the energy investment for nuclear power, and so has a big effect on the resultant EROI.<br />
<br />
When calculating the EROI of an energy source, we should use the most <b>modern </b>technology when calculating energy inputs. We wish to know the EROI of an energy source <b>going forward, </b>not the EROI of an energy source if we had built it years ago.<br />
<br />
As an example, the paper by Weissbach et al<sup><span style="font-size: xx-small;">[1]</span></sup>, in its calculations of the EROI of solar PV, assumes the <b>Siemens process </b>is used to generate solar PV grade silicon. However, that process has been supplanted by processes which use only 40% of the energy<sup><span style="font-size: xx-small;">[9]</span></sup>. <b>This factor by itself increases the EROI of solar PV in Weissbach's paper from 3.8 to 6.6.</b><br />
<br />
<h3>
Error #6: Invalid Comparisons Are Made</h3>
The are actually different types of EROI depending upon where the boundaries are drawn for calculations. When calculating the EROI of oil, do you include refinery losses? Energy losses for the transport of oil? Waste heat losses from the car? And so on. Each one of those calculations represents a <b>different type </b>of EROI. Some EROI calculations attempt to include only energy inputs used for extraction at the mine mouth, whereas other EROI calculations attempt to include <b>every </b>energy investment in the entire economy, such as the energy investment for building rail lines to transport the coal. Those are <b>different types </b>of EROI.<br />
<br />
EROI figures should <b>not be compared </b>if they draw the boundaries very differently. For example, there was a very famous graph from Charles Hall which makes such comparisons<sup><span style="font-size: xx-small;">[9]</span></sup> (found <a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhXVgf1R9zrocPk8KDw-dzrYKF5Z5yOK_xKAyJlrjCjMv5jW9zkOkI_45X2sAvvOu2picr1hRlX-c8pJYzeWGoDQtuSNCRoWGtCeWkwBTwOHaYPjjp6uewjsGzDrFCfbTHclhP7TLsIsnT2/s1600/1.jpg">here</a>). That graph spread like wildfire throughout the peak oil community. However, that graph is repeatedly comparing different types of EROI figures which are <b>not comparable.</b><br />
<b><br /></b>For example, the comparison of the EROI of coal (about 70) to nuclear (about 10), taken from that graph. There is a big difference in the kinds of EROI for those two sources. The figure for coal is <b>before </b>waste heat losses are subtracted for generating electricity, whereas the figure for nuclear is <b>after </b>waste heat losses are subtracted. When a correction is made for that, coal has an EROI of about 24.5, compared to nuclear of 10. The discrepancy has been reduced considerably.<br />
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As another example from the same graph, oil from 1930 is reported to have an EROI of 100, whereas hydroelectric is reported to have an EROI of 30. However, the EROI of oil from does not include refinery losses and waste heat losses from interal combustion engines in 1930. Correcting these factors yields an EROI of <b>10.5 </b>for oil in 1930, not 100. Of course, hydroelectric also suffers from electrical resistance losses which reduces its EROI to perhaps 25. However, the adjusted EROI ratio for oil has gone from <b>much higher </b>to <b>much lower </b>when an adjustment is made so the figures are comparable.</div>
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<h3>
Conclusion</h3>
The six errors described above are widespread throughout the ERoEI literature. They are partly responsible for the wide discrepancy between reported ERoEI findings.<br />
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For example, Charles Hall et al's book<sup><span style="font-size: xx-small;">[5]</span></sup>, <i>Spain's Photovoltaic Revolution</i>, is committing errors #1, #2, #3, and #5. When I correct those errors and re-calculate, I obtain an EROI of <b>6.27 </b>for solar PV<b>, </b>not 2.79 as reported.<br />
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Weissbach's paper<sup><span style="font-size: xx-small;">[1]</span></sup> calculates an EROI of solar PV at 3.8. However, that paper is committing errors #2, #3, and #5. When I correct those errors, I obtain an EROI of <b>12.96</b>, and not the 3.8 which that paper reported. Incidentally, that paper also calculates the EROI for solar in a cloudy site in Germany, and then generalizes that to the EROI of "solar PV" altogether. If I correct that factor also, and use the average insolation for the inhabited northern hemisphere, then I obtain an EROI figure of <b>22 </b>for solar PV<b>, </b>which is much higher than the reported figure of 3.8.<br />
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Finally, even the concept of EROI has problems.<b> </b>Perhaps net energy should be expressed or reported differently, using a different ratio. This is because EROI gives an exaggerated impression of the difference between energy sources. For example, assume a hypothetical energy source with an EROI of 10,000, and compare it to an energy source with an EROI of 10. The source with an EROI of 10,000 would require 0.0001% of its output (1/10000) to build another like it, whereas the source with an EROI of 10 would require only 10% of its output (1/10) to build another like it. In other words, a reduction in EROI of 99.99% led to a reduction of net energy output of only 10%. This is because EROI is less and less important as it becomes higher. Instead of using EROI, we should calculate net energy as 1-(EI/ER), and then express that as a percentage. For example, if natural gas has an EROI of 15 (everything included such as infrastructure), and solar PV has an EROI of 6.27 (everything included), then their inverted ratios are <b>93%</b> and <b>84%</b> respectively. This means that 7 percent of the energy from the gas plant is necessary to build another gas plant, whereas 16 percent of the energy from the solar plant is necessary to build another solar plant. The net energy available to society has declined by only 9% despite EROI falling by more than half. Thus, EROI figures give an incorrect impression, and should be calculated and reported differently.<br />
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When all the problems above are corrected, it's unclear if there is any significant difference in net energy between different methods of generating electricity. The highest EROI source (hydroelectric) requires 1.3% of its output to build another hydroelectric dam, whereas the lowest source (solar PV) requires 16%. This implies only that we would need to build slightly more solar cells (~15% more) to obtain the same net energy. Any EROI more than 5 or so makes little difference (20% at most). All common methods of generating electricity seem to exceed that threshold.<br />
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Certainly, we should investigate further into this matter. If any method of generating electricity has a disastrously low EROI (lower than 4 or so, everything included) then it would be very helpful for us to know about it. Hall's work is very useful in this regard, insofar as he attempts to include all energy investments, which will give us better approximations of relative EROIs. However, we must avoid the above mentioned errors in performing our calculations.<br />
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p.s. This paper should be seen as a draft. I will update it if any relevant objections are made.<br />
<br />Tomhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18396160316791132955noreply@blogger.com11tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7005412100005882053.post-40451197572019110802015-04-26T15:09:00.003-07:002015-04-26T17:45:41.558-07:00Civilization would rapidly rebound after a catastrophe<div style="border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; color: #3f4549; font-family: Georgia, Times, serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 21px; margin-bottom: 15px; padding: 0px;">
<i>Here is a comment I wrote in response to an article. The article was asking whether industrial civilization could be reconstituted from scratch after a worldwide collapse. The author argues that it would be more difficult to rebuild, now that the best fossil fuels are depleted. I argue that it would be <b>easier </b>to industrialize the second time around. As follows:</i></div>
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I think that industrial civilization would be reconstituted fairly quickly, like within two centuries.</div>
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In my opinion, It would be<b> FAR</b> easier to industrialize the second time, despite fewer and worse fuels. Any reborn civilization would progress through the industrial revolution <b>far</b> faster, and far easier, than we did originally. That is because they would start with our technical knowledge, which would more than compensate for any degradation of fuel quality.</div>
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For the first 80 years, up until about 1790, steam engines had an efficiency of just 1%. Early steam engines lost 99% of their coal energy as waste heat. This was because nobody had <b>invented</b> the Watt engine, the Corliss engine, the Wilkonson boring machine, the compound engine, and the Parsons engine. Those basic inventions in steam technology increased the efficiency of steam engines from 1% to 15%. In other words, that basic technical knowledge allowed steam engines to obtain 15x as much power per unit of fuel. A triple expansion steam engine from 1890 is not much harder to manufacture than a Newcomen engine from 1790, but it provides 15x the work per unit of fuel. Simply <b>understanding </b>the basics of thermodynamics and how to build a more efficient steam engine, results in a 15x advantage.</div>
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Any reborn civilization would <b>start</b> with that knowledge. They would start with engines which produce 15x the power, per unit of fuel. That advantage would more than compensate for any degradation of fuel quality. Does coal really have 15x as much energy as charcoal? The answer is no.</div>
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If industrial civilization was able to advance with 1% efficient engines, then it would be able to advance with 15% efficient engines. That advantage would far outweigh any degradation of fuel quality.</div>
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As long as a few textbooks survive and those textbooks <b>describe</b> how to build such engines, then industrial civilization would bounce back fairly quickly. Any new industrial revolution would be far faster than the original one.</div>
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After that, if we retained even 15 textbooks about basic physics, chemistry, thermodynamics, electricity, inventions, and so on, it would be enough to bring us well into the 20th century fairly quickly.</div>
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(The original article, to which this was a response, is <a href="http://aeon.co/magazine/technology/could-we-reboot-civilisation-without-fossil-fuels/">here</a>.)</div>
Tomhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18396160316791132955noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7005412100005882053.post-3567433945931975092014-09-01T03:44:00.000-07:002014-09-08T23:36:19.877-07:00World trade is not endingPeak oilers and energy decline theorists both believed that world trade would rapidly come to an end around 2005. They believed that world trade would collapse as oil peaked and started declining, or as a consequence of declining ERoEI. This was one of the cornerstone beliefs of the peak oil and energy decline movements.<br />
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As usual, it was totally wrong. World trade did not collapse. In fact, the opposite happened. World trade, and especially ocean-going trade, has increased tremendously since that time. For example, the panama canal is now booked to capacity every single year, and must be expanded. The Suez canal must also be expanded.<br />
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In this article I will examine why world trade has not collapsed, and why it is not collapsing in the foreseeable future. I will divide my discussion into separate sections for the different modes of transportation (ships, trains, and trucks) and will explain why the transportation of cargo for that mode is not declining.<br />
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<h4>
SHIPS</h4>
Cargo transportation by ship will not decline in the foreseeable future. That's because ships are becoming more fuel-efficient at a rate of about 2% per year and will continue doing so for decades, thereby offsetting any declines in oil production.<br />
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To a significant extent, shipping companies <b>choose</b> the fuel efficiency they want. Shipping companies could easily order ships with twice the fuel efficiency as those of today. Or, they could order ships with half the fuel efficiency. Ships which are more fuel-efficient are more expensive, so are only worth it when fuel prices are high enough to justify the added cost of the more expensive ship. As fuel prices increase, however, shipping companies order more fuel-efficient ships, and thereby drive down the amount of fuel consumed per ton-mile, and offset the decline in oil production.<br />
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The fuel efficiency of ships is a function of their size and speed. Larger and slower ships are far more fuel efficient. By halving the speed of a ship, fuel consumption is reduced by 75% per ton-mile. Furthermore, by quadrupling the size of a ship, fuel consumption is reduced by another 50% per ton-mile. As a result, a ship which is 4x the size and half the speed, consumes only about 12.5% as much fuel per ton-mile.<br />
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Ships have been getting much larger and slower over the last few decades. As a result, the amount of fuel per ton-mile has been deceasing for decades, and continues to decrease. When oil prices tripled back around 2006, the largest shipping company (Maersk) responded by ordering the triple-E class of ships which consume half the fuel per ton-mile as the average long-distance ocean ship of today. Other shipping companies followed suit. By just ordering the same kind of ship for the next 30 years, shipping companies will reduce the amount of fuel per ton-mile by half over that period, as they gradually retire their older and less-efficient ships and replace them with more efficient ones.<br />
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As a result, even if oil peaked today and declined by 2% per year for the next 30 years, we could still deliver the same amount of cargo in 30 years as today, because of increases in fuel efficiency which are happening anyway and will offset declines in oil production. By just ordering the same kind of ships which they are ordering now, the fuel consumption per ton-mile will drop by half over the next 30 years as older and less-efficient ships are retired.<br />
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Of course, there is a limit to the fuel efficiency of ships. When ships are traveling at only 8 knots, it saves no fuel to slow down any further. Also, ships could only be made approximately 4x larger than those of today before they start to buckle under their own weight. As a result, it would be impossible to improve the fuel efficiency of ships by more than 8x relative to today.<br />
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However, that is still enough to offset any plausible declines in oil production, well into the future. Even if oil production peaks in 2020 and follows a bell-shaped Hubbert curve, the shipping industry will offset the declines of oil by increasing the efficiency of ships, until at least 2050.<br />
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Of course, it would be possible for shipping companies to <b>accelerate</b> the improvement of fuel efficiency if fuel became scarce, so the shipping industry could withstand greater than 2% yearly declines without a reduction in cargo ton-miles.<br />
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Even after oil production has peaked and declined by 80%, it still will pose no serious problem for the shipping industry. Ships fundamentally do not require oil for their propulsion. Ships can be built with <b>STEAM TURBINE</b> engines, and such engines do not require oil. Steam turbine engines can be designed to use virtually anything that will burn as fuel. Ships with steam turbines could use coal, gas, wood pellets, old newspapers, pelletized switchgrass, pelletized animal shit, sewage, corn husks, weeds, old paper plates, or whatever else. Steam turbine engines can also use very low-quality fossil fuels, such as oil shale (without extracting the oil), which are found in vastly greater quantities than crude oil ever was. Steam turbine engines were the most common kind of ship propulsion from 1950 to 1970, and could become so again. Since those ships can use almost any fuel, we are not running out of fuel for ships.<br />
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Some of the possible fuels are renewable, such as wood pellets or switchgrass. These fuels have an ERoEI of approximately 10 (or 3 if you subtract waste heat losses), making them only slightly worse than oil in terms of ERoEI. Such fuels can be grown indefinitely on marginal land.<br />
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<h4>
TRAINS</h4>
Cargo transportation by train is not ending. More likely, it will increase in the decades ahead.<br />
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Trains fundamentally do not require oil for their operation. Trains can easily operate using electricity from overhead wires. This is already the case in many parts of Europe and Russia. The technology to do this is <b>older</b> than the widespread adoption of internal combustion engines. As a result, we could gradually replace diesel-burning trains with electric ones and so remove oil as a fuel from train transport altogether.<br />
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Already, much of Europe has electrified its rail lines. Russia has already electrified the entire trans-Siberian route. A large fraction of cargo delivered by rail in the world is already propelled by electricity. This transition away from fossil fuels is already underway, and will gradually reduce and then eliminate the oil required for rail transportation.<br />
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The rail network could easily be expanded to come within 5 miles of 95% of the population. In fact, in 1910 in the US, the rail network was approximately three times longer than today, and actually did come within 5 miles of 95% of the population. There was a rail line going to almost every little town, in 1910. If we revive and electrify the rail network which existed in 1910, then cargo could be delivered to almost every town or city in the US without using any oil.<br />
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Bear in mind that the United States has vastly greater wealth, infrastructure spending, and manufacturing capability than it did in 1910. As a result, the rail network of that era could be revived much more easily than it was built. Europe would have an easier time still, because of higher population density.<br />
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It’s worth mentioning briefly that trains could be powered by reciprocating steam engines (like old-fashioned steam locomotives) which could use almost anything as fuel. Apparently, modern reciprocating steam engines can be about 18% efficient which is double what the old locomotives achieved in the 19th century. There is even an association in the USA that wishes to start making steam trains and powering them with “bio-coal” (apparently some kind of charcoal made from trees). Personally, I’m not sure it’s a viable idea, but if you’re a nostalgia buff then you might want to look at the coalition for sustainable rail (http://www.csrail.org/).<br />
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<h4>
TRUCKS</h4>
What about trucks? Long-haul trucking isn’t even necessary. In the United States, in 1910, most cargo was delivered by rail. The interstate highway system didn’t exist back then. In fact, long-haul trucking is fairly recent. As oil became cheaper, we gradually shifted from trains to trucks. When fuel becomes more expensive, we will gradually shift back the other way, from trucks to trains, thereby using less fuel.<br />
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If we revive the rail network from 1910, then long-distance trucking wouldn’t even be necessary. We could use short-haul battery-electric trucks to deliver goods the final few miles from the railway depot to the store. If it were necessary, we could also use trolley-trucks powered by electricity from overhead wires.<br />
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<h4>
CONCLUSIONS</h4>
We do not face significant declines in long-distance transport of cargo, over any time period, at least not from energy shortages. We have vastly more fuel than is required, and vastly more options than are required. We could increase the quantity of cargo delivered, far into the future, regardless of when oil peaks and starts declining. We could easily offset any plausible rate of oil decline, using obvious and well-understood technologies.<br />
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These adjustments will be carried out <b>automatically</b>, as the result of basic market mechanisms. As prices for one thing become higher, shipping companies automatically switch to something else. When it becomes cheaper to electrify rail, then rail is gradually electrified. Shipping and transport companies already carry out these calculations and procedures routinely. They already order ships or trains based upon fuel prices going forward, and thereby gradually adjust to changing fuel availability and cost. This is <b>already happening </b>and will continue to happen. Also, municipalities will allow the re-activation of long-dormant rail lines if fuel prices are high enough to require it. No action on your part is required to make this happen.<br />
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Peak oilers and energy decline theorists reached a different conclusion. They believed that world trade would collapse around 2005. However, they made four incorrect assumptions, as follows: 1) peak oil was imminent; 2) oil is the only fuel which can power long-distance transportation; 3) ships and trains cannot be any more efficient than they are today; 4) the mode of transportation used must be the same as today. All four of those assumptions were clearly and obviously wrong. Peak oil has not occurred yet. Even after peak oil has occurred, we could increase the efficiency of ships, and so offset oil declines for at least 4 decades. Even after oil has been practically exhausted, we could switch fuels, from oil to any number of other fuels. Furthermore, we could change the mode of transportation from trucking to rail. As a result, we do not face any inevitable decline in long-distance transport of goods, regardless of when oil peaks, or how rapid the decline is.<br />
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Of course, world trade may decline <i>slightly </i>or gradually in the future, for a variety of reasons. For example, it may become uneconomic to ship extremely bulky and inexpensive products (like iron ore) over long distances, since those products are barely worth shipping long distances now (they can be mined almost anywhere), and would become uneconomic to ship long distances with even slight increases in shipping costs. Also, there are other factors such as wars, depressions, and disasters which could decrease world trade. Furthermore, there is wage convergence, whereby wages in the third world are gradually catching up with those of the first world, which may reduce the volume of trade in the future. However, there will never be any abrupt drop-off in world trade because of energy shortages. World trade will remain more extensive than it was in 1990, far into the future, unless some genuinely unexpected event (like war) changes that.<br />
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<span style="font-size: xx-small;">(Note: This article was edited on Sept 7, 2014)</span><br />
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Tomhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18396160316791132955noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7005412100005882053.post-10237688336378470852014-07-27T16:32:00.000-07:002017-02-19T11:16:53.414-08:00Renewables have higher ERoEI than fossil fuels<div dir="ltr" style="margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 15px; line-height: 1.15; white-space: pre-wrap;">One the central claims of the peak oil/energy decline movement, is that renewable sources of power have extremely low <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_returned_on_energy_invested">ERoEI</a>. </span><span style="font-size: 15px; line-height: 1.15; white-space: pre-wrap;">Therefore, it is claimed, renewables are no substitute for fossil fuels, because they cannot provide enough “net energy” to power civilization. In support of this claim, energy decline adherents often post graphs like </span><a href="http://scitizen.com/cacheDirectory/HTMLcontributions/img/balloonchartic8.jpg" style="font-size: 15px; line-height: 1.15; white-space: pre-wrap;">this one</a><span style="font-size: 15px; line-height: 1.15; white-space: pre-wrap;">, showing that renewables (especially solar PV) have low ERoEI compared to fossil fuels. More recently, Hall and Prieto have published a book, </span><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Spains-Photovoltaic-Revolution-Investment-SpringerBriefs/dp/144199436X" style="font-size: 15px; line-height: 1.15; white-space: pre-wrap;">Spain's photovoltaic revolution</a><span style="font-size: 15px; line-height: 1.15; white-space: pre-wrap;">, in which they claim that the ERoEI of solar PV in Spain is only 2.45, which is far lower than the ERoEI of fossil fuels.</span></span></div>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br />In fact, those claims are entirely wrong. Renewables have ERoEI ratios which are generally comparable to, or higher than, fossil fuels. Although peak oilers reach a different conclusion, that is because they are carrying out the calculation incorrectly. They are ignoring or not including massive waste heat losses (generally 60% or more) from combustion engines which drastically reduces the ERoEI of fossil fuels. Those waste heat losses provide no energy services to society, and should be counted as losses, but are wrongly counted as "energy returns" by peak oilers. Furthermore, peak oilers are ignoring or not counting other large energy losses of fossil fuels. Those omissions exaggerate the ERoEI of fossil fuels relative to renewables. When the calculation is carried out correctly, renewables have higher ERoEI ratios than fossil fuels.<br /><br />In other words, the notion that renewables have ERoEI ratios which are lower than fossil fuels, is simply mistaken. It arises from performing invalid, apples-to-oranges comparisons, or from not counting energy losses of fossil fuels.</span><br />
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<h2 style="line-height: 1.15; margin-bottom: 0pt; margin-top: 0pt;">
<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-size: large;">Fossil fuels have very low ERoEI ratios</span></span></h2>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Take <a href="http://scitizen.com/cacheDirectory/HTMLcontributions/img/balloonchartic8.jpg">this graph</a> as an example. It compares the ERoEI of solar PV for <b>electrical power</b>, against the ERoEI of coal and gas for <b>heat</b>. That comparison is invalid, because it’s an apples-to-oranges comparison. Thermal power plants (like coal-burning plants) waste approximately 2/3ds of their energy as waste heat. Waste heat is radiated out into the atmosphere from the power plant, and provides no energy services to society. This massive energy loss from fossil fuels is<b> not counted </b>in that graph of ERoEI, thereby artificially inflating the ERoEI of fossil fuels. If we subtract the energy losses from conversion of thermal energy to electricity, then the ERoEI of fossil fuels declines by approximately 2/3rds relative to solar PV. Conversely, we could also increase the ERoEI of solar PV by approximately 3x, thereby providing an energy quality correction. As a result, the ERoEI for thermal power plants which generate electricity is approximately 2/3rds lower than the graph indicates, or (conversely) the ERoEI of solar PV is approximately 3x higher.<br /><br />It’s simply meaningless to compare the ERoEI of <b>electricity generation</b> from renewables, against the ERoEI of <b>heat</b> from fossil fuels, because heat is an extremely low-quality kind of energy which is far less capable of performing work. This is an elementary principle of thermodynamics. In order to convert heat to work, we must lose the vast majority of that heat as waste. For example, the vast majority of energy from fossil fuels is simply rejected as waste heat from power plants or internal combustion engines, and so shouldn’t be counted as an “energy return” in ERoEI calculations.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">In general, the ERoEI of fossil fuels is extremely low. Natural gas may have an ERoEI of 10, but that falls to 5 when considering the massive waste heat losses emitted from natural gas turbines (generally less than half of the energy in gas is converted to electricity). Coal may have an ERoEI of 30, but that declines to 10 when considering that coal power plants lose approximately 2/3rds of the energy of the coal as waste heat.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The ERoEI of oil is particularly low because it's used in inefficient internal combustion engines inside of vehicles. Most car engines lose about </span><b style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">80%</b><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> or more of the energy from gasoline, as waste heat, when you include both engine and transmission losses. As a result, the ERoEI of energy which actually </span><b style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">turns the wheels of the car</b><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> (rather than heating the outside atmosphere) is not 14.5 for oil, as commonly claimed, but only <b>2.9</b>.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br />Renewable sources of energy do not suffer from those tremendous losses. Although renewables sources of energy do suffer from power grid losses, those losses are minor (usually less than 5%).</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">As a result, the ERoEI ratios of renewable sources of power are often much higher than their fossil fuel counterparts. Wind turbines have an ERoEI of 18, compared to 10 for coal or 5 for natural gas. Solar PV panels powering battery-electric cars have an ERoEI of about 7 (deducting grid losses and recharging heat losses), compared to 2.9 for oil in gasoline-powered cars.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Incidentally, the extremely low ERoEI of oil for driving cars and trucks (2.9), refutes the notion that an ERoEI less than 8 would lead to the collapse of industrial civilization. That claim is extremely common in energy decline circles, but it was pulled out of thin air and was wrong to begin with for several other reasons. In fact, modern industrial civilization has been growing for decades (especially China and Korea) with ERoEIs far lower than 8.</span></div>
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<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-size: large;">Hall and Prieto’s criticism</span></span></h2>
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">More recently, a <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Spains-Photovoltaic-Revolution-Investment-SpringerBriefs/dp/144199436X">book</a> by Hall and Prieto, has become all the rage in energy decline circles. That book claims that the ERoEI of solar PV is grossly exaggerated. Hall and Prieto adjust the ERoEI of solar PV downwards, by adding all kinds of incidental energy costs. They add every incidental energy cost they can think of, like the energy costs of building fences around the solar farm, and so on. They even add energy costs for things like corporate management, security, taxes, fairs, exhibitions, notary public fees, accountants, and and so on (monetary costs are converted into energy by means of a formula). Sometimes, their estimates of those costs are absurdly high. According to Hall and Prieto, the ERoEI of solar PV is only 2.45 when all those things are added.<br /><br />Once again, the calculation is incorrect, and the comparison is invalid. Hall and Prieto are adding every incidental energy cost to solar that they can think of. However, such energy costs are <b>not included</b> in the ERoEI calculations of fossil fuels. For example, the ERoEI of oil does not include the costs of security in the middle east, or the costs of pipelines, tankers, tanker trucks, road wear from tanker trucks, construction of gas stations, energy costs of driving to the gas station to refuel, the highway patrol, and countless other things. If those costs were counted, then ERoEI of oil (which is already low, at 2.9, when including waste heat losses) would only decline further.<br /><br />It's necessary to perform an apples-to-apples comparison here. If we're going to add up every incidental energy cost of solar PV, then we must perform the <b>same procedure </b>for oil. Only then would we have a valid comparison.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">If you carry out a detailed accounting procedure for </span><b style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">both</b><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> solar and oil, then the ERoEI of oil will be even lower in comparison, than it already was. The incidental costs of oil are almost certainly higher than those for PV. Whereas oil is a scarce substance which requires massive extraction and transportation costs, silicon is the most abundant mineral in the Earth’s crust (sand, rocks) and does not require expensive or elaborate techniques of extraction or transportation. Whereas oil comes from unstable regions and requires massive security and military costs, silicon requires only a few security cameras. Whereas oil is subject to ongoing transportation costs, silicon needs to be transported only once during the lifetime of the solar cells. In general, the incidental costs of oil are far higher than those for solar PV. As a result, if we include those incidental costs in both cases, the adjusted ERoEI of oil will be even lower in comparison than it already was.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br />Again, when you perform valid, apples-to-apples comparisons, the ERoEI of solar PV is higher than that of oil or natural gas. Oil for transportation in cars has an ERoEI of only 2.9 (because of waste heat losses), but that is before we include incidental costs such as security, infrastructure, and so on, so oil’s total ERoEI would only decline, and would likely be lower than 2.<br /><br />Hall and Prieto’s analysis is mistaken in other ways. Their estimate of 2.45 for PV is certainly far too low. They include things like taxes and land leases, which are not energy costs, but redistributions of money. Taxes provide services for society, so they should be counted as energy returns, not energy costs. If taxes in Europe on gasoline were counted as an energy cost, then the ERoEI of oil there would certainly fall to below 1. Also, Hall and Prieto include massive energy costs for premature retirement of solar cells because of rapidly advancing technology, but those cells won't be prematurely retired because they are paid for in advance and almost free to operate at that point, regardless of their efficiency compared to newer panels (newer panels would simply be <b>added</b> for future projects). Also, Prieto and Hall include things like administrative expenses, employees’ salaries, and so on, using a formula for converting dollars to energy which is far too high and is just wrong. You would obtain a far lower figure by </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">converting salaries to energy using a more reasonable formula, of dividing the entire energy expenditure of a country by its entire GDP in order to obtain a conversion factor.</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /><br />A correct calculation of the the ERoEI of solar PV including everything, would be more like 6, not 2.45. You can derive this figure by removing everything from Hall and Prieto’s analysis which is not an energy cost (such as taxes or land leases), and by using a more reasonable formula to convert monetary costs to energy.</span><br />
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<span style="background-color: transparent; color: black; font-family: "arial"; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="font-size: large;">Conclusions</span></span></h2>
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">In short. Renewables generally have higher ERoEI ratios than their fossil fuel counterparts. When you carry out a valid, apples-to-apples comparison, the ERoEI of renewables is generally better. This is because the ERoEI of fossil fuels is actually very poor--generally less than 5--when you correctly subtract the massive waste heat losses of combustion engines, and also subtract the massive incidental costs (such as security costs) of fossil fuels.<br /><br />The only circumstance where fossil fuels have a higher ERoEI for renewables is when generating heat for smelting of ores or making cement or glass. That’s because such applications do not take place inside inefficient combustion engines, and so don't require subtracting the enormous waste heat losses of such engines. As a result, such applications still favor fossil fuels. Coal has a much higher ERoEI for this purpose than solar thermal plants, and (more importantly) is much cheaper. However, those uses are only a small fraction of total energy usage. Those uses will probably be the last energy uses which are converted from fossil fuels to other sources of energy, possibly more than 100 years from now.<br /><br />Not that ERoEI matters much anyway. The whole idea is a mistake. What matters is the cost (in money) of net energy, for an energy source. If the cost of net energy is low, then the ERoEI is just totally unimportant. For example, if it were possible to build a 1 GW fusion power plant very easily out of duct tape for only $10, then it wouldn’t matter at all if it had an ERoEI of less than 2. We could just <b>build more of them,</b> and thereby produce the same amount of net energy as a higher-ERoEI (but more expensive) energy source. As long as an energy source has an ERoEI higher than 1, the ERoEI ceases to matter, and what matters is the total cost of net energy. This is discussed further <a href="http://bountifulenergy.blogspot.com/2010/09/eroi-doesnt-matter.html">here</a>.</span><br />
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Tomhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18396160316791132955noreply@blogger.com50tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7005412100005882053.post-29657794678388293662012-12-25T03:47:00.000-08:002013-07-27T16:54:15.907-07:00New Year Predictions<br />
<h2>Introduction</h2>
In this article I will offer some of my own predictions for what the future holds, with regard to energy supplies. I have three reasons for doing this. First, I wish to provide an alternative set of predictions which does not commit any of the errors of the peak oil camp. Second, I wish to provide a set of predictions which does not assume either business as usual OR collapse, thereby avoiding the "either-or" thinking prevalent in peak oil circles which posits that either business as usual must continue (impossible) or we must collapse to a pre-industrial state. Third, I wish to counteract the notion (very common in peak oil circles) that economists or students of economics assume that the world is infinite or extends to infinity in all directions, or that new resources magically appear as a consequence of demand. By offering these predictions, I hope to provide material which hasn't been considered by peak oil adherents, because of their unfortunate tendency to ascribe magic-infinite beliefs to all those who do not accept their conclusions.<br />
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Unfortunately, I cannot give all my reasons for believing the predictions I'll put forth here. Each prediction would require an essay-length treatment. For example, my prediction regarding ocean shipping would require an explanation of the basic physics of ships, of the alternative fuels available, of the time required to build a new fleet of ships, of capital expenses, of the methods that ship buyers use to calculate the size and speed of new ships, of basic optimization problems, and so on.<br />
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Although I can't give a fully detailed explanation of my reasons (because I don't write peak oil blogs for a living), I still can give my reasons in overview, or explain briefly why I think something is the case. For example, I can explain that ship builders could easily build ships that are more than 5x as fuel-efficient as today, but it only becomes cost-effective to do so when fuel is more expensive than now; that ship builders pick the most cost-effective ship given their anticipations about the future prices of fuel; that we have more than enough time to transition the shipping fleet to more efficient ships; and that these things imply that ocean shipping will not increase by more than 15% in the long run because that is how much the costs would increase with a tripling of oil prices, and if oil prices increased by more than that then shipping companies would switch to alternative fuels like anhydrous ammonia which do not require any fossil fuels. This degree of explanation is possible here.<br />
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I will offer basic reasons along with each of my predictions. In some cases, I will leave out the basic explanation when I feel it's fairly obvious.<br />
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With that in mind, here are my predictions for the future.<br />
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<h2>Predictions</h2>
Oil production will peak and start declining some time in the next 12 years (before 2025). I gather this figure from Jean Lahererre. Please note that prior predictions from peak oil pessimists, and from people using linearization methods, have been quite incorrect. Nevertheless, I will make a worst-case assumption here, and will assume that peak oilers finally get it right. Once the declines begin, oil will decline at less than 1% per year for the first decade or more.<br />
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Similarly, coal and natural gas will both peak before 2100 and will decline gradually thereafter.<br />
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A few years before the peak of oil, speculators will detect that oil production is nearing its peak. The speculators will immediately bid up the price of oil to over $200/barrel*. This could happen fairly rapidly, like within 2 years. Speculators will bid up the price of oil to what they believe the longer-term price will be. Speculators do this because they make money by anticipating things, thereby moving forward the date of price increases, and prompting the transition to alternatives long before any declines have actually occurred. I'll assume (for simplicity and convenience) that gasoline will cost $7/gal* after at the pump after the initial increase, in the USA, and will cost more in European countries where petrol taxes are higher. It's possible that the price of gasoline will briefly go higher than this.<br />
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Once the price of oil has increased, the world economy will accelerate its gradual shift from oil to other sources of energy for transportation. Also, the world economy will accelerate its gradual shift to more fuel-efficient kinds of transportation. Ships will become larger and slower, and thereby much more fuel-efficient. Trains will displace trucks to some extent, and new track will be laid. Cars will become more fuel efficient. Plug-in hybrids will become common. Eventually, transportation will be electrified. This is because the entire economy <b>automatically and always transitions</b> to the next-best alternative when something becomes too expensive.<br />
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The price of oil will eventually level off and will never go higher than $200/barrel* for long, because prices higher than that will cause car makers to switch to battery-electric drivetrains, thereby driving the price back down. Higher prices will also cause cargo carriers to switch fuels, electrify, and switch modes (like from trucks to trains), thereby driving the price back down.<br />
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Once oil has been declining for a few years, further declines will be accompanied, simultaneously, by improved efficiency, fuel switching, and greater electrification. The long-term price of oil will hover around the cost of its next-best alternative energy source and carrier (batteries in cars), continuously, until oil is nearly exhausted, 100+ years from now. There may be temporary periods of higher prices, however the price of oil will <b>always</b> ultimately revert to the cost of its next best alternative energy source and carrier.<br />
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In the long run, the economy will <b>adjust in the best manner possible</b> to much higher oil prices. This is <b>not the same</b> as saying that resources are infinite. It implies that people will drive plug-in hybrids and will end up paying modestly more for personal transportation. Cargo shipping will cost slightly more. That is all.<br />
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<h2>More detailed predictions</h2>
I wish to go into further detail about these predictions. However, from this point forward it will be necessary to divide my predictions into SHORT-RUN and LONG-RUN predictions. By SHORT-RUN I mean that period of time which is shorter than the replacement time for the auto fleet (like 15 years), plus the amount of time necessary to shift production lines to more efficient cars. By LONG-RUN I mean that period after all transportation sectors have turned over their fleet of engines, ships, cars, trains, etc.<br />
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It's necessary to divide predictions into short-run and long-run predictions, because there will be a period during which we transition to a more efficient transportation infrastructure. There will be a period during the transition, and a period after the transition, and the economy will look different during these two periods. After declines have begun, however, car manufacturers will anticipate further declines.<br />
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There will be a transition period because people and firms will not correctly anticipate the date of peak oil or the amount of price increases. This is because the exact date of peak oil is essentially uncertain, and also because consumers do not anticipate things, but essentially just respond to changing circumstances as they occur.<br />
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<h2>The short-run effects of high oil prices</h2>
In the short run, the abrupt increase in oil prices, caused by speculators, will trigger a nasty recession.<br />
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The world economy will eventually recover from the recession and continue growing <b>even though</b> oil prices will never return to their prior levels, and even though oil production will never again increase to its prior levels. Economic growth does not require increasing oil extraction.<br />
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At that point, car manufacturers will scramble to increase production of ultra-light cars, hybrids, plug-in hybrids, electrics, etc. Car manufacturers will take more than 5 years to shift their production to more fuel-efficient cars. Car manufacturers will "aim ahead" and will transition to producing cars which they think are appropriate for the longer run, given further gradual declines in oil supplies. This is because firms attempt to anticipate, just like with the Y2K bug. They may be imperfect at this, but they will anticipate further declines once declines have begun.<br />
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During the transition to more fuel-efficient cars, many people will be stuck with old gas guzzlers which are then obsolete. There will be an "interim period" of about 10 years during which many people drive old cars which get less than 30 mpg. Some of these people will need to curtail discretionary travel, like long-distance road trips, because fuel will be too expensive. Those people will need to drive somewhat less until they can replace their gas guzzlers with new and more fuel-efficient cars. Eventually (within 14 years) most of the car fleet will have shifted to much more fuel-efficient cars, and to plug-in cars. At that point, if there are further declines in oil supplies which are more rapid than car manufacturers had anticipated, then a few consumers will have to curtail discretionary longer-distance transportation (in other words, they will be limited to the range of their batteries some of the time).<br />
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<h2>The long run-effects of high oil prices (30 years after the peak)</h2>
In the long run (30 years after the peak) the entire transportation infrastructure will have been converted to more efficient modes of transportation, and to alternative energy sources.<br />
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In the long run, $7/gal* gasoline will make very little difference for first-world living standards. The economy will <b>adjust</b> to higher oil prices. Cars will require far less gasoline to travel a given distance, and will be able to travel a considerable distance without any gasoline at all. When this transition has occurred, the nastiest effects of peak oil will have passed.<br />
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In 30 years, personal transportation will be modestly different. A few more people will take public transportation. Most drivers will have plug-in hybrids that look like priuses.<br />
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The total cost of automobile transportation will be slightly higher than today. After the car fleet has transitioned to plug-in hybrids, the average person will pay about $50/month* more for driving a car than they do now, even with $7/gal* gasoline. This figure of $50/month increase is derived from the additional cost which prius-like plug-in hybrids impose, assuming that battery costs come down somewhat as a result of both mass manufacture and technological innovation, and that gasoline costs $7/gal* and people drive 1000 miles per month, on average. (People will drive 750 miles per month using batteries and 250 miles using gasoline. The cars will get 60 mpg when using gasoline, so gasoline costs will be $30/month, plus another $40/month for electricity, which is much cheaper than we pay for fuel now. However, the savings on fuel will be more than offset by a $6000 increase in the cost of the car).<br />
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Cargo transport by sea will be change a bit. Shipping companies will switch to ships which are much larger, and which travel at 2/3rds the speed of current ships. Shipping companies will do this because they are <b>always</b> replacing old ships with the most cost-effective new ships for what they anticipate fuel costs will be for the next 20 years. These decisions will cause a 60% reduction in fuel consumption per tonne-mile, while increasing the capital expenses of the shipping fleet by a modest amount. The ultimate result will be a very small increase (less than 15%) in shipping costs, per tonne-mile.<br />
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The figure for cost increases (~15%) is easily derived by looking at the additional capital cost of ships which use 1/3rd the fuel, and assuming 3x more expensive fuel and slightly higher operating expenses. You can look up a few basic figures and then solve a basic optimization problem using Calculus 1 to figure it out. I have not bothered to do this, however I can "eyeball estimate" what the approximate result would be. Shipping companies will <b>figure it out</b> since they know more about the topic than you and I, and they carry out optimization problems like that <b>routinely</b>. Their price of fuel will never increase by more than 3x in the long run since synthetic fuels are then much cheaper, thereby encouraging switching and driving down the price of oil, and this implies that total costs for ocean shipping will not increase beyond 15% in the long run.<br />
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Shipping companies may also switch fuels at some point, to natural gas or to coal (with steam turbines).<br />
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Cargo transport by land will change a bit. More cargo will be transported by rail, and less by truck, because rail uses about 1/4th the energy per tonne-mile. New rail will be laid. Trucks may have 3 or 4 trailers and may travel at slower speeds, thereby reducing fuel consumption. Other innovations are possible, such as trolley-trucks. Some rail ways will be electrified. Ultimately, costs of cargo transport by land will increase modestly, but definitely not more than 25% per tonne-mile.<br />
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The increases in shipping costs (both land and ocean) will cause negligible increases in the cost of transported goods. For example, a pair of shoes will cost about $0.15* more. Food will cost very slightly more.<br />
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Plastic will become more expensive and rarer. Food packagers will switch to other materials, such as glass bottles, aluminum cans, cardboard boxes, etc. Clothing and toy manufacturers will switch to other materials, such as silicone, rubber, canvas, and other materials not derived from fossil fuels.<br />
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Air travel will be considerably more expensive than today, perhaps more than 40% more expensive. This will be the most visible and dramatic long-term effect of declining oil supplies.<br />
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Competition from Chinese people for oil supplies will cause <b>far</b> more rapid declines in the supplies available to Westerners during the next 20 years than any geological constraints.<br />
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Ultimately, we have the technology available to us today, to reduce fuel consumption by more than half without any reduction in miles traveled per person, or or any reduction in cargo tonne-miles. We could simply switch car production to prius-like cars (thereby doubling mpg) and use more trains and larger ships. The market economy will <b>optimize </b>a solution which is at least as good as this.<br />
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<h2>The very long-run effects of fossil fuel depletion (After all fossil fuels have been exhausted, 100+ years from now)</h2>
People will ride in battery-electric cars. Energy for the cars will come from solar power plants, wind turbines, and nuclear power plants.<br />
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Electric power generation will shift to nuclear plants and renewable plants. This will happen smoothly and without any major disruption, since the entire fleet of power plants will be replaced several times in the interim, and power companies order new plants based upon anticipation of the cost of fuel over the next 20 years. Prices for electricity will probably be lower than today, because renewable energy costs are decreasing over time and already are not much higher than prices for fossil fuel plants.<br />
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Total energy production worldwide will be far higher than today, despite a concomitant decline of fossil fuels. This is because China and India are growing rapidly and ultimately do not require any fossil fuels to continue that growth.<br />
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Ships will use anhydrous ammonia for fuel, I would guess (speculative). The ammonia will be derived from wind power, taken from stranded wind resources. Overall, ocean shipping will cost slightly more than it does today.<br />
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Truck transportation will be rarer. There will be far more rail in the world, and far less truck transportation. Very large retail outlets (like Wal-Mart etc) might have their own rail terminals (obviously this is very speculative).<br />
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Housing will have better insulation and will make greater use of "passive heating" techniques.<br />
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The world economy will have gone through many recessions. Each time, the economy will recover, and will continue growing despite a near-total exhaustion of all fossil fuels.<br />
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The average temperature of the surface of the earth will be 4 degrees centigrade warmer.<br />
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In 100 years, most people in the world will have first-world living standards, despite the exhaustion of fossil fuels. Fossil fuels are not needed for economic growth. In fact, fossil fuels are not needed for any purpose. They are the cheapest fuels right now. That is all.<br />
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<h2>No Disruptions Will Ever Occur</h2>
Most importantly. There will <b>NEVER BE ANY MAJOR DISRUPTION</b> to industrial civilization as a result of declining supplies of fossil fuels. More specifically, there will never be any major disruption to food supplies, food transport, electricity production, or any other essential thing, in any industrialized country, as a result of declining fossil fuel supplies.**<br />
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The economy <b>transitions to alternatives</b> when it's appropriate to do so. There <b>are alternatives</b> for every use of fossil fuels, and the economy will use them when the time is right. The economy transitions <b>very reliably, like clockwork</b>. It is <b>always transitioning</b>, even right now, and it will <b>continue</b> to do so as fossil fuels decline.<br />
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Long-distance transport of goods will never end. Long-distance transport consumes less than 5% of all oil supplies now, so it wouldn't be sacrificed during the next 100 years even if oil were the only possible fuel. However, oil is <b>not </b>the only possible fuel, since ships and trains can easily use other fuels such as synthetic fuels or electrification (for trains). As a result, there is more than enough time to transition (100+ years), and more than enough alternatives to do so.<br />
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Industrial growth will continue despite the decline of fossil fuels. This is because fossil fuels are not needed for industrial growth. Growth could occur with any source of energy which returns more than was required to obtain the energy. For example, it is entirely possible to use a single solar thermal plant to smelt the ores, melt the glass, and manufacture the synthetic fuels needed to build five more solar thermal plants, and so on. As a result, industrial growth does not require any fossil fuels and has never required any. Fossil fuels were selected first because they were cheapest.<br />
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The economy has <b>more than ten times</b> as much time as required to transition to alternatives, while avoiding any disruption of essential services. In fact, the economy could reduce its consumption of oil by 90% within 10 years without any risk of collapse. Transitioning that quickly would impose severe restrictions on personal travel in the interim (such as fuel rationing) until new vehicles were built, but would pose no risk of collapse. There are two reasons the economy would avoid collapse in this case: 1) the economy sacrifices the most important things last; and 2) the economy starts transitioning right away to alternatives. Thus, even if we underwent a 90% reduction in oil supplies over ten years, there would be absolutely no risk of collapse, because 10% oil supplies are more than enough to provide essential services (~3% for tractors, food transport, public transport) and to provide for the remainder of the transition at the same time (building an electric transportation infrastructure).<br />
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I realize this point requires far more elaboration. Look at it this way: look up the amount of energy used by truly essential purposes in the US economy (i.e. food production and transport, etc). Could you devise a way to transition to trolley-buses and trolley-trucks throughout suburbia while continuing essential services? Try to think of ways to avert collapse with 10% oil supplies. What if you banished all personal auto transport, except to and from work in carpools? What if you diverted all construction resources to rapidly putting up wooden poles (like old telephone poles) with cables strung between them for trolley buses, throughout suburbia? If this were done in parallel everywhere, and you employed 25% of the population in doing only that, how long would it take to have working trolley-bus service almost everywhere? How much steel is made right now, and how much electrical cable could be built per year for the trolley buses? If all lumber were diverted to poles, how many could we make? Wouldn't it be possible to convert the densest suburban areas to electrical transport first, within a few years, thereby freeing up some of the 10% oil supplies for additional purposes almost right away? Couldn't we replace the wooden poles with sturdier structures once the new infrastructure was going? Also, could we build natural gas cars for rural residents within 10 years? How many cars do we build now, and how different are natural gas cars? How long would it take us to build synthetic fuel plants, at the same time as our trolley-bus system? Could that also be done with the 10% oil budget? The answers to these questions are fairly basic. We could build enough of an alternative transportation infrastructure within a few years. We could produce enough steel, poles, and trolley-buses within 3 years to transition enough of the economy to an alternative transportation infrastructure. Not to mention, we could start mass-manufacture of natural gas vehicles almost right away since they are nearly identical to the vehicles constructed now. These sudden changes would be at massive cost, and tremendous inconvenience, and would require the abandonment of much capital equipment; but it would avoid any possibility of collapse. Bear in mind that the petroleum shortage would start easing as soon as <i>any fraction</i> of our hypothetical alternative infrastructure was complete.<br />
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If you can figure out a way to avoid collapse, off the top of your head, the economy will do that or something better. The economy is like a giant learning machine. It optimizes, evolves, and finds solutions. That is how our economy got to this point. That is how the network of rail lines, mines, factories, suppliers, sub-contractors, fiber optic lines, retail stores, etc, developed in the first place and operates now. If the economy were so stupid that it cannot manage a simple optimization and reallocation problem, then the economy would collapse within a month, regardless of peak oil. The problems entailed by just operating the economy now, are <b>vastly</b> more complicated and difficult than the problems of adjusting to peak oil.<br />
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Again, there will not be any disruption of essential services in first-world countries due to peak oil. Anyone who claims there will be, is badly misunderstanding the speed with which the economy could adjust, how it adjusts, the alternatives available, and the likely pace of fossil fuel declines. Any serious analysis of these matters would not permit even the minutest chance of collapse due to fossil fuel declines.<br />
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<h2>Alternative Possibilities</h2>
Of course, I can't really predict the future. I'm relying upon certain assumptions while making predictions, and those assumptions may turn out to be incorrect. If some of my assumptions are incorrect, then obviously my predictions above would be incorrect to some extent also.<br />
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My major assumptions are as follows.<br />
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First, I am assuming that we don't suffer unpredictable disasters like a nuclear war, or an emergent disease which kills of 90% of the population, or a meteor strike which decimates the biosphere, or any other similar disaster. Things like that are non-linear and essentially impossible to anticipate. Obviously if any of them occurred, then we could have an interruption to civilization. I am only claiming that <b>fossil fuel depletion</b> will never cause any interruption. <br />
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Second, I have assumed that oil will soon peak and decline. In effect, I have graciously granted this point, and am willing to accept the prognostications of ASPO and Jean Laherrere about future oil production. I should point out, however, that their prior predictions have been overly pessimistic, and quite incorrect. Also, their predictions are controversial. There are petroleum analysts who believe we'll be able to exploit the massive resources of unconventional oil such as tar sands and shale. Were this to happen, then petroleum prices might inch up gradually over decades (in fits and spurts, to be sure) and the economy would face only a gradual transition to alternatives, without the irritating "transition period" described above. In this case, auto manufacturers would have more than enough time to transition production to more efficient cars, and there would never be any irritating "transition period". In this case, my predictions above would be too pessimistic, and we might never face anything more severe than slight recession and modestly higher prices as we transition to alternatives to oil.<br />
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Third, I have assumed that there will be no major technological developments in the ensuing years. To be more specific, I have assumed that batteries and other energy storage devices remain at their present level of development. Clearly, this may not be true. Someone may invent the better battery one day, and I have no way of predicting whether this will occur. If a better battery were invented, then the economy could transition off of oil before the peak even occurs, in which case peak oil would be a complete non-event of no interest to anybody except toy manufacturers and airlines, who would then face a century-long transition to other materials or fuels. Or, if the better battery were invented after peak oil, then we could return to "energy guzzling" cars again.<br />
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<h2>Summary</h2>
<ul>
<li>Oil may peak and decline before 2025.</li>
<li>If that happened, oil prices would increase fairly rapidly to over $200/barrel.</li>
<li>In the SHORT RUN, this would cause:</li>
<ul>
<li>A nasty recession</li>
<li>An "interim" period, during which some vehicles are "gas guzzlers" relative to what is then required. This "interim period" will last until the car fleet can be transitioned to plug-in hybrids.</li>
<li>People who own these "gas guzzlers" will need to curtail discretionary travel, and drive less, until they can buy a more fuel-efficient car.</li>
</ul>
<li>In the LONG RUN, peak oil will cause:</li>
<ul>
<li>Very little difference.</li>
<li>People will drive prius-like plug-in hybrids</li>
<li>People will pay about $50/month* more for car transportation.</li>
<li>Slight (meaning barely perceptible) increases in the cost of goods due to increased shipping costs</li>
<li>Plastic will be rarer for food packaging, cases for electronics, and toys. Other materials (silicone, aluminum, paper, cardboard, glass) will become more common for these purposes.</li>
</ul>
<li>In the VERY LONG RUN, the exhaustion of all fossil fuels will cause:</li>
<ul>
<li>Very little difference in day-to-day living compared to continued fossil fuels. Obviously there will be major technological changes in that time, but most changes in day-to-day living won't be imposed by declining supplies of fossil fuels.</li>
<li>Energy and transportation prices will be slightly higher _per person_</li>
<li>Energy will come from renewable sources</li>
</ul>
<li>There will never be any major disruption, to any essential services, in any
industrialized country, over any time period, due to declining fossil fuel supplies</li>
<ul>
<li>The economy adjusts rationally to declining fossil fuel supplies</li>
<li>We have more than 10x longer than would be required to adjust to declining fossil fuels</li>
<li>Peak oil poses absolutely no risk of collapse</li>
</ul>
<li>If APSO's projections about oil supplies are incorrect, and we exploit the large amount of unconventional oil resources, then the transition away from oil could be very gradual and may never pose any difficulty more serious that mild recession and modestly higher prices.
</ul>
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* Throughout this article, the prices quoted are in 2012 US Dollars. Obviously they could be much higher in the future because of inflation.</div>
** Of course there will be transient disruptions to electricity grids, etc. There will be brown outs and other things, which happen all the time and have always happened. I'm claiming there will be no sustained, severe interruption.<br />
*** NOTE: I made several minor modifications to this article as of July, 2013, as follows: I took a more negative stance on the prior predictions of ASPO etc in light of recent events. I also clarified the section about the interim period, by adding the word "discretionary".
Tomhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18396160316791132955noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7005412100005882053.post-66230526548015437362012-01-04T22:49:00.000-08:002014-11-08T11:03:07.335-08:00Renewables do not require a fossil fuel subsidy<br />
Recently I was reading the comments at the excellent blog, <a href="http://physics.ucsd.edu/do-the-math">do the math</a>, when I found this claim:<br />
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
"Solar and wind capturing devices are not alternative energy sources. They are extensions of the fossil fuel supply."</blockquote>
<br />
This claim is similar to the "fossil fuel subsidy" argument, which crops up very frequently in peak oil forums. Basically, the argument is that renewables are "subsidized" by fossil fuels, because renewables are built using energy from fossil fuels. For example, windmills require coal to smelt the iron ore, to extract aluminum from their oxides, and so on. So it could be said that windmills were "subsidized" by coal, and could not have existed independently.<br />
<br />
The argument is incorrect. While it is true that the <i>first generation</i> of rewnewable plants would have a "coal subsidy", any <i>subsequent</i> power plants would have a "renewable subsidy". That is because we build everything using the <i>prior</i> energy source. Once renewables are established, we will use <i>them</i> to smelt ores, extract aluminum oxides, manufacture parts for renewable plants, and so on. Thus we do not have a permanent fossil fuel subsidy; instead, we have a <i>fossil fuel ladder</i>, which we use and then kick away.<br />
<br />
The transition from coal "subsidy" to renewable "subsidy" will happen automatically, as a result of basic market mechanisms. When renewable electricity and heat are cheaper and more prevalent than coal, they will also be cheaper sources of energy to manufacture subsequent power plants.<br />
<br />
Of course, the transition away from the coal "subsidy" will not happen all at once. What really will happen, is that the first renewable plant will have a 100% coal subsidy for its construction, then each additional renewable plant will have a declining coal subsidy and increasing renewable subsidy, until the coal subsidy reaches zero.<br />
<br />
As an example, look at early industrialism. The energy for early industrialism came from British coal. British coal “subsidized” the subsequent energy sources, even those in the USA. Does that mean we can never transition away from British coal? Does that mean all power is subsidized by British coal? Why didn’t civilization collapse as British coal declined?<br />
<br />
Here is another example. The initial metals for early industrialism were smelted using charcoal, from WOOD. Thus, coal had a “charcoal subsidy”. Does it <i>still</i> have a charcoal subsidy? Do all subsequent power sources also have a charcoal subsidy? What about the subsequent nuclear plants? Do they have a charcoal subsidy? No. Charcoal was the first step; it provided a subsidy <i>once</i>.<br />
<br />
Of course there is also the issue of oil. Oil subsidizes renewables because oil is used to power the mining machinery. However, even oil is replaceable with renewables. We can substitute batteries, or can manufacture hydrocarbons using the fischer-tropsch process. At some point this will be cheaper than diesel fuel from oil, because diesel fuel will become more expensive and batteries less expensive.<br />
<br />
The "subsidy" argument has already repeatedly failed in the past. <b>Every </b>source of energy was subsidized by the prior one. Coal was originally subsidized by WOOD (charcoal) because steam engines originally ran using wood. Oil extraction was subsidized by coal, because the components of early oil wells were manufactured using coal. Natural gas was subsidized by oil and coal. Nuclear power was subsidized by coal and oil. At present, in France, about 5 million cars per year are manufactured which have a <b>nuclear subsidy, </b>because part of the energy for their manufacture came from nuclear power plants. In this case, a fossil fuel-burning engine has a nuclear subsidy.<br />
<br />
Does this mean it's impossible to transition from one energy source to another? <b>No.</b> We have already transitioned between energy sources, repeatedly, despite subsidies. The subsidy is <b>temporary.</b><br />
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In conclusion. Fossil fuels are not necessary for any purpose. They were a cheap and easy first step; that is all. Fossil fuels are like a ladder we used to climb upwards to industrial civilization, but now we could kick the ladder away.<br />
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Tomhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18396160316791132955noreply@blogger.com9